

345097

JPRS-CPS-84-067

12 October 1984

China Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

Approved for public release;
Distribution Unlimited

19980226 074

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3

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12 October 1984

CORRECTED COPY

CHINA REPORT
POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

CONTENTS

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

UNITED STATES

Kissinger on World Situation, Sino-U.S. Ties
(LIAOWANG, No 34, 20 Aug 84)..... 1

SOVIET UNION

PRC Tourist Group Visit to USSR
(Moscow in Mandarin to China, 1, 2 Sep 84)..... 4

19 August Arrival
1 September Departure

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

XINHUA Analyzes Canadian Political Situation
(Gu Yaoming; XINHUA, 29 Aug 84)..... 7

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Opposing Subjectivism Emphasized for Party Consolidation
(Liu Zhigang; SHEHUI KEXUE, No 3, 25 Jun 84)..... 10

Socialist Humanitarianism Discussed
(Wang Enyi; YUNNAN SHEHUI KEXUE, No 4, Jul 84)..... 13

Beijing Holds Reunification Theme Concert
(XINHUA, 8 Sep 84)..... 23

Minority Areas Forge Ahead in Development (XINHUA, 11 Sep 84).....	24
Popularization of Adult Education Urged (Yao Zhongda; LIAOWANG, No 23, 4 Jun 84).....	25
Education Achievements in Past 35 Years Reviewed (XINHUA, 17 Sep 84).....	27
XINHUA Reports Book Publication Over 35 Years (XINHUA, 19 Sep 84).....	29
XINHUA Examines Chinese Cinema Industry (XINHUA, 21 Sep 84).....	31
Modern Chinese Novels Published in Collection (XINHUA, 19 Sep 84).....	33
Album Published of Scholars Who Studied in West (XINHUA, 18 Sep 84).....	35
PRC Statesman on Policies Toward Xizang (XINHUA, 17 Sep 84).....	36
Briefs	
Festival Resumed After Suspension	38
Pilots From Minority Nationalities Trained	38
Intellectuals to Show Moral Courage	38
Communist Youth League Growth Outlined	39

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

EAST REGION

Briefs	
Shanghai Rural Education	40
Shanghai Urban Area Expansion	40

SOUTHWEST REGION

Party Consolidation Achieves Progress in Yunnan (YUNNAN RIBAO, 26 Jul 84).....	41
---	----

NORTHWEST REGION

Second Phase of Party Consolidation Begins in Shaanxi (Zheng Gang; SHAANXI RIBAO, 23 Jul 84).....	42
--	----

Resolutions of Ningxia CPPCC Reported (NINGXIA RIBAO, 26 Jul 84).....	43
--	----

MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY AFFAIRS

Xian Establishes Antiaircraft Artillery Reserve Force (XIAN WANBAO, 26 Jul 84).....	45
--	----

TAIWAN

Taiwan Paper Hails Relations With Arab World (Editorial; CHINA POST, 16 Sep 84).....	48
Taiwan Premier Visits European Products Exhibit (CNA, 7 Sep 84).....	50
Taiwan President's Speech at Asia-Pacific Meeting (CNA, 16 Sep 84).....	51
CHINA POST Editorial Marks Armed Forces Day (CHINA POST, 6 Sep 84).....	53
Navy Watching Japanese Fishing Near Pengchia (CNA, 20 Sep 84).....	55
Commentary Replies to Remarks by U.S. Officer (CNA, 10 Sep 84).....	56
Commentary Says 'Republic of China' Proper Name (CNA, 7 Sep 84).....	58
Briefs	
European Studies Meeting	60
Military Accelerates Research, Development	60

HONG KONG MEDIA ON CHINA

Xu Jiatun's 'Policy Decision, Practice' (Lu Chuan-chi; CHENG MING, No 83, 1 Sep 84).....	61
Communist Party on China, Military Relations Examined (Zhang Ming; CHENG MING, No 81, Jul 84).....	68
Background of Geng Biao, Huang Hua Incident Discussed (Zhu Yuan; CHENG MING, No 81, Jul 84).....	75

CHIU-SHIH NIEN-TAI Articles Examine PLA, Hong Kong (CHIU-SHIH NIEN-TAI, Jul 84).....	81
---	----

Editor's Preface
Stationing of Troops, by Qi Xin
PLA Described, by Mu Fu
Personal Story, by Liang Liyi
Military Dependents, by Li Huiru
Special Economic Zone, by Yu Jiwen

UNITED STATES

KISSINGER ON WORLD SITUATION, SINO-U.S. TIES

HK071326 Beijing LIAOWANG in Chinese No 34, 20 Aug 84 pp 11-12

["Special Interview" from Washington by Peng Di [1756 6611] and Qian Xing [6929 5887]: "Kissinger on World Situation and Sino-U.S. Relations"]

[Text] Editor's note: Before departing for home at the end of their assignments, LIAOWANG contributing reporter and XINHUA reporter in Washington, Peng Di and Qian Xing, were granted an exclusive interview by Dr Henry Kissinger on 27 July. They asked him to discuss his views on the current world situation and Sino-U.S. relations. The following is their report from Washington on the interview. [End editor's note]

Former U.S. Secretary of State Dr Henry Kissinger was interviewed by us in his office on the eighth floor of the Park Avenue Building in New York's busy central district. We had a cordial and friendly conversation with him before our departure for home at the end of our assignments. This was an occasion on which he could speak freely about world affairs. He had made Chinese tea for our conversation. He sipped the tea from time to time while talking. He expressed his guarded optimism about the current world situation, including the development of Sino-U.S. relations. He held that compared with the early 1980's, the current situation has improved slightly.

In the early 1980's, Dr Kissinger told us that "the 1980's will be a period of challenges as well as opportunities." It is now the mid-1980's. Therefore, we began our interview by asking him: Do you have any new views on the world situation? What are the new challenges? Where are the new opportunities?

Kissinger replied: "In my opinion, the fundamental issues of foreign policy have not changed much, because these issues are affected by geographical, historical and objective factors. Therefore, challenges will continue to come from two directions. Protection of necessary peace is one direction. At the same time, the more advanced industrial countries should aid in the development of the countries that are still in the modernization process, so as to increase similarities in the world and reduce the gap between very rich and very poor countries."

He said: "In my opinion, the prospects of realizing these objectives have improved as compared with the early 1980's. People have increased their under-

standing of interdependence throughout the world. There are fewer opportunities for those countries that threaten peace. The United States has become stronger. After the general elections, a resolute U.S. Government will have many opportunities to join its friendly countries in productive activities."

On the Middle East situation, Dr Kissinger said that he hopes that the talks on the peaceful solution of the issues in this region will make headway after the Israeli general elections. However, he pointed out: "New tension, that is, the Iran-Iraq war, has appeared in that region. In my opinion, the Middle East is still a very dangerous region. I believe the United States will surely adopt a more positive policy to help bring about reconciliation among all parties concerned."

On the Central American issue, Kissinger said: "As you know, I am in favor of a constructive solution. There are two problems in Central America. One of these is whether the countries in this region can break away from U.S. interference and develop. The answer is yes. However, if the scope of the current Soviet and Cuban political and military influence continues to expand, it will pose a problem for the United States, just as Soviet military influence in Vietnam poses a problem for China."

Then, Kissinger changed the topic to Sino-U.S. relations. He said: "I think the relationship between the two parties is basically good because it reflects the state interests of both countries. A review of the past decade shows that perhaps the U.S. side at the very beginning adopted an overly romantic viewpoint toward the relationship between the two countries so that we came almost to the point of completely equating this relationship with the personal relations that had developed between the leaders of the two countries. Later the relationship between the two countries became tense for some time because both countries underwent domestic changes and had to face some concrete problems instead of dealing with the general atmosphere. In the beginning, much progress was made to improve the atmosphere. However, at a certain point in time people had to deal with more concrete problems."

He said: "In my opinion, we are now in a relatively mature stage. Both parties see not only their common interests, but also the existence of some current problems which are difficult to solve. Therefore, they must work on solving these problems."

On the Taiwan issue, Dr Kissinger persistently held that it should be solved by the Chinese themselves. He emphatically said: "This point has been written in the Shanghai communique and I still believe in it."

He said: "The lesson we should learn from the past is that each side must strive to understand the psychology of the other. Each side must be patient with the other. I am basically optimistic about this. In my opinion, we are now in a process of making good progress. We should pay attention to making each side understand very well the thoughts of the other side. We cannot constantly hold identical views, but an important thing is that we must understand each other's motives."

He said: "The United States should aid China in its modernization program. I think this would represent an important contribution toward peace in that region and the stability of the world. We do not need any formal arrangement between us, but each of us must understand the other's analysis of the world situation. As I have often said in the past, I think that a China free from foreign pressure is agreeable with the interests of the United States. I also think that a developing China is agreeable with the interests of the world. We have common interests in many regards. We should exchange views in connection with this. As for the aspects in which we do not have common interests, we should at least know each other's whys and wherefores."

Kissinger said that a very desirable path would be for the peoples of the United States and China to carry on more extensive dialogues and deeply analyze the differing opinions on some concrete problems, so as to seek common ground and discover mutually beneficial solutions. "In my opinion, holding dialogues-- dialogues not entirely at the governmental level on our side--will be highly profitable."

When discussing the view of some people in the United States that Sino-U.S. relations are on a "single track" chiefly beneficial to China, Kissinger said: "This is pure nonsense." He added: "As a country which has such a vast territory, which is so important, which has such a long history, and which exerts such great influence, China constitutes a decisive factor in international affairs. A major event in China today is to achieve its modernization program. I think this will also conform to the interests of the United States. This is not a favor to China, but is what the United States should do. We do it for our own sake. Likewise, in developing cooperation with us, China does not bestow a favor on us. I am in favor of this viewpoint: Each of the two countries should not regard the other as a card in its hands. This is a short-sighted view which courts failure. This is not the basis for lasting relations. When we initiated our relations with China, we fully understood that both parties would benefit from this. This situation has not changed. Therefore, I strongly disapprove of the argument of some people that the development of Sino-U.S. relations will chiefly benefit China. At the current stage, the benefit China derives from Sino-U.S. relations highly conforms to our own interests too."

Recalling his first visit to Beijing, Dr Kissinger said the things that have happened now do not seem to be "so dramatic as the daring action which President Nixon and I fortunately took at the beginning; but that kind of action was suited only to that time. At present, objective conditions such as those no longer exist. After all, the objective conditions for taking that kind of dramatic action exist only once in a generation."

As the interview drew to a conclusion, we asked him whether he had any plan to visit China again.

Kissinger said: "As you know, I hold a deep affection for China." "I have not been to China for 3 years, but I do not have any fixed plans to visit China yet. Maybe next autumn, I hope," he added. Kissinger saw us to the door, saying: "I appreciate very much the many friendly actions you have taken in my favor during your stay in the United States."

CSO: 4005/014

SOVIET UNION

PRC TOURIST GROUP VISIT TO USSR

19 August Arrival

OW040855 Moscow in Mandarin to China 1600 GMT 2 Sep 84

[Text] We have reported that a Chinese tourist group arrived in Moscow on 19 August. During a reception held at the House of Friendship the next day, Bernov, chairman of the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries; and Tikhvinskiy, an academecian and deputy chairman of the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society, briefed the Chinese guests on the activities of the union and the society. They also expressed the belief that, during their visit in the USSR, the Chinese guests would be able to see with their own eyes Soviet people's friendship toward the Chinese people.

The Chinese tourist group visited Alma-Ata, capital of the Kazakh SSR, from 21 through 25 August. While there, the Chinese guests visited an exhibition of the Kazakh SSR's economic achievements, from which they came to understand the republic's current situation. Members of the Chinese group held identical views on what they saw and heard. They wrote these words in the visitors' book: We wish Khazakhstan still greater and brilliant achievements in its economic, scientific and cultural development.

The Chinese guests were greatly impressed by a meeting they had on 22 August at the Alma-Ata Cotton Textile Plant, the largest light industrial enterprise in Kazahk SSR. The meeting was significant because the plant is an organ under the Kazahk Chapter of the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society. The plant director, (Geordechin), used to be a worker at the plant. He guided the guests when visiting the workshops where cotton yearns and [words indistinct] were produced. Upon being asked what their impressions about the enterprise were, the Chinese guests said unanimously: Your enterprise is large and efficient. We can see that the workers are satisfied with the plant and are proud of it.

Members of the Chinese group also visited a collective farm in Alma-Ata, and had talks with the staff of the Kazakhstan Institute of Agricultural Science. They also visited the Kazakh SSR Historial Museum.

From 26 through 28 August, the Chinese tourist group visited Kiev, capital of Ukraine. The Chinese guests visited Kiev's historical spots and had a meeting with the leading officials of the Ukraine Chapter of the Soviet-Chinese

Friendship Society. They were highly impressed with their visit to the museum of the 1941-1945 great patriotic war. After visiting the museum, Wang Fulin, head of the Chinese tourist group, told a reporter of this station: [Begin Wang's recording] I am very happy that the Chinese tourist group has this opportunity to visit your country. During the past 7 days, I feel the friendship [words indistinct]. Today we visited the beautiful city of Kiev, which is not at all unfamiliar to the members of this group. We realize that the people in this heroic city made great sacrifices during the defense of the country. We are familiar with Kiev just as we are familiar with Leningrad and other cities, which are famous for [words indistinct]. During World War II, Chinese and Soviet people shared the same destiny. In those days, we paid great attention to the situation on the Soviet battlefields everyday, and the Soviet Army's recovery of Kiev encouraged us tremendously. We are glad that we can see that Kiev is a beautiful city, totally rebuilt. I want to share my heartfelt happiness with the Soviet people. The Chinese people and the Soviet people are two great peoples. Their friendship and [words indistinct] are significant for safeguarding peace. During the revolutionary struggle and construction in the past, our two countries [words indistinct]. We Chinese people will not forget the Soviet people's great assistance to us. The purpose of our visit to the USSR this time (?is to promote mutual) understanding and friendship. [end recording]

The Chinese delegation visited Leningrad from 29 through 31 August, while there, the Chinese guests visited the (Piskarev) memorial cemetery, where 470,000 Leningrad residents who died in the defense of Leningrad are buried. The Chinese guests observed a 1-minute silence to mourn the heroic defenders of Leningrad, and then laid a wreath at the statue to the fatherland.

The Chinese tourist group also visited the Lenin Museum, and the (Smolnyy) Maze. Upon their departure from Leningrad, Wang Fulin told a reporter of this station: Leningrad is a city of glorious traditions. It was a heroic city during World War II. This is why we Chinese people are highly emotional while visiting Leningrad. We are proud of this city. We are glad that we can visit Leningrad.

1 September Departure

OW020320 Moscow in Mandarin to China 1230 GMT 1 Sep 84

[Text] The Chinese tourist group of the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries and the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association headed by Wang Fulin, vice president of the former association, returned to Moscow 1 September after touring various parts of the Soviet Union. The group arrived in the Soviet Union on 19 August at the invitation of the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society.

During their stay in the Soviet Union, the Chinese guests have visited Alma-Ata, Kiev and Leningrad. They were welcomed by official representatives

of the various local authorities and also met with activists of the branches of the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society. The guests visited industrial and agricultural enterprises, museums, children's institutions and participated in cultural activities. The Chinese guests visited an exhibition on USSR's economic achievements on 1 September.

CSO: 4005/879

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

XINHUA ANALYZES CANADIAN POLITICAL SITUATION

OW291934 Beijing XINHUA in English 1612 GMT 29 Aug 84

["News analysis by Gu Yaoming: Canadian General Election Final Count-down-- Who Will Be Canada's Next Prime Minister?"]

[Text] Ottawa, 28 August (XINHUA)--As Canada's 4 September parliamentary election campaign is drawing to a close, who will be the country's next prime minister has become the major topic of the town these days.

After 7 weeks of campaigning, Brian Mulroney's Progressive Conservative Party has caught the scent of victory.

Although the Tories trailed well behind Prime Minister John Turner's Liberal Party when the election was called on 9 July, recent public opinion polls put Mulroney's conservatives solidly in front, suggesting the possibility of a conservative sweep in next Tuesday's voting.

The latest poll results published Saturday showed that the liberals have fallen 30 points behind the Tories.

The poll, in which 1,533 eligible voters were questioned by telephone between 19 and 22 August, was commissioned by the SOUTHAM NEWS newspaper chain and conducted by the journalism school of Ottawa's Carleton University.

Even more surprising, the poll indicated that the conservatives seem to have pulled ahead in every region, enjoying a 24-point lead in the traditional liberal stronghold of Quebec and a 4-point lead in Ontario, a pivotal province supplying 95 of the 282 seats in the House of Commons, and so often sways elections. In the 1980 elections, the Tories got only 12 percent of the vote in Quebec, winning just one seat while the liberals got the remaining 74 seats.

Overall, the poll gave the conservatives [number indistinct] percent support of the decided vote against 27 percent for the liberals and 15 percent for the new democrats led by Ed Broadbent.

Mulroney told reporters at an impromptu news conference in Union Bay, British Columbia, where he was campaigning that he was "very encouraged" by the poll results and will continue to "work very hard right up to voting day."

But Turner, campaigning in Regina, Saskatchewan, said in a television interview that he was "not discouraged at all" by the poll and appeared to question its accuracy.

Former Prime Minister Joseph Clark, a conservative, also questioned the poll, published on the heels of other polls showing the conservatives 14-17 points ahead of the liberals.

However the polls are interpreted, Prime Minister Turner's election campaign has been battered by top-level dissension, unfavorable poll results and Turner's own gaffes, giving a boost to opposition leader Brian Mulroney who put in motion a well-oiled campaign machine.

Turner's National Campaign Director William Lee resigned on 4 August in a huff, taking three aides with him when the election was at its midway point. His departure threw the already troubled campaign apparatus into even greater disarray.

The liberal election campaign has been widely described as disorganized and badly prepared, but the worst of Turner's troubles have been self-inflicted.

He had to apologize twice for misstatements, once for saying Mulroney was threatening to fire 600,000 civil servants. Not only had Mulroney not said that, but it became apparent that the prime minister did not know Canada only has 500,000 civil servants.

His other gaffe was saying Manitoba had a lower unemployment rate than the rest of the country because people were fleeing the province. But it turned out that Manitoba is gaining population at the rate of 1,000 per month.

Political experts have been saying that this election will focus on Canada's sagging economy--11.7 percent unemployment, rising interest rates and a Canadian dollar worth barely U.S.\$.75. However, Turner and Mulroney have very similar positions on this top issue.

Under the Lester Pearson and Pierre Trudeau, the liberals have been in power since 1963 with only one interruption. Joseph Clark defeated Trudeau in May 1979, but his Tory government lasted just 9 months. Canadians have hoped for a thorough ventilation of the crucial economic and political issues facing the country--deficit, crown corporations, energy policy, social programs, taxation, government spending and industrial policy. Turner's challenge was to show that he could produce a change from the Trudeau years.

But when, the day before calling the election, he decided to announce that Trudeau, before resigning, had appointed 17 MPs to patronage jobs, people thought it wasn't enough to say that Turner would be much different from Trudeau.

After Senator Keith Davey succeeded Lee as the liberal campaign director, Turner's style on the hustings changed dramatically. Shifting away from his

earlier statesman-like stance, he began mounting direct attacks on Mulroney. Eventually, there went the last public illusion about great change and reform which Turner would probably bring in.

Turner also tried to set up an image of competence and good organization, but his early errors made the image fade instantly. The perception grew rapidly that he was not a great enough fixture to provide the change so widely sought.

Though the liberals are still with the will to keep fighting to voting day, it seems unlikely that a last-minute liberal attack on the probable cost of a conservative government or a dramatic intervention by Pierre Trudeau, as some liberals expected, could reverse the strong tide favoring Mulroney's troops. Even Turner himself seemed to be conceding the possibility of defeat when he told a TV interviewer in Guelph, Ontario, last week that he would stand by his promise to rebuild the party in or out of government.

Now as the general election has entered its final count-down the Tories have benefited from Turner's gaffes and are behaving like winners, although Canadians are apparently preparing to vote "for change for the sake of change."

CSO: 4000/455

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

OPPOSING SUBJECTIVISM EMPHASIZED FOR PARTY CONSOLIDATION

Lanzhou SHEHUI KEXUE [SOCIAL SCIENCES] in Chinese No 3, 25 Jun 84 pp 47-48

[Article by Liu Zhigang [0491 1807 0474]: "Party Consolidation and Opposing Subjectivism"]

[Text] In light of the positive and negative experiences of the Chinese revolution, we can clearly see that opposing and correcting subjectivism in our Party's guiding ideology and among our Party cadres is a matter of life and death for our Party. Subjectivism has historically taken hold of our Party for a long time and has almost ruined China's entire revolutionary cause. Judged by epistemology, opportunism, whether being Right or "Left," has its ideology rooted in subjectivism. Subjectivism has caused us to unrestrainedly exaggerate the function of subjective activity and adopt the wrong way of cognition. As a result, subjectivity has been made inconsistent with objectivity and cognition divorced from practice thereby our practices have always ended in failure. The damage brought upon our Party by subjectivism has been extremely serious. The Yan'an Rectification Movement, therefore, took opposing subjectivism as its major task. Comrade Mao Zedong exerted his best effort throughout his life to conduct a struggle of opposing subjectivism and attempt at combining the universal truth of Marxism with the actual situation in China in order to enable our Party to achieve the goal of making no or fewer mistakes in the practice of the Chinese revolution. Since the struggle of opposing subjectivism is closely linked to the cause of the Chinese revolution, it becomes more important for us to adopt the Marxist scientific way of thinking when we carry out the struggle in the ongoing party consolidation.

"The Decision Concerning Party Consolidation" adopted by the second plenary session of the 12th Party Central Committee has proposed four tasks for us to make a good job of the ongoing party consolidation. The first two are the "achievement of ideological unity" and "rectification of the Party's work style." Achieving ideological unity means correcting all erroneous "Left" or Right tendencies which run counter to the four basic principles and the correct Party line. Analyzing ideological roots is exactly a matter of opposing subjectivism. Rectifying the Party's style of work means promoting the revolutionary spirit of serving the people, wholeheartedly, checking various acts of exploiting one's office for personal gains, and opposing the bureaucratic attitude of not holding oneself responsible to the Party and the people. Opposing bureaucratism, which also means opposing the will of one's superior,

is a matter of opposing subjectivism as well. In this light, we can see that opposing subjectivism is an important substance of making a good job of the current Party consolidation. Hence, the "Decision" points out, "It is essential to overcome subjectivism, conduct careful investigation and study, proceed from reality and seek truth from facts in all matters, and combine revolutionary vigour with scientific approach."

Subjectivism during the period of socialism is seen in many faces: All "Left" things are subjectivistic from the point of view of epistemology; bureaucratism and the superior's will are subjectivistic; premature advance out of impatience and being conservative are subjectivistic; the guiding ideologies of factionalism, mountain-stronghold mentality and cliqueishness in our Party organizations are subjectivistic; and in terms of the cause of an error in a person's ideology, the liberalism within our Party which advocates absolute freedom of personal speech and primary importance of personal opinion is also subjectivistic. There are subordinates who hold a rigid way of thinking, do not use their brains to think, and, as described by Mao Zedong in "Opposing Book Worship," "blindly execute their superiors' instructions by outwardly holding no objection to them at all. They are not genuinely implementing the instructions; instead, they are taking the most brilliant scheme to slow them down." This attitude of formalism built purely on the superiors' concepts without conducting the discussion and examination of the actual situation is in reality subjectivistic as well. In terms of the cause of an error in a person's subjective factors or ideological roots, the liberalization tendency of propagating bourgeois humanitarianism and socialist alienation currently existing in our society is exactly a mischief caused by subjectivism, modern dogmas and modern metaphysics. It is only natural for some cadres to have made the mistake of being subjectivistic and adopted a more or less subjectivistic and one-sided way of thinking in their work, but we cannot stick the label of subjectivism on them without an analysis. Since the majority of them are working for our Party and the people and their fault lies only in adopting a one-sided approach toward problems, they would make a marked progress as soon as they have eliminated the one-sidedness. However, we must let them know the damage to our Party resulting from subjectivism. Subjectivism which has caused us to unrestrainedly exaggerate the function of subjective activity and adopt the wrong way of cognition is the main ideological root of the mistake of being "Left" or Right which we have made for a long time.

How do we oppose subjectivism? For those comrades who have made this type of mistake, we should follow the policy of "learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones and curing the sickness to save the patient" and help them correct it by means of criticism and self-criticism. How do we prevent subjectivism from being committed by us? First, we must adhere to our Party's practical and realistic line of thinking and cognition. Seeking truth from facts is the living soul of Mao Zedong Thought as well as the scientific way of thinking which we should adopt to correctly recognize the objective world. To seek truth from facts, we must persist in integrating theory with practice and uphold that practice is the source of cognition and the criteria for the judgment of such cognition. Second, we must oppose individualism and acquire an unselfish communist world outlook. Since individualists always attach

primary importance to the interests of individuals or small groups and forever base on "I" to draw a line between them and others, it is unable for them to grasp and treat problems with impartiality and avoid being one-sided and subjectivistic. Hence, to acquire an unselfish communist world outlook is the ideological basis for opposing subjectivism. Third, to conduct the investigation and study in our ways of thinking and of doing things must be upheld. Strictly speaking, the process of cognition and that of practice are also the process of investigation and study. All general and specific policies can be made only after, not before, an investigation and study. Guiding principles which are set without a practical investigation are only unrealistic and idealistic. The investigation must be an in-depth one conducted in the type of analysis with attention paid to "cross section." The method of investigation should be integrating materials with views as it is an effective way to oppose subjectivism. Fourth, no foreign ingredients are added, which means that before understanding a certain thing, we should not bear in our minds many "restrictions" or prejudices and look for proofs of our views only in certain aspects of the thing. It is absolutely impossible for us to reach a scientific conclusion if our minds are stuffed with subjective things and our thinking is guided by forcing subjectivity on objectivity instead of acquiring the processed concrete materials from the objective world. Hence, we should have no regret at all for giving up everything we have had which does not coincide with the objective reality at the time when our opinions are being tested by practice. These are the direct measures to oppose subjectivism. Fifth, we must adhere to the mass line which has been Comrade Mao Zedong's consistent way of doing things. We must often listen to the masses for their opinions and collect thoughts from all quarters and then absorb the reasonable ones according to facts. By so doing, we will richly enlighten ourselves and further perfect ourselves by discarding the wrong and immature portions of the cognition previously possessed by us. This is a scientific attitude which we ought to assume to acquire our cognition of all things. In short, we must persist in opposing subjectivism and do it thoroughly so that we can achieve the goal of eliminating all kinds of wrong ideological roots within the Party. [Editor-in-Charge: Wang Buqui (3769 2975 6311)].

12730

CSO: 4005/773

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

SOCIALIST HUMANITARIANISM DISCUSSED

Kunming YUNNAN SHEHUI KEXUE [SOCIAL SCIENCES IN YUNAN] in Chinese No 4,
Jul 84 pp 79-84, 70

[Article by Wang Enyi [3769 1869 3300]: "On Socialist Humanitarianism"]

[Text] In his article "Humanitarianism and Alienation," Comrade Hu Qiaomu pointed out from the very beginning that humanitarianism has two different connotations: one is in the sense of a world view and historical view, and one is in the sense of an ethical principle and moral norm. He pointed out: "We are against the abstract propagation of humanitarianism and the idealist view of humanitarianism, but we do not indiscriminately oppose humanitarianism in any sense. We demand to carry out a Marxist analysis of humanitarianism, criticize bourgeois humanitarianism, and propagate and practice socialist humanitarianism." This differentiation of humanitarianism in two different connotations is the basis of the theoretical discussion in Comrade Hu Qiaomu's article; it has provided us with the direction in correctly understanding and propagating humanitarianism; it clears up the confusion in our discussion on the question of humanitarianism during the past few years, and it has provided us with a sudden enlightenment in our perception. What should we really oppose? What should we really criticize and inherit? and what should we propagate and practice? All this has thus become perfectly clear. This makes it unlikely for us to take humanitarianism as a historical view in providing guidance and solution to the various problems in a socialist society; it helps us to feel even more justifiably in propagating and practicing socialist humanitarianism. It is indeed of great theoretical and practical significance.

This article presents some skindeep views of mine on the correct understanding and propagation of socialist humanitarianism.

I

In order to correctly propagate and practice socialist humanitarianism, we must first of all criticize bourgeois humanitarianism. Propagating and practicing socialist humanitarianism and criticizing bourgeois humanitarianism are two sides of the same question, just like building socialist spiritual civilization and eliminating spiritual pollution. The purpose of criticizing bourgeois humanitarianism is precisely to

correctly propagate and practice socialist humanitarianism. Because, there has been a trend within and without this country which attempts to "humanitarianize" Marxism, that is, to "supplement" Marxism with humanitarianism in the sense of world view and historical view, or even to reduce, or partly reduce, Marxism to humanitarianism. But Marxism is opposed to humanitarianism as a world view and historical view; the Marxism is opposed to humanitarianism as a world view and historical view; the Marxism based on historical materialism and the bourgeois humanitarianism based on historical idealism are two fundamentally different systems of thought. As two fundamentally antagonistic world views (systems of thought), there is no relationship of succession whatsoever between Marxism and bourgeois humanitarianism as world view and historical view; precisely on this point we must not allow any mix-up of boundaries of principle between the two. These two clearly distinctive, fundamentally antagonistic systems of thought can never include each other. In solving the various problems in a socialist society, we can only take Marxist historical materialism as our guide; in adjusting relations between men in a socialist society, we can only rely on socialist humanitarianism as an ethical principle under the guidance of Marxism. Therefore, in order to correctly propagate and practice socialist humanitarianism, we must first of all criticize bourgeois humanitarianism, and oppose the abstract propagation of humanitarianism. In the meantime, we must especially see that, viewed from the historical angle, it was only after Marxism had criticized and overcome bourgeois humanitarianism that the former began to develop.

In order to clarify the relationship between Marxism and humanitarianism, it is necessary to discuss in general the historical development of humanitarianism.

Bourgeois humanitarianism is the theorization and systemization of the views of the bourgeoisie of man, human nature, man's worth and the emancipation of individuality, etc; it is a product of the capitalist mode of production and a theoretical reflection of the class interests of the bourgeoisie. Bourgeois humanitarianism, as a social trend, came about during the European period of renaissance from the 14th to the 16th century; its earliest form was humanism. A fundamental characteristic of humanitarianism during the renaissance period was the proposition of man as the center of all things in contrast to God as the center, paradise and the future world as man's spiritual sustenance, and stoicism as a moral commandment, as set by medieval Catholicism. They took man as the center, and demanded to ascribe everything to man, and not to God. Borrowing the words from the Latin poet Terence [phonetic] of the second century B.C., they said that "I am a man, I should enjoy all what a man should enjoy"; thus they confronted divine nature with human nature, substitute the human way for the godly way, and opposed religious fetters with individual freedom. The earliest poet of the renaissance period Dante had already said: "Man's nobility, insofar as his many achievements are concerned, exceeds that of an angel." They demanded respect for "human nature," "human dignity," "human worth," "man's free will," and "free development of individuality." They treasure the meaning of

man's mundane life and mundane enjoyments. Although, on account of its clear-cut opposition to feudalism and autocracy and their spiritual support, medieval theology, humanism has played a tremendously progressive role in history, what they spoke of as man and human nature were both abstract man and human nature, with their social and class contents drained; such man actually does not exist in real life. Meanwhile, what they spoke of as man was humanity as a whole in form but the bourgeoisie in reality; what they advocated as respect for man's dignity, man's worth and man's freedom of will actually meant no more than a struggle for the dignity of the bourgeoisie and the freedom of will of the bourgeoisie, that is to say, a struggle for the freedom of the bourgeoisie to develop its own class interests. Hence, the humanitarianism of the renaissance period suffered the limitations of not only being anti-religious and less than thorough but also of the idealist view of history and the egoism of the bourgeoisie.

The humanitarianism of the period of bourgeois revolution in the 17th and 18th century was called humanitarianism of the period of bourgeois enlightenment movement. A conspicuous characteristic of the humanitarianism of this period was the transformation from an anti-divine rule struggle into an anti-political power struggle, and its clear political ingredient was opposition to feudalism. With the form of the theory of human rights and the central content of "freedom, equality and fraternity" it saliently manifested itself as the idea of "man's endowed rights," advocating that freedom and equality were endowed in man and hence his "natural rights" born according to his own nature. Such humanitarianism with "man's endowed rights" as its basic content opened fire directly on the feudal political system, and provided a theoretical basis for the bourgeois revolution; although it played a tremendously progressive role in history, the historical view of this kind of humanitarianism was still idealist. Because the idea of "man's endowed rights" was built on the foundation of an abstract theory of human nature. Rousseau was one who held that men were born free and equal, that freedom and equality were man's endowed rights; said he: "Giving up one's freedom is giving up one's own qualification as man, giving up man's right...such renunciation is not in accord with human nature" ("On Social Contract," p 13). What it [sic] speaks of here as human right looks like the right of all humanity on the surface, but is in reality no more than the right of the bourgeoisie as a class alone, especially property ownership of the bourgeoisie. Marx and Engels profoundly exposed this point, pointing out that such recognition of human right "is but a recognition of the egoistic urban bourgeois,...human right here fails to enable man to cast off property, but, instead, enables him to enjoy the freedom of owning property; human right fails to enable man to abandon his dirty behavior of pursuing wealth, but merely enables him to enjoy the freedom of going into business" ("The Complete Works of Marx and Engels," Vol 2, p 145). This shows that, as the principal content of the humanitarianism of the period of bourgeois revolution, such views as "human rights," "freedom" and "equality," while waving the banner of all humanity, actually consisted a purely bourgeois slogan.

The bourgeois humanitarianism of the 19th century (there have been at various points the humanitarianism of utopian socialism, the humanitarianism of the classic philosophers of Germany, etc.), because it arose after the publication of the "Communist Manifesto" and the West European revolution of 1848, and at that time there had begun already the anti-bourgeois revolutionary movement led by the proletariat, turned its progressive and positive role into a conservative and reactionary one. The bourgeois humanitarianism of this period generally took "fraternity" as the core of man's way and the principal content of human nature. Whether it was the humanitarianism of utopian socialism or the humanism of Feuerbach, while their expressions differed they both placed individual freedom and individual happiness under the slogan of "fraternity" and sought their realization. The humanitarianism of utopian socialism advocated "man's nature" and "reason"; Feuerbach's humanism, on the other hand, sought to explain man's essence, "the abstract thing endowed in each individual," "man as man's highest quality," etc., from the point of "species" and "man and man's unity". They both took abstract man and abstract human nature as their point of departure. Besides, there was also Kant's "man as an end, not a means," which sought to explain humanitarianism by way of abstract speculation, etc.

From the above examination of the brief history of bourgeois humanitarianism, we can clearly see the following points:

First, bourgeois humanitarianism has undergone various forms of development in its history, and during different periods it even had different contents; but one thing in common they all had was the propagation of an abstract theory of human nature, taking the abstract man as the center of that theory. Whether advocating man as the center or "man's endowed rights" or maintaining that human nature was no other than reason, or proclaiming that "man is man's highest quality," they all took the abstract man as their point of departure. Therefore, propagating the abstract man and converging upon him the form of a general nature constitute a common characteristic and basic symbol of bourgeois humanitarianisms. Such a point of view is evidently that of historical idealism.

Second, while bourgeois humanitarianism varied a great deal and came in all colors, they all had individualism as their core. This is an inevitable reflection of capitalist commodity exchange and capitalist private ownership in their conception; this determines that they consistently hold individual interest above everything else. When abstractly discussing man's worth, man's dignity, man's rights, man's freedoms, and man's goals, they invariably consider these questions by proceeding from the individual, from oneself, taking the self as the criterion to measure everything else.

Third, the social roles played by bourgeois humanitarianism in different periods were different. During the period of the renaissance and the period of bourgeois revolution, it played the progressive role of opposing feudalism and opposing religious theology; but the bourgeois humanitarianism after the 19th century (after the bourgeoisie had seized power and firmly

established its rule), gradually declined and became the instrument for the bourgeoisie to oppose the workers movement and oppose man's progressive cause.

Hence, the bourgeois humanitarianism with the abstract man as its core is historical idealism. Despite its wearing the coat of generality, and while its manifestation and role in the developmental process of history were also different, viewed in terms of its essence (in terms of its entirety) it represented from beginning to end the basic interests, wishes, needs and ideals of the bourgeoisie and remained to be a bourgeois ideology. Therefore, it is fundamentally incompatible with the revolutionary world view of Marxism which represents the interests of the proletariat.

It is precisely in this question of the point of departure that the key to strictly differentiating the historical materialism of Marxism from the bourgeois humanitarianism lies. And it is precisely because of "a shift of the point of departure," that is, from analyzing man himself speculatively toward an analysis of the production of material goods, that the birth of scientific Marxism was prompted. Precisely because the points of departure of Marxism and bourgeois humanitarianism are different, the antagonistic world views of two systems of thought also took shape accordingly. Hence, Comrade Hu Qiaomu's article emphatically pointed out: "As world views and historical views, Marxism and humanitarianism, and historical materialism and historical idealism can never be mixed together, mutually absorb, mutually include, or mutually ascribed to each other. It is impossible to be entirely so ascribed, nor partially so ascribed." The idea that humanitarianism "may encompass all humanity yesterday and today," that it is "the common spiritual wealth of all countries of the world," that even attempts to "ascribe Marxism in part or as a whole to humanitarianism," is extremely erroneous; its goal is to take out the revolutionary essence of Marxism in an attempt to "humanitarianize" Marxism.

II

Marxism resolutely opposes the idealist view of history of humanitarianism; it also opposes the latter's abstract propagation; but it by no means negates all humanitarisms. Bourgeois humanitarianism as an ethical principle is one which cannot be indiscriminately opposed and must be critically inherited. Marxism is by no means separated from the development of world civilization but a product of its very development; it is the generalization and summation of man's past scientific knowledge. The great historical merit of Marxism lies precisely in it has critically summed up man's total cultural heritage, established the theories of dialectical materialism and historical materialism, profoundly revealed man's historical development, especially the laws of capitalist development, and thereby turned socialist utopianism into science, including here, of course, the critical inheritance of the humanitarianist ideas in history. On this basis, Marxism upholds revolutionary humanitarianism and socialist humanitarianism. Just as Comrade Hu Qiaomu's article pointed out: Viewed from the historical development of ideologies,

a new society must always critically inherit, develop and reform many things pertaining to the spiritual wealth of man's civilization from the old society; ethics and morality are of this nature. Hence, socialist humanitarianism differs in essence from bourgeois humanitarianism as an ethical principle but at the same time is related to it in a definite way in terms of critical inheritance."

Critical inheritance with respect to bourgeois humanitarianism as an ethical principle, generally speaking, refers mainly to the humanitarianism which has played a progressive role in history, particularly that of the periods of the renaissance and bourgeois revolution; as ideological material it is a part of man's superior cultural heritage; therefore it cannot be simplistically negated, but should have its idealist, individualist parts and parts providing theoretical support to the capitalist system, i.e., its historically obsolete or even reactionary dross discarded, and at the same time have its reasonable elements, i.e., its more or less scientific, democratic and revolutionary essence absorbed, reformed, and transformed into ideological elements of socialist humanitarianism.

Specifically, we must on the one hand thoroughly criticize the abstract nature of bourgeois humanitarianism (such as abstract man, abstract general human nature, abstractly discussing "man's goal," "man's worth," "man's rights," "man's dignity," "man's freedom," etc.), its falsity (such as "love for humanity" transcending classes, "freedom, equality and fraternity" as principles of bourgeois humanitarianism which, despite the "all humanity" banner they wave, have remained to be but slogans of the bourgeoisie and have always served the economic and political interests of the bourgeoisie. This point is the inevitable reflection of the fact that its class nature and profound theory of the abstract principle contradict its practice.) and limitation of historical idealism (such as its theories of historical idealism in terms of abstract man and the abstract theory of human nature which not only determine that, in theory, it is entirely erroneous and unscientific, but also determine that in the practice in the capitalist society it also has never been really implemented and realized); on the other hand, we must also inherit and transform its reasonable elements, mainly certain reasonable things in the ethical principle of bourgeois humanitarianism and the many outstanding ideas in the humanitarianism of utopian socialism on social ideals.

In a word, with respect to our treatment of bourgeois humanitarianism as an ethical principle, we must respect history and must never repeat the "away with you all" kind of "Leftist" tendency of the past which was inclined to undercut history, to think there is no inheritance to speak of in respect to law, morality and other things of the like in the upper structure, and thereby to put socialist humanitarianism and bourgeois humanitarianism as an ethical principle metaphysically in absolute opposition to each other, to deny that there was any relationship of historical inheritance between the two, or even reproach humanitarianism without analysis as revisionism as soon as it is mentioned; such a view is

evidently erroneous. Contrariwise, if we only see socialist humanitarianism critically inheriting the reasonable elements of bourgeois humanitarianism as an ethical principle but fail to see socialist humanitarianism coming mainly from the great practice of the people in building socialism and depending on a socialist economic base, or fail to see its essential difference from bourgeois humanitarianism and thereby "applaud it as a whole," that would also be greatly mistaken.

III

In criticizing abstract humanitarianism, we mean to discard the idealist view of history of humanitarianism, but never to adopt a totally negating attitude with respect to humanitarianism in history. Precisely on the contrary, in special realms such as those of ethics and morality and on certain special relationships between man and man, we need to energetically propagate and practice socialist humanitarianism.

What is socialist humanitarianism? Comrade Hu Qiaomu made the following discourse: "Socialist humanitarianism is humanitarianism as an ethical principle and moral norm; it stands on the economic base of socialism, adapts to the political system of socialism, and belongs to the ideology of socialist ethics and morality; as an ethical principle, it is based on the Marxist world view and historical view." This passage very clearly tells us that the socialist humanitarianism we wish to propagate and practice is in essence different from the abstract humanitarianism propagated by certain people, and at the same time points out the relationship between socialist humanitarianism and Marxism.

First, socialist humanitarianism is humanitarianism not as a world view but as an ethical principle and moral norm; it is based on the Marxist world view and historical view. Therefore, our world view and historical view are dialectical materialism and historical materialism, we take socialist humanitarianism only as an ethical principle subordinate to our world view and historical view. This draws a clear boundary with humanitarianism as world view and historical view and is thus essentially different from bourgeois humanitarianism as an ethical principle.

Second, socialist humanitarianism takes the historical materialism of Marxism as its guide and is subordinate to the Marxist world view and historical view; this determines that it does not take such realms of historical idealism as the abstract man and theory of human nature as its point of departure but proceeds, instead, from the basic principle of historical materialism of social existence determining man's social consciousness, from socialist social relations, and from the needs and possibilities of the realistic development of socialist construction in our country.

Third, socialist humanitarianism takes its stand on the foundation of a socialist economy; this determines that the realization of socialist humanitarianism does not depend on appealing to humanism, to man's reason,

to all humanity, to the good heart of the exploiters and oppressors, or to such abstract preaching as "resisting no evil," but on the conditions of going through class struggle and going through proletarian revolution and people's democratic dictatorship. In a word, it is not theory separated from practice, but unity of theory and practice.

Fourth, precisely because socialist humanitarianism is built on a socialist economic foundation and also adapted to the socialist economic foundation and political system, and the socialist economic foundation happens to be public ownership, the socialist political system, fundamentally speaking, protects the interests of the masses of the people. Therefore, the core of socialist humanitarianism can hardly be bourgeois individualism but can only be proletarian collectivism.

Fifth, precisely because socialist humanitarianism has collectivism as its core, holds that "the individual cannot depart from the collective," advocates unity between individual interests and collective interests and that "the individual must serve the collective, and the collective must also serve the individual," therefore socialist humanitarianism accords with the interests and wishes of the overwhelming majority and is also acceptable by the overwhelming majority; this is the opposite to the false character of abstract humanitarianism; it possesses a genuine, realistic, tremendous force and progressive character unmatched by bourgeois humanitarianism.

In view of our above perception of the essential characteristics of socialist humanitarianism, when correctly propagating and practicing socialist humanitarianism we must especially pay attention to the following questions:

Socialist humanitarianism is the ethical principle and moral norm of the socialist era and is demonstrated from the ethical angle in three aspects: the respect and care the socialist state and socialist society have shown toward the rights, interests and personality of the overwhelming majority of the people; the common care shown by the overwhelming majority of the people about their common interests; the fact that among the people themselves they should be and are able to establish relationships of unity, mutual assistance and friendly love and exclude the kind of relationships of each profiting at our people's expense and each trying to outwit others in the old society. As an ethical principle and moral norm, socialist humanitarianism's main content is: among the people themselves, efforts are made to satisfy as much as possible people's increasing needs in their material and cultural life and to develop to the fullest possible extent each individual's talents, to maintain each individual's dignity, to bring into play to the maximum each individual's enthusiasm in engaging himself in creative labor for the building of socialism, and thereby to continue to enhance each individual's worth. The real, actual foundation of socialist humanitarianism is the public ownership of the means of production, and a socialist public ownership makes the fundamental interests of the individual and society consistent with each other. Therefore, the main content of socialist humanitarianism can really be attained and can be realized gradually.

Propagating and practicing socialist humanitarianism must take a stand on a steadfast, realistic foundation; we must proceed from relationships in our socialist society, from the needs and possibilities of the realistic development of our socialist construction, and can never depart from our current realities, follow other than our realistic needs and possibilities, or abstractly make all kinds of impractical demands. Because doing so would not only fail to solve practical problems but even cause confusion in people's thinking.

Propagating and practicing socialist humanitarianism must correctly treat the relationship between socialist humanitarianism and class struggle and must unite with loving the people and hating the enemy. Socialist humanitarianism is consistent with the Marxist theory of class struggle. "Treating ourselves with kindness" and "treating the enemy with harshness" are mutually complementary; they are the two sides of one question in this socialist humanitarianism. Because, for the sake of loving the people, it is necessary to hate the enemy of the people; only by hating the enemy of the people can we really love the people. In real life, some of our comrades cannot see the fact that while our socialist society has already eliminated the exploitive classes and exploitive systems, and class struggle is no longer the main contradiction in our society, class struggle will exist in certain realms in our society for a long time to come; they therefore often cut socialist humanitarianism and class struggle apart or put them in opposition to each other, and thereby harbor so-called "love for all men," "fraternity," or even attempt to use "the nectar of love to dissolve the iron knot of society." This is obviously totally wrong.

Propagating and practicing socialist humanitarianism must never drift into empty talk, but must place starting point on the realistic foundation that they can be gradually realized, and attention must especially be paid to the exemplary role played by model conduct of advanced elements. Because "socialist humanitarianism by no means springs forth spontaneously or naturally but takes shape gradually under the ideological education of communism and the guidance of the model conduct of advanced elements." At the same time, under the ideological education of communism, our correct propagation of socialist humanitarianism requires "the four advocacies," that is, we must advocate serving the people wholeheartedly, we must advocate charging forward first and retreating later, suffering hardship first and enjoying life later, we must advocate thinking first of all of others and thinking of the people in the face of any undertaking, and we must advocate sacrificing our own interests in favor of other people's interests when necessary and sacrificing our personal and minority's interests for the sake of the motherland's and the majority's interests.

Putting socialist humanitarianism into practice is an important component part of building our socialist spiritual civilization; it is the development of revolutionary humanitarianism at the present stage. Today, in particular, we must especially see the compelling realistic significance of propagating and practicing socialist humanitarianism:

1. On the one hand it can help people first of all to draw a clear boundary with abstract humanitarianism and, on the other hand, consciously resisting the abstract propagation of humanitarianism can also help people overcome the "Leftist" error of the past, when opposition was expressed against humanitarianism in any sense because the two connotations of humanitarianism were not differentiated, and thereby enable us to energetically propagate and practice socialist humanitarianism in a forthright manner.

2. Propagating and practicing socialist humanitarianism, compared to Communist morality and as moral requirement at a lower plane, is of far greater breadth and can be accepted by the overwhelming majority.

3. Because of the influence of feudal ideas for a long time, because of the erosion by the rotten ideas of the bourgeoisie, and because of cultural backwardness and economic backwardness, in our real social life criminal practices in violation of humanitarian principles still exist in various degrees. The indifferent attitude of lacking concern, respect, sympathy, and love for others (first of all, the common laborers, common intellectuals, common service personnel and common customers, especially for ordinary women, ordinary children, ordinary oldsters and disabled persons) likewise still exist in various degrees. In order to develop the building of our socialist material civilization and spiritual civilization, we must carry out resolute struggle against these phenomena; we must carry out ideological and moral education among the vast ranks of our cadres, masses, youths and children with the Communist ideology as its core, including the socialist ethnical principle.

4. In all our undertakings, we must invariably pay attention to propagating and practicing socialist humanitarianism. Socialist literature must especially endeavor to propagate socialist humanitarianism. Just as Comrade Hu Qiaomu's article has pointed out: "What we oppose is merely the propagation of the humanitarian world view and historical view in literary and art works or literary and art criticisms and the propagation of a theory of human nature that transcends history and transcends society by extorting revolutionary history and revolutionary reality; but we definitely do not oppose, nor allow others to oppose, literary and art works reflecting the care, respect, sympathy and friendly love shown to others by our revolution, our socialist society and our revolutionaries and laborers; we definitely do not oppose, nor allow others to oppose, literary and art workers taking a revolutionary and socialist stand in their concrete, vivid description of genuine human nature, human feelings, patriotism, sense of justice, and the personal dignity of ordinary citizens. If we express our opposition in that way, it would be not only stupid but tantamount to opposing socialist literature and art themselves, destroying their life, depriving them of their influence and educational meaning." Understanding this, what to oppose and what to advocate become all clear at a glance. "All kinds of worries" can now be dismissed, and we can then propagate socialist humanitarianism in a forthright manner.

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

BEIJING HOLDS REUNIFICATION THEME CONCERT

OW081632 Beijing XINHUA in English 1632 GMT 8 Sep 84

[Text] Beijing, 8 September (XINHUA)--A concert on the theme of China's reunification was held here tonight to celebrate the mid-autumn festival, which falls on 10 September this year.

Entitled "Voice of the Strait," this second concert of its kind was jointly sponsored by seven organizations, including the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the All-China Federation of Taiwan compatriots and the Chinese Musicians' Association.

The traditional mid-autumn festival, the 15th day of the 8th lunar month, is a time for family reunions. The performers in the Beijing Exhibition Center theater presented choruses, duets and solos expressing the desire of the Chinese people on either side of the Taiwan Straits for National Reunification.

Songs by both mainland and Taiwan composers were rendered, most specially prepared for the concert. Li Huanzhi, vice-chairman of the Chinese Musicians' Association, said that the organizers had received more than 300 compositions from musicians across the country.

The concert was brought to a climax by the Taiwan campus song "descendants of the dragon" by Taiwan musician Ho Teh-chien, who came to the mainland last year.

Zheng Jian, vice-chairman of the All-China Federation of Taiwan compatriots, said exchanges between the two parts of China had increased in recent years. "I hope the concert can contribute its bit to final reunification," he said.

Among the audience were Yang Jingren and five other vice-chairmen of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, and Lin Liyun, chairman of the All-China Federation of Taiwan compatriots.

CSO: 4000/001

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

MINORITY AREAS FORGE AHEAD IN DEVELOPMENT

OW111041 Beijing XINHUA in English 0852 GMT 11 Sep 84

["Construction Forges Ahead in Minority Areas--Twenty-sixth of the National Day Focus Series"--XINHUA headline]

[Text] Beijing, 11 September (XINHUA)--Industry took the lead in areas inhabited by China's ethnic minorities last year, recording a 51 percent share of their local economies to surpass traditional agriculture and animal husbandry as a source of income.

Industrial output in minority areas was valued at 31.68 billion yuan and agricultural output, 30.39 billion yuan, in 1983, for rises of 5,600 percent and 400 percent, respectively, over 1949.

China's 55 ethnic minorities have a population of 67 million, or 6.7 percent of national total. Minority areas cover more than 50 percent of the country's land, mainly in the northwest, southwest and other border regions.

In the past 35 years, 37,000 industrial and mining enterprises have been set up there. Major sites include the Baotou Iron and Steel Company in Inner Mongolia, the Karamay oilfield in Xinjiang, and the Helanshan coal producing center in Ningxia.

Industrial development has led to the founding of a number of new cities and towns which are now becoming economic and cultural centers in minority regions.

New progress has also been made in agriculture, thanks to special policies passed in 1979 to encourage farmers and herdsmen to work under the family-based contract responsibility system. Agricultural output has registered an annual growth rate of 7.7 percent for the past 5 years.

Over 12,000 kilometers of railroads and 230,000 kilometers of highways have been built to ease the traditional isolation of minority areas.

From 1979 to 1983, the central government allotted 24.5 billion yuan for the economic and educational development of minority autonomous regions. More-developed provinces and municipalities along the east China coast have also sent large numbers of skilled workers and technicians, as well as much equipment, to aid the minority areas.

CSO: 4000/001

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

POPULARIZATION OF ADULT EDUCATION URGED

Beijing LIAOWANG /OUTLOOK/ in Chinese No 23, 4 Jun 84 p 41

/Article by Yao Zhongda /1202 0112 6671/, assistant chief of Adult Education Department, Ministry of Education: "The New Situation Confronting Adult Education"

/Text/ Adult education is the most vigorous and thriving aspect in the realm of education today. The higher the level of productive forces, the greater is the attention on adult education. The practices of America, Japan, West Germany and the Soviet Union all illustrate this point. With the rapid development of the economic construction, China's adult education also confronts a fairly rapidly developing new situation.

In the past 3 decades or more, China's adult education has made great strides: More than 143 million worker-peasant masses and basic level cadres cast off the state of illiteracy; after learning to read, more than 39.4 million reached the level of elementary school graduates; by means of spare-time studies, more than 12.4 million elementary school level young people and young adults reached the level of secondary school graduates and more than 1.935 million people reached college and professional level or above. However, among the more than 400 million young and adult peasants, 80 million are illiterate or semi-illiterate and only 25 million attend peasant schools (classes, groups) of all levels and all types. The situation is very incompatible with the rapidly developing economic construction.

To adjust to the growing demand of the broad masses and cadres to learn current affairs and policies, cultural knowledge, and science and technology, we must give attention to problems in the following aspects in adult education:

1. We must actively expand the range of education. The "Decision on Strengthening the Education of Workers" published by the party Central Committee and State Council in 1981 demanded that, by the year 1985, 60 to 80 percent of the young and adult workers below the level of junior middle school graduates must reach such level; one-third of those of the level of junior middle school graduates must reach the level of senior middle school or technical secondary school graduates; a considerable portion of those of senior middle or technical secondary school level must reach college and university level. In the past few years, the various departments and areas performed large volumes of work, but as a whole, the development scale is still not large enough, especially in

peasant education. Most areas still focus on the key schools and have not done much in broadening the range of education.

Today, China's rural political and economic situations have greatly improved, and broadening the range of education is not only necessary but feasible. Recently, the "Suggestions on Promoting Education through Multiple Channels" of Hebei province approved by the Hebei provincial party committee and people's government demand that, by 1985, 50 to 70 percent of the townships (towns) in the province have started peasants' technical schools and 50 to 70 percent of the villages have started peasants' spare-time schools. There are many provinces and cities throughout the country with economic conditions and educational bases similar to Hebei. As long as the work of broadening the range of education is suitably launched, it is entirely possible for adult education to make a fairly great development.

2. Adult education must be linked with the building of the two civilizations. Adults are the direct participants in production and work. In terms of their education, we uphold the principle of serving production. However, the ultimate goal of education is to raise the productive ability of the laborers, and the attainment of this ability requires both the factor of techniques and skills and that of ideological awareness, neither dispensable. Thus, adult education must be closely integrated with the building of a socialist spiritual civilization. Attention must be given to such courses as history, geography and legal knowledge.

3. On the basis of the overall planning of political, cultural and technical education, we should make different demands of students of different educational backgrounds and uphold the principle of multilevel and multiform education. Politics, culture and technology are all indispensable, but for different objectives and at different times, particular emphasis on one or the other should be made. There are more than 120 million junior and senior middle school graduates in rural areas throughout the country. Except a small number of them who should be placed, according to need and feasibility, under long-term systematic training and improvement, the majority should undergo short-term training in multiple forms. In regard to around 50 percent of the peasants who are of elementary school level, we must improve their cultural, as well as political and technical, level. We must realize that it is difficult to answer the developmental needs of agricultural modernization if the peasants are not of junior middle school level or higher. Many of the rural specialized and key households today include junior and middle school graduates in their midst. This fact is sufficient to illustrate the importance of education.

In face of the challenge of a worldwide new technical revolution, people generally feel that education will become a lifetime endeavor. Therefore, adult education has a vast prospect of development. It not only produces a significant effect on improving the cultural and scientific levels of the entire nation and transforming the political, cultural and technical qualities of the laboring people, but also constitutes an important means to train specialized personnel of all levels and all types. As long as we start from China's practical conditions, a new situation of fairly fast development will emerge in adult education.

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

EDUCATION ACHIEVEMENTS IN PAST 35 YEARS REVIEWED

OW170336 Beijing XINHUA in English 0243 GMT 17 Sep 84

["China's Achievements in Education--31st of the National Day Focus Series"--XINHUA headline]

[Text] Beijing, 17 September (XINHUA)--A fairly complete socialist education system, ranging from infant education to the training of research workers, has been erected and consolidated in the 35 years since the founding of the People's Republic of China.

There are now over one million schools of all levels and types throughout the country. Students number 213.85 million.

In 1983, there were 680 units in the country training postgraduate students. The 805 institutions of higher learning offer more than 850 subjects and take in over 1.2 million students, 10.4 times the figure for 1949. The various types of institutions of higher education for adults amount to 1,196, with more than 1.1 million students, among whom 926,100 will graduate with college diploma.

In 1983, there were 3,090 vocational secondary schools. The number of students reached more than 1.14 million, five times the 1949 figure. There were also 3,443 technical schools, with 525,000 students. There were 5,481 agricultural and professional middle schools in 1983, with 1.22 million students.

Regular middle schools reached 96,500, with some 44 million students, 42.3 times the 1.03 million in 1949. Besides, there were 96,600 secondary schools for adults, with some 9.75 million students.

There were 862,000 primary schools across the country in 1983, with students numbering 135.78 million, 5.6 times the 24.39 million of 1949. Various types of elementary schools for adults have 8.17 million students.

Nearly 41,800 postgraduates have been trained in the past 35 years. Over 4.1 million students graduated from regular institutions of higher learning, 19.5 times the 210,800 in 35 pre-liberation years, 1912-1947. Graduates of secondary schools numbered 7.22 million, 13.2 times more than the 546,700 in 1931-1946 period. Graduates of various types of colleges for adults reached two million, and graduates of various adult secondary schools numbered 2.9 million.

The country brought the rate of primary school-age children attending school up to 94 percent in 1983, from 25 percent in 1949. The cities and some other comparatively developed areas, primary education is now universal. [Sentence as received] Universal secondary education has already started in some of the cities.

According to incomplete statistics, some 150 million illiterate people have learned to read and write in the past 35 years. This brought the country's illiteracy rate down to 23.5 percent in 1982 (from 80 percent in 1949)--in young and middle-aged peasants, 30 percent, and in industrial workers, 5 percent.

China has sent more than 30,000 students to study abroad over the past 35 years. Meanwhile, the country has welcomed 13,394 foreign students. More than 100 institutes of higher learning have established cooperative relations with over 200 foreign counterparts.

The country had 9.23 million teachers last year, 9.9 times the number of 1949. Among them, there were 358,000 university teachers, compared with 16,000 in 1949, and 2,962,000 secondary school teachers, 34.7 times the number of 1949.

Over the past 35 years, the government has spent 151,139 million yuan on education. On top of this, enterprises, peasant associations and Overseas Chinese have also raised money for schools.

CSO: 4000/001

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

XINHUA REPORTS BOOK PUBLICATION OVER 35 YEARS

OW190206 Beijing XINHUA in English 0141 GMT 19 Sep 84

[More Chinese Publications and Journals--33d of the National Day Focus Series--XINHUA headline]

[Text] Beijing, 19 September (XINHUA)--Chinese publishing houses printed 5.8 billion books in 1983, more than any other countries in the world, according to the Publication Bureau of the Chinese Ministry of Culture.

The 35,700 titles issued last year far exceeded the 8,000 titles and 105 million copies released in 1949. They also marked a substantial increase over 1978, when 3.7 billion copies of 14,987 titles were published.

The books cover a wide range of subjects, from works on Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought to science readers and works of art.

The first Chinese edition of the complete works of Lenin, a series of 39 volumes, was released in the early 1960's. Publishers are now working on a second, 60-volume edition, and a 50-volume set of the collected works of Marx and Engels will be completed later this year.

Also published are the works of Chinese leaders including Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun. Nearly 55 million copies of the "Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping" were sold, making it the most popular book in China in 1983.

Scientific works have also gained a significant audience. The more than 8,000 titles issued last year accounted for nearly one-fourth of all book sales, an increase of 12.2 percent over the previous year.

Publications on agronomy and other subjects aimed at rural peasants registered sales of 953 million yuan (about U.S. \$380 million), about half of the national total for 1983.

Further attention has been devoted to more than 80,000 ancient works needing collation and republication. Since 1949, about 2,500 titles have been released, 500 of them in the last 2 years.

These include the first seven installments of the 1,000-volume "complete works of the Tang Dynasty," which covers writings completed by 3,000 authors from 6th to 9th century. Also to be issued this year are five books of the Chinese Tripitaka, a huge collection of rare Buddhist scriptures.

Among the other ancient works to be published soon are the Tibetan epic, "King Gesar," the Mongolian classic, "Zhanggal" and the Uygur "knowledge of happiness, enjoyment and wisdom."

Modern Chinese literature has also been given attention with the compilation and release of complete works by leading writers Lu Xun, Guo Moruo, Mao Dun, Wen Yiduo, Tian Han and others who played an influential role in modern Chinese culture.

Books by foreign authors are gaining new popularity. Recent publications include the "Chinese translation of world academic masterpieces" series covering over 1,000 titles, and the "foreign literature masterpieces" series which covers 200 classics. The complete works of Shakespeare, Balzac and Hugo and the writings of Maxim Gorkiy are also coming off print.

The large number of available books is supplemented by 3,415 magazines with a total circulation of 1.7 billion and 340 newspapers issued at the provincial level and above. The papers recorded a daily circulation of 96.11 million last year, a 160 percent increase over 1978.

All Chinese books are published by 292 publishing houses and sold at the country's 6,400 state-run XINHUA bookstores, 78,000 supply and marketing cooperatives and retail shops, and more than 4,600 collective or individually-run bookstores.

CSO: 4000/001

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

XINHUA EXAMINES CHINESE CINEMA INDUSTRY

OW210609 Beijing XINHUA in English 0125 GMT 21 Sep 84

["Largest Audience, Cheapest Tickets --35th of the National Day Focus Series"--XINHUA headline]

[Text] Beijing, 21 September (XINHUA)--China has the world's largest film audience and cheapest film tickets, according to the Ministry of Culture Film Bureau today.

In 1983, Chinese film audience numbered 27.3 billion, 5.9 times more than 1965, the year before the "cultural revolution," and the price of tickets has been held to about 30 cents rmb.

The Chinese film studios were closed for 7 years during the 1966-1976 cultural revolution, but from 1977 to 1983, they produced 558 feature films, compared to the 603 made in the 17 years from the founding of the people's republic in 1949 to 1966.

There were 3 studios in China in 1950. There are now 19.

The number of cinemas and film projection teams also rose to 162,000 last year, 8 times more than in 1976. Over 90 percent of China's 720,000 production brigades have regular film shows, with every rural resident attending 24 showings.

Movies reflecting current issues are among the most popular. Of the 127 feature films produced last year, 69 percent focussed on contemporary themes.

Among the most acclaimed were the prize-winning "a story that should not have happened" and "behind the accused," which sharply criticise errant Communist Party members and social tendencies hindering the nation's progress.

Also popular are films on important events such as the 1927 Nanchang uprising, and the "Xian incident" of 1936 in which Chiang Kai-shek was captured by patriotic Kuomintang officials who wanted to join the communists in fighting Japanese aggression.

To encourage the industry, three national awards have been instituted: The "hundred flowers" award run by the monthly "popular cinema" based on opinion polls; the "golden rooster" award, sponsored by the Chinese Film Artists Association based on specialists' judgment; and the official "outstanding film" award sponsored by the Ministry of Culture.

From 1950 to 1983, Chinese films won 155 awards at international film festivals.

Chinese movies have further gone to about 400 distributors overseas. From 1977 to 1983, China exported 3,196 films and imported nearly 300 films from foreign countries and Hong Kong.

The China Film Co-production Corporation, established in 1979, has so far made 65 films with foreign and Hong Kong producers. These include the Sino-Italian serial, "Marco Polo"; "the chess game yet to be finished," a Sino-Japanese joint effort; and "the burning of Yuanminyyuan" and "the reign behind the screen" with Hong Kong.

CSO: 4000/001

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

MODERN CHINESE NOVELS PUBLISHED IN COLLECTION

OW191327 Beijing XINHUA in English 1252 GMT 19 Sep 84

[Text] Beijing, 19 September (XINHUA)--Masterpieces of Ding Ling, Zhou Libo, Du Pengcheng, Wang Meng, Wei Wei and five other famous writers are chosen to form a special collection of the best modern Chinese novels to be published on National Day.

It is sponsored by the nation's leading people's literature publishing house in Beijing. More such collections are to follow.

At a press conference here today, its new editor-in-chief Tu An called the collection "a brilliant record" of new China's literature.

"Our primary task," he said, "has always been to publish literature that will reflect our times, including creations that mirror the revolutionary struggles of the Chinese people under the leadership of the Communist Party."

"We do not cover up contradictions in reality," he said, "but we do work with an aim to encourage and inspire the readers."

Another important task for the publishing house is to compile and publish influential literary works and theoretical writings since the "4 May" movement in 1919 up to 1949, as well as Chinese classics and modern evaluation.

Tu said the publishing house also works to "systematically introduce foreign literature to Chinese readers."

About 2,300 titles of Western classics and contemporary foreign literary works have been translated into Chinese since 1951, when the publishing house was founded. They include "Complete Works of Shakespeare" (11 volumes, 1978) and "Collected Works of Gorkiy" (20 volumes, to be complete in 1985). Publication of "Complete Works of Balzac," 30 volumes, will be finished by 1989, Tu said.

Complete works of a number of well-known Chinese writers, such as Lu Xun, Guo Moruo and Mao Dun, have been published. And collections of writings of Zhou Yang, Hu Feng, and other noted literary critics, will also be published.

Over the past three decades, Tu said, the publishing house has turned out nearly 7,000 titles of new books, including 3,700 titles on contemporary themes, 440 titles of classical Chinese literature and 20 titles of college literature textbooks, with a total circulation of 571.48 million.

The publishing house has presented works by more than 1,000 Chinese writers. Over 500 artists have helped design book-covers and illustrations.

Tu said the publishing house has been keen on new comers in literature. It started "contemporary literature" (DANGDAI), Beijing's most influential literary magazine, in 1981. It has since introduced more than 100 new writers.

Tu An, himself a poet and Chinese translator of Shakespeare's sonnets, said the principle of the publishing house is to "let a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend."

The publishing house had Feng Xuefeng, the literary critic as its first director, followed by novelist Ba Ren, and children's literature writer Yan Wenjing. Its current director is the novelist Wei Junyi.

Working for the publishing house are 150 experienced editors and specialists, one third of them being members of the National Writers Association.

All provinces, autonomous regions and major cities in China have their own publishing houses. Some 50 of them are publishing literature.

CSO: 4000/001

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

ALBUM PUBLISHED OF SCHOLARS WHO STUDIED IN WEST

OW181307 Beijing XINHUA in English 1210 GMT 18 Sep 84

[Text] Beijing, 18 September (XINHUA)--A picture album on a number of powerful brains have been published here.

With 255 pictures and 76,000 words, the album includes some 90 Chinese scholars and scientists who returned to China after studying in Europe and the United States.

It is the first time to publish a book on Western returned students since the people's republic was founded 35 years ago.

The foreword was written by Zhou Peiyuan, 82, a noted physicist who earned his doctorate in the 1920's in the United States.

Among the noted scientists included in the book who returned to China before 1949 or in the early years of the people's republic are Iu Jiaxi, president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, nuclear physicist Qian Sanqiang, mathematician Hua Luogeng, geologist Zhang Wenyou. Tan Haosheng is a scientist in mechanics who returned to China in 1965. There are also a number of scientists who returned from abroad or Taiwan in recent years, including Bei Yukun (Y. K. Pei), a senior chemical industry engineer who is now technical advisor to the state administration of the building materials industry, Peng Peigen (Alfred Peng), an architect who is now associate professor at Qinghua University, and Fan Lenian (Fan Loh-nien), a water conservancy expert who is now deputy head of a research institute.

Edited by the Western Returned Students' Association, 13,000 copies of the album have been sent to scientists and scholars in 43 countries and regions. The association was founded in 1913 and has 1,200 members in Beijing.

CSO: 4000/001

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

PRC STATESMAN ON POLICIES TOWARD XIZANG

OW170926 Beijing XINHUA in English 0913 GMT 17 Sep 84

[Text] Beijing, 17 September (XINHUA)--A Chinese leader of the Tibetan nationality described the policies currently in effect in Tibet adopted by the central authorities as realistic and based on a more accurate, all-sided and penetrating understanding of local conditions, in an article in the latest issue of RED FLAG magazine.

The author, Ngapoi Ngwang Jigme, 73, is a vice-chairman of the national people's congress standing committee. A high-ranking official assisting the Dalai Lama in administrative affairs, he was the head of a Tibetan delegation to negotiate with the central authorities in 1951 on the peaceful liberation of Tibet.

Tibet is a very special region, he said, as far as its natural environment, history, politics, nationality, religion, culture and influence abroad are concerned.

Tibet is inhabited almost exclusively by a homogeneous nationality, the Tibetan, which makes up more than 94 percent of its population, and almost all Tibetans follow Lamaism. The nationality and religion, he said, are the most outstanding characteristics of Tibet that make it different not only from China's inland provinces but also from other minority areas like Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang.

In historical development, he said, the Tibetan nationality has its unique psychological make-up, sentiments and customs.

His article contains some interesting anecdotes about the two late Chinese leaders Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, in connection with Tibet.

According to the author, Mao Zedong was a man who knew the special conditions of Tibet. Once he pointed out that in handling any problem in Tibet one must first consider two things, namely, nationality and religion.

After the armed rebellion in 1959 in Tibet was put down and democratic reform was initiated there, the author recalled, a number of innocent local people were wronged for alleged connection with the rebellion and some local officials were overanxious to promote collective farming in the region. These tendencies were checked with the personal interposition of Mao and Zhou.

In 1961, Mao told the author that it was wrong to set up agricultural cooperatives in Tibet, and the local peasants should be left to enjoy the pleasure of farming their own land. In 1962, Zhou instructed the local authorities to release those who had been arrested on false charges.

But during the "cultural revolution" between 1966 and 1976, radical policies disregarding the unique conditions in the region were imposed, which hindered the social development there, the article says.

These erroneous policies have been corrected since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Party Central Committee in 1978. In addition, he says, a series of flexible policies have been adopted to speed up Tibet's economic and cultural development.

A prosperous and civilized socialist Tibet will become a reality if the new policies are carried out to the letter, the article concludes.

CSO: 4000/001

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

FESTIVAL RESUMED AFTER SUSPENSION--Beijing, 8 September (XINHUA)--The mid-autumn festival fair, after two decades of suspension, reopened today in the Chinese capital. The mid-autumn festival, a traditional Chinese celebration symbolizing the reunion of the whole family, falls on 10 September this year, and the fair will last for 3 days. Erected along two kilometers of sidestreets near Wangfujing, the capital's shopping center, the fair has more than 200 stalls, mainly selling mooncakes of some 30 kinds. Among the most popular are those with fairy-tale designs. One design tells the story about Chang'e, a legendary lady who swallowed an elixir stolen from her husband and flew to the moon; another shows a Tang Dynasty (618-907) emperor and his concubine gazing at the full moon. The stalls also sell roast duck, mutton and other foods. Artists with nimble fingers make dough figurines, and puppet shows attract a youthful audience. [Text] [OW081230 Beijing XINHUA in English 1208 GMT 8 Sep 84]

PILOTS FROM MINORITY NATIONALITIES TRAINED--Beijing, 20 September (XINHUA)--Out of China's 55 minority nationalities, more than 30 nationalities have their own pilots, a source close to the air force said here today. China began to enroll minority pilots in Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region in the early period of new China, and since then the air force has recruited pilots every year from minority nationalities to keep abreast with the expansion of the army and the national defense, said the source. Now minority pilots come not only from nationalities with a population greater than one million, but also from small nationalities including the Kirgiz, Daur, Xibe and Monba. These pilots now fly fighter planes, bombers, reconnaissance and transport planes. Many of them have become aviation teachers and commanders. [Text] [OW111303 Beijing XINHUA in English 1152 GMT 20 Sep 84]

INTELLECTUALS TO SHOW MORAL COURAGE--Beijing, 3 September (XINHUA)--Intellectuals newly-elected to leading posts are urged to be braver and more efficient in making strategic decisions by today's GUANGMING DAILY. The paper says large numbers of young and middle-aged intellectuals have been elected to leading bodies, especially in basic units like factories, mines and companies. Most of them are qualified for their new work and have shown promise. But others have fallen short due to a lack of courage or proper support from their immediate superiors. Some intellectuals, in keeping with their historical role as advisers or counsellors to Chinese governments, are still not accustomed to making policy decisions by themselves, the paper notes. However, it adds, they should now realize that their positions have changed, and try to adapt to new condi-

tions. Most of the newly-elected intellectuals will be competent in their tasks if they modestly learn from their veteran colleagues and become more decisive, it says. [Text] [OW031255 Beijing XINHUA in English 1231 GMT 3 Sep 84]

COMMUNIST YOUTH LEAGUE GROWTH OUTLINED--Beijing, 13 September (XINHUA)--The Communist Youth League of China now has more than 48.5 million members, the most in the last 35 years, according to today's CHINA YOUTH NEWS. The league, which was founded in 1922, has more than 2.5 million chapters. These organizations have taken in over 150 million members between 14 to 28 years of age since 1949. Many have now been promoted to leading positions in party and government institutions nationwide. The youth league has also developed ties with more than 300 youth and student organizations in over 100 countries. More than 1,000 youth delegations have visited China at its invitation, while over 700 more groups have been sent abroad since the founding of the people's republic. [Text] [OW131333 Beijing XINHUA in English 1237 GMT 13 Sep 84]

CSO: 4000/001

EAST REGION

BRIEFS

SHANGHAI RURAL EDUCATION--Shanghai, 1 Sep (XINHUA)--Over 320,000 peasants took part in cultural or agro-technical study in Shanghai's 10 suburban counties, one of China's most flourishing agricultural areas, in the first six months of this year. The figure was 170,000 more compared to that of the same period last year, according to the Shanghai Municipal Education Bureau. To meet the farmers' growing enthusiasm for study, county governments have run radio and television schools, vocational schools and over 90 percent of all the townships have set up educational centers for adults. In the villages various part-time training classes have sprung up, and there are now 2,400 part-time schools run by the county authorities. In Zhongnan brigade, Nanhui County, where mushrooms have been grown for eight years, eight women took part in a training class which helped them cultivate first-class mushrooms and increase the output. Since then, the class has been expanded to enroll 400 peasants. In Huqiao Township Technical School, Fengxian County, 96 percent of the engineering students became qualified draftsmen upon graduation, and another 26 specializing in finance and accounting have all been employed by local production brigades. [Text] [OW010800 Beijing XINHUA in English 0727 GMT 1 Sep 84]

SHANGHAI URBAN AREA EXPANSION--Shanghai, 31 Aug (XINHUA)--Urban Shanghai will take over the administration of 22 nearby towns and townships tomorrow in its largest governmental readjustment to date. The move will expand Shanghai's urban area from 230 square kilometers to more than 340 square kilometers. The seven towns and 15 townships were formerly controlled by Chuansha, Shanghai, Jiading and Baoshan counties, all parts of Shanghai Municipality. A municipal spokesman said the readjustment would help spread Shanghai's urban population and ease communications and housing problems. [Text] [OW311608 Beijing XINHUA in English 1555 GMT 31 Aug 84]

CSO: 4000/454

SOUTHWEST REGION

PARTY CONSOLIDATION ACHIEVES PROGRESS IN YUNNAN

Kunming YUNNAN RIBAO in Chinese 26 Jul 84 p 1

[Article: "Eighteen of the Units Involved in the 1st Stage of Yunnan's Party Consolidation Have Begun Comparative Examinations"]

[Text] After review and approval, 18 of the units involved in the 1st stage of Yunnan's party consolidation have begun comparative examination work. As of 25 July, 11 units--including the Kunming Railroad Bureau, the Yunnan Normal University, the Yunnan Department of Commerce, the Yunnan Architectural Engineering Co, the Yunnan Industrial College, party committees in state agencies at the provincial level, the Yunnan Cadre School for Economic Management, the Yunnan Agricultural Institute, the Yunnan Statistical Bureau and the Yunnan Department of Machine-Building Industry--have convened expanded party committee conferences and meetings of all party members in each agency to conduct comparative examinations collectively.

These units have conscientiously studied the decision to launch party consolidation and all related documents and have identified the major problems they each must resolve. And the program of simultaneous consolidation and restructuring has begun to show results. In order to conduct comparative examination work properly, each unit made ample preparations, beginning from April, and in party group (party committee) and enlarged party group (party committee) meetings focused on the principal problems in leadership, initiated full discussions, summarized experience and lessons and unified thinking. Each unit integrated the upper with the lower levels by promptly reporting discussions concerning leadership to party members and by mobilizing the latter to help the unit party committee identify the principal problems in leadership. Meanwhile, each unit also held informal discussions with non-party personages so as to solicit opinions from all sides, and responsible comrades in some units initiated heart-to-heart talks with many people and listened to the latter's ideas.

The units that have conducted comparative examinations have conscientiously established as their guiding ideology the Central Committee's party-consolidation decision and Circular Nos 7, 8 and 9 from the Central Commission for Guiding Party Rectification; have emphasized investigation of the major problems in units' implementation of the party's line, guiding principles and policies; and have earnestly investigated the principal problems in units' work styles, discipline and organization.

12431
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NORTHWEST REGION

SECOND PHASE OF PARTY CONSOLIDATION BEGINS IN SHAANXI

Xian SHAANXI RIBAO in Chinese 23 Jul 84 p 1

[Article by Zheng Gang [6774 6928]: "A Group of Units Conducts the Second Phase of Party Consolidation Pilot Projects"]

[Text] A group of prefectural, city and county-level units has been selected as trial points for the second phase of party consolidation. The Shaanxi Provincial CPC Committee ordered party organizations in these units to conscientiously strengthen leadership of trial-point work and to complete this work with high standards and good quality so as to provide experience for the second stage of the province's party consolidation.

The provincial party committee selected the Xi'an party committee and agencies subordinate to the city and the Hanzhong party committee and agencies subordinate to the prefecture to be the trial-point units in party consolidation at these two levels. Prefectures and cities such as Xianyang, Baoji, Tongchuan, Weinan, Yan'an, Yulin, Shangluo and Ankang and provincial economic departments, and national-defense industry, science and education commissions, have, at the request of the provincial party committee, established trial-point party consolidation units, including organs under county party committees; industrial, communications, agricultural, forestry, public security and procuratorial agencies and people's courts under prefectural and city party committees; and institutions of higher learning and large enterprises.

The provincial party committee has placed great emphasis on the second stage of trial-point party-consolidation work and has decided to send liaison groups to the Xi'an and Hanzhong party committees. Bai Wenhua [4101 2429 5478], vice chairman of the Provincial Advisory Committee, has been named to head the liaison group stationed in Xi'an. The provincial party committee has also ordered all relevant prefectural and city party committees and economic agency, national-defense industry, scientific and education commission party organizations to send liaison groups to their subordinate trial-point units. The groups dispatched by the Weinan, Tongchuan and other prefectural party committees have already reached their posts. And must trial points have widely implemented ideological mobilization of party members and begun studying party documents.

12431

CSO: 4005/797

NORTHWEST REGION

RESOLUTIONS OF NINGXIA CPPCC REPORTED

Yinchuan NINGXIA RIBAO in Chinese 26 Jul 84 p 1

[Article: "Resolutions of the Eighth Expanded Conference of the Fourth Ningxia Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference Standing Committee (Passed 21 July 1984)"]

[Text] The Eighth Expanded Conference of the Fourth Standing Committee of the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference [CPPCC] attended the Seventh Meeting of the Fifth Standing Committee of the Ningxia People's Congress and heard reports by NPC Delegate Ma Qingnian [7456 7230 1628] on the spirit of the Second Session of the Sixth NPC and by CPPCC Delegate Ma Dezhong [7456 1795 6988] on the spirit of the Second Session of the Sixth CPPCC. Delegates and comrades attending the expanded NPC conference enthusiastically and conscientiously studied and discussed documents from the two national sessions and received much instruction and encouragement.

The expanded conference unanimously endorsed Premier Zhao Ziyang's government work report and the Regional National Autonomy Law of the PRC and the Military Service Law of the PRC passed by the NPC; resolutely supported the important proposals concerning economic work raised in Premier Zhao's report: to strengthen organizational restructuring and to further implement the policy of opening up to the outside world; and firmly endorsed the state's policies of returning Taiwan to the motherland, achieving unification and recovering sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997 and the special measures adopted for Hong Kong. The conference expressed the belief that we stand on the verge of a great era of economic development and revolution in new technology and that we must undertake much reform work. The CPPCC and delegates at all levels in Ningxia thus must conscientiously study and publicize Premier Zhao's report, adapt to reform and the new situation, propose constructive ideas and suggestions, give full play to the wisdom and strength of people of all walks of life, vigorously help the government complete all reform tasks and make new contributions to the achievements of the magnificent goals set by the 12th CPC Congress and to "the emancipation of Ningxia."

The conference expressed the belief that the Regional National Autonomy Law of the PRC upholds the principles of equality and unity among all nationalities, protects the democratic rights of all minorities to manage their own internal affairs and fully accords with the basic interests and common aspirations of

all nationalities. The promulgation and implementation of this major law will more firmly establish socialist national relations of unity and brotherhood among all nationalities and promote Ningxia's economic and cultural development. The CPPCC and delegates of all levels in Ningxia must vigorously assist the government in publicizing and implementing this law in order to enhance the great unity among all nationalities in the region so that we can jointly strive to achieve common prosperity.

The conference unanimously endorsed Chairman Deng Yingchao's [6772 7336 6389] speech, Vice Chairman Hu Zi'ang's [5179 1311 2491] report on the standing committee's work and the political resolutions of the CPPCC session. The conference expressed the belief that Chairman Deng Yingchao's proposals to maintain the excellent traditions of united-front and CPPCC work, conscientiously to implement political consultation and democratic supervision, to work together, to make many friends and to engage in self-education represent a summarization of our experience in united-front work, provide good material to carry out united front theoretical and policy reeducation and a guiding principle to effectively carry out the work of the CPPCC. This speech greatly encouraged and strengthened the confidence and resolve of all nationalities, democratic parties and patriotic personages to struggle for unity and to revitalize China. The speech will also play an important role in improving political-consultative work, expanding the patriotic united front and completing the three major tasks of the 1980's and 1990's. The CPPCC conferences and delegates of all levels in Ningxia must study conscientiously, propagandize widely, resolutely carry out all work and strive to improve all aspects of political consultative work!

12431

CSO: 4005/797

MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY AFFAIRS

XIAN ESTABLISHES ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY RESERVE FORCE

Xian XIAN WANBAO in Chinese 26 Jul 84 p 1

[Article: "Why Are We Establishing the Antiaircraft Artillery Reserves; Interview with He Chenghua, Secretary of the Municipal Party Committee and First Political Commissar of the Xian Military Subdistrict"]

[Text] On the eve of the 57th anniversary of the founding of the PLA, reporters from this newspaper interviewed He Chenghua [0149 2110 5478], secretary of the municipal party committee and first commissar of the Xian Military Subdistrict, and asked him some questions regarding the work of establishing the Xian Air Force Antiaircraft Artillery Reserve Unit and of concern of the masses.

Question: Why the name "reserve unit"?

Answer: Reserve duty is a form of military service, and a reserve unit is an armed organization that is formed during peacetime to meet the needs of emergency mobilization and to establish new army units during wartime. Reserve units are an important component of China's armed forces, are an important organizational form that facilitates rapid mobilization and expansion of our armed forces during wartime, represent a new development in China's military mobilization work in this new situation, constitute a major reform of China's military system and provide an important means by which to establish a better reserve-force system possessing Chinese characteristics.

Question: What is the difference between reserve units and militia organizations?

Answer: First, the responsibilities borne during wartime differ. Although militiamen will be responsible for enlisting to fight during future wars, these men will usually be assigned to hold their original positions, to defend cities and villages and to assist army-unit operations. Conversely, once war breaks out reserve units will be rapidly integrated into army units and will proceed to the battlefield. Second, the organizational forms differ. Militias are usually organized on the basis of companies and platoons, while reserves follow the army system of divisions and regiments and are formed according to the principles of local recruitment; combination into larger units; facilitation of rapid mobilization, training and familiarity between officers and soldiers; and coordinating the upper and lower levels, officers and soldiers and technology.

The targets of recruitment also differ somewhat. Core militiamen are usually selected from youths of ages 18 to 28, while reserves are selected according to the standards for army recruits. Reserves are to have political consciousness, good health and 2 years of military training and are to be selected primarily from core militiamen and demobilized army men. Not only do we need reserve troops, we must also recruit reserve officers.

Question: Why must we form a reserve unit? And why locate such a unit in Xian?

Answer: The formation of reserve units is a practical move in the comprehensive implementation of the Military Service Law and forms an important measure that accords with the guiding principles of our strategy of aggressive defense and that facilitates the strengthening of preparatory work for wartime mobilization. First, the formation of such units is a good means of implementing rapid mobilization. Since World War II, imperialists and hegemonists have frequently employed surprise attacks, undeclared war and preemptive measures in their military aggression. Thus when fighting breaks out, our ability to mobilize and respond quickly will have a great effect on battlefield developments. Proper organization of reserve units would greatly reduce the amount of time needed to form new army units and would meet the needs of battlefield developments. Second, the formation of reserve units is an excellent way of accumulating a supply of good soldiers. If able-bodied militiamen and, especially, retired soldiers are organized into wartime-strength reserve units and given strict education and training, we can ensure that we have abundant high-quality military strength to send to front when war comes. Third, the formation of reserve units provides an excellent way by which to reduce military expenditures and strengthen economic development and the buildup of national defense. When such units are established, we can reduce the size of the standing army, cut military expenses and concentrate material and financial resources in the four modernizations. In short, the formation of reserve units can reduce the number of troops maintained during peacetime and increase the number and quality of troops available during wartime.

Xian is the largest city in and the gateway to China's northwest, forms a communications hub linking the interior with the northwest and the southwest and occupies a vital strategic position. Thus it is very essential that we establish a reserve unit here to strengthen our defense capabilities. We must strive to do this work well.

Question: Some people assert that the establishment of reserve units implies that we are about to go to war. Is that really true?

Answer: That is a misconception. In the long term our objective in establishing reserve units is to prepare for war. As the saying goes, "with preparations one can dominate other people, without preparations, one is dominated by others." Confronted with turbulent international conditions, we cannot but be prepared. But this does not mean that war will commence immediately. We must be attentive to preventing evil people from spreading rumors, sowing destruction and obstructing the smooth establishment of reserve units.

Question: What kind of qualifications are required to become a reserve?

Answer: There are two types of reserves. The first consists of core militiamen and retired soldiers and specialized technicians who are registered for reserve service and under 28 years of age. The second includes ordinary militiamen, retired soldiers who are registered for reserve service and between the ages of 29 and 35 and other qualified citizens.

With the exception of a few officers who are on the active list, most reserve officers will be selected from among qualified demobilized soldiers, local cadres, college graduates, professional armed cadres, militia cadres and specialized technicians.

Question: In your work, what do you require of the city's party and government organizations and residents?

Answer: Our task of forming the Air Force Antiaircraft Artillery Reserve Unit was directly assigned by the PLA General Staff. Time is pressing, requirements are high, the scope involved is very broad, the work is very technical and the task is a pilot project. All levels of party and government organization and personnel and defense agencies must take the Military Service Law as a guide, steadily unify thinking, increase understanding, strengthen leadership and treat this work as a major task. All relevant agencies must actively cooperate and render the necessary human, material and financial support. The broad masses of cadres and people throughout the city must carry on and develop the excellent traditions of the Chinese people, correctly handle the relationship between the creation and the protection of wealth and between the implementation and the protection of the four modernizations and, with concrete action, enthusiastically support the work of forming the antiaircraft reserve unit. I believe that if everyone, high and low, works together, we are bound to complete this glorious task successfully and thus shall contribute to the strengthening of our national defense.

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CSO: 4005/797

TAIWAN PAPER HAILS RELATIONS WITH ARAB WORLD

OW190640 Taipei CHINA POST in English 16 Sep 84 p 2

[Editorial: "Closer ROC-Arab World Relations"]

[Text] Last Friday we observed in the editorial column that the Republic of China has established strong bonds of friendship with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, both of which are Arab nations. In fact, the ROC has developed friendly relations with many other Arab nations as well.

As Vice President Lee Teng-hui remarked in a written message to the 1984 convention of the Sino-Arabian Cultural and Economic Association, growing relations have been built between the ROC and many Arab nations with which it has no formal relations. These include Jordan, Bahrain, Oman, the UAE, Kuwait and Libya.

The vice president further pointed out that the ROC has established corresponding organizations in these nations, and that the Jordanian Commercial Office in Taipei has contributed substantially to the expansion of trade between the ROC and many Arab nations.

Ties between the ROC and Saudi Arabia have been particularly strong. The government of this Middle East kingdom has provided the ROC with a great deal of aid over the years. The many loans it has extended to the ROC have been a tremendous help to the ROC economy. In return, the ROC has helped Saudi Arabia with construction projects and the development of medical facilities. Cooperation and friendship on both sides have been built on a sense of justice let alone mutual understanding between them.

As for Arab nations with which the ROC has no diplomatic relations, as Vice President Lee stated, exchange of visits by business leaders and political figures and cultural intercourse have been increasing in recent years, contributing considerably to the expansion of relations between the two sides.

The reasons for such good relations are not far to seek. One factor is history. Long before contacts started between China and Europe, traders had travelled between China and Arabia. Their travels brought about the exchange of culture between the two ancient worlds.

A more important factor, however, is the many values and ideals the people of the ROC and the Arabs share. The Chinese virtues of kindness, honesty, forgiveness, among others, toward one's friends and neighbors are also required of the Muslims by their religion. Islam, which revolves around a belief in the Arab God, Allah, is incompatible with atheistic communism, which denies the existence of spiritual beings. Therefore, although some Arab nations associate with the Chinese Communist regime, they do so on the basis of political expediency and basically they remain anticommunist.

The ROC should strive to cement an even greater and closer relationship with these Arab nations. Such an effort is well worth the bridging between the Chinese and Arab civilizations.

CSO: 4000/002

TAIWAN

TAIWAN PREMIER VISITS EUROPEAN PRODUCTS EXHIBIT

OW070551 Taipei CNA in English 0256 GMT 7 Sep 84

[Text] Taipei, 6 Sep (CNA)--Former President Yen Chia-kan and Premier Yu Kuo-hwa Thursday made a 1-hour tour of the European products exhibition which will end Sunday, and they expressed their satisfaction over the success of the show.

The week-long exhibition, the second of its kind since 1981, is being held at the China External Trade and Development Council display center in Taipei's Sungshan domestic airport.

Former President Yen arrived at the exhibition site early Thursday and he carefully studied many items of the European products displayed at various stands, a spokesman for the exhibition organizers said.

Yen said that the symposia sponsored by the European participants have enabled the exhibitors and local manufacturers, as well as specialists, to exchange their views and they will help boost the nation's imports of European goods.

He pointed out that the meetings will undoubtedly be beneficial to lower the trade imbalance between this country and the European nations, and at the same time, they will allow European businessmen to have better understanding of the market potentials in Taiwan.

Later in the day, Premier Yu visited the exhibition halls. He said he was impressed by the sophisticated machinery and equipment at the Swedish hall.

After touring other exhibition stands, the premier expressed his belief that the current production show will enhance trade transactions between the Republic of China and Europe.

CSO: 4000/002

TAIWAN PRESIDENT'S SPEECH AT ASIA-PACIFIC MEETING

OW161730 Taipei CNA in English 1458 GMT 16 Sep 84

[Text] Seoul, 16 Sep (CNA)--President Chiang Ching-kuo said in his message on the occasion of the 20th General Assembly of the Asian-Pacific Parliamentarians' Union that the current international developments demonstrate that stability of the Asian-Pacific region is crucial to peace and prosperity of the free world.

The meeting will open in Seoul Monday. Full text of President Chiang's message follows:

The Asian-Pacific Parliamentarians' Union, in the spirit of its charter, has been moving forward with vigor since the enlargement of member countries. At the 20th General Assembly in Seoul, it is of special significance that the parliamentarians from member countries in the Asian-Pacific region, enjoying freedom and democracy, are meeting here to promote security, peace and prosperity in this part of the world.

The current international developments demonstrate that stability of the Asian-Pacific region is crucial to peace and prosperity of the free world. The military expansionism of the Soviet Union and the potential threat from Communist China have alerted the free countries in the Asian Pacific region to their anti-communist vigilance, and directed the attention of the free world on the importance of maintaining peace and security of this area. The APPU, through its continuous efforts, has made significant contribution in world affairs.

The important problems facing Asian-Pacific nations at present are to eliminate the development of crises in Asia-Pacific region to contain Soviet expansionism, to stop Chinese Communist infiltration and subversion, to help newly independent countries developing economies, and to organize a collective security system. The parliaments, governments and peoples of the Asian-Pacific nations must cooperate closely in a common effort for an early solution of the problems.

The Republic of Korea, an original member of the APPU, has made important contribution to the development of the Asian-Pacific Parliamentarians' Union. Acting as the host of this 20th General Assembly in Seoul, the Republic of Korea once again establishes determination to safeguard freedom--this is most gratifying.

I sincerely believe that all of you attending the general assembly, in your deliberations, will bring the functional leadership of the APPU into full play, will promote greater unity of all Asian-Pacific nations, and will make even greater and more constructive contributions in the efforts to maintain the security, peace and prosperity of this region.

Please accept my sincere congratulations, and best wishes for the success of the general assembly.

Taipei
17 September

Chiang Ching-kuo
President,

Republic of China

CSO: 4000/002

CHINA POST EDITORIAL MARKS ARMED FORCES DAY

OW102303 Taipei CHINA POST in English 6 Sep 84 p 4

[Editorial: "Armed Forces Day"]

[Text] The Republic of China celebrates Monday the Armed Forces Day with appropriate ceremonies to honor the heroes of the armed forces and various Chu Kuang units of different branches of the armed forces.

In commemorating this significant occasion, the people of this nation should pay homage to the valiant members of the armed forces for their untiring efforts in guarding this nation from a communist invasion as well as from upheavals and agitations from within. They also provide invaluable services to the farmers during their harvest time by rendering them assistance in harvesting the crops. They also rush to the aid of flood victims during typhoons and torrential rains. They are also courageous in helping the recent mine disasters victims and their families.

Their generosity in providing all these services to the community has not only made them an integral part but also much endeared them to all the people.

Needless to say, these social and philanthropic activities are merely a small portion of their duties. Their main tasks remain constant combat training and readiness to face the challenges from our potential enemy or enemies. In this regard the ROC armed forces constitute one of the strongest armies in the Asian and Pacific regions.

However, the ROC armed forces are faced with a strong force of the Chinese Communist regime whose aggressive designs know no bound. Thus, our forces are constantly under the threat of the Chinese Communists. The communist numerical superiority over our armed forces of about 10 to 1 renders the situation even more precarious and disturbing.

Fortunately, the ROC armed forces are qualitatively superior to Peking's armed forces. It has prevented the Peking regime from launching any invasion against us during the last 33 years after its disastrous defeat suffered from our forces in its attempted invasion of Kinmen in 1949 and 1958. Since then our armed forces' combat ability and mobility have been greatly enhanced while the Chinese Communist Armed Forces remain outdated and without much modern weapons.

The Chinese Communist invasion of Vietnam in 1972 has amply proven what kind of armed forces Peking can put forward in an invasion of its neighbors. The mad adventure launched by Teng Hsiao-ping to "punish" the Vietnamese turned out to be a debacle for the Peking regime without hurting the Vietnamese too much. The present fighting at the Vietnamese border proves once again the aggressive nature of the Peking regime as well as the indecisiveness and the weakness of its forces.

But as Peking has never given up its hope of invading Taiwan, we must be ever more alert to their evil intentions to subdue or conquer us. But with our high morale and unity in anti-Communist determination, the Chinese Communists would have a tough time in winning such a venture without prompting the United States to come to our assistance in our defense in accordance with the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act.

It is hoped, however, that the free world leaders realize the strategic importance of the Republic of China on Taiwan which holds the center of an island chain of defense in the Western Pacific. If it should be seized by any power unfriendly to the free world, it would cut the defense chain in the middle and render the whole defense untenable. If the Chinese Communists should be permitted to conquer Taiwan, then communist influence would spread to all nations in the Asian and Pacific region.

As it is, the Chinese Communists are trying to gain control of Hong Kong Red prematurely. Thus the armed forces of the Republic of China should be much strengthened and on the alert to defend peace and freedom of this region to prevent another communist aggression.

CSO: 4000/002

NAVY WATCHING JAPANESE FISHING NEAR PENGCHIA

OW201844 Taipei CNA in English 1448 GMT 20 Sep 84

[Text] Taipei, 20 Sep (CNA)--A flotilla of 40-odd Japanese fishing boats intruded upon the Republic of China's territorial waters around the Pengchia Islet, about 60 kilometers northeast of Keelung, early Wednesday and made away with a fishcatch worth nearly NT dlrs 20 million. The ROC Navy said Thursday it is watching closely developments around the small island.

In reply to questions about the incident, the navy headquarters here said safeguarding the safety and interests of the ROC fishermen operating within the nation's territorial waters is part of the cruising mission of the ROC's naval fleet.

Navy sources said the navy sent out planes and vessels to the scene immediately after receiving reports that Japanese fishermen were catching fish there. The navy planes saw Japanese fishing boats, but they disappeared when the navy's ships arrived, the sources added.

Experts with the Council for Agricultural Planning and Development said the "Taiwan-Penghu Joint Fishery Advisory Committee," composed of military and agricultural units, should ask the naval authorities to strengthen patrol missions and expell intruding foreign ships so as to protect the interests of the nation's fishermen.

These experts pointed out Thursday that Wednesday's incident was nothing unusual because the ROC Navy cruises the nation's territorial waters only when military maneuvers are staged and they rarely go on "fishermen-protection" missions.

They said calling on the Japanese authorities to stop their fishing boats from intruding upon the ROC territorial waters is but a negative action, adding that asking help from the navy is a much more positive way to avoid the losses to the nation's fishcatch.

CSO: 4000/002

COMMENTARY REPLIES TO REMARKS BY U.S. OFFICER

OW100503 Taipei CNA in English 0328 GMT 10 Sep 84

[Text] Taipei, 10 Sep (CNA)--Here is a commentary, CHICOM Design on ROC, aired by the Broadcasting Corp.

A United States Navy specialist has advanced the theory that Peking may attempt a naval blockade of Taiwan between 1985 and the end of the century if it failed to induce the Republic of China to surrender before then.

Cmdr David G. Miller, Jr based his projection on the argument that a military invasion would be costly to Red China in terms of manpower and materiel besides leaving its borders with Vietnam and the Soviet Union vulnerable, and that a naval blockade would be "virtually bloodless and risk free."

Muller spoke in subjunctive mood. But the Republic of China has no illusions about Peking's intention about the anti-communist bastion of Taiwan. The communists vowed to "liberate Taiwan with a blood bath" after they usurped power on the mainland.

Peking tuned down its rhetoric only after the death of Mao-tse-tung. Instead of talking about "liberating Taiwan," it is now calling for "peaceful reunification" with Taiwan partly to dissuade the U.S. from continuing arms sales to Taipei and partly to lure the people of free China into a false sense of security.

However, the Chinese communist leadership has at no time promised to rule out the use of force against free China. In the last couple years, the Red Army has been receiving intensive training in amphibious operations. It is obvious that the target is Taiwan.

The Republic of China is taking no chances and has been preparing for whatever form of military action Peking might take against Taiwan, because the free Chinese Government and people will under no circumstances accept a communist rule, no matter how sweet Peking's promises may sound.

Peking is aware of that too. It has not resorted to force only because the military balance of power in the Taiwan Straits has not yet tipped to their favor. Once the communist leadership is convinced that a cross-channel invasion will be a push-over, they will not hesitate to launch an attack on free China or resort to a naval blockade.

According to Comdr Muller, the U.S. will not come to the Republic of China's aid because Washington values its relationship with Peking, and Taipei might turn to the Soviet Union for help.

As a matter of fact, the Republic of China never expected the U.S. to help defend Taiwan after the termination of the mutual defense treaty in 1980. What Taipei asks is that the U.S. lives up to the Taiwan Relations Act, which calls for the sale of defensive weapons to the Republic of China.

So long as the Republic of China is adequately armed, Peking will think twice before it makes any rash moves, and the question of U.S. involvement will never occur.

As to the possibility of free China seeking Soviet help in case of emergency, it is just a speculation. The Republic of China has not forgot that it was the Soviet Union that was largely responsible for the fall of the mainland. And Taipei sees no merit at all in playing off one communist power against the other.

CSO: 4000/002

COMMENTARY SAYS 'REPUBLIC OF CHINA' PROPER NAME

OW070558 Taipei CNA in English 0304 GMT 7 Sep 84

[Text] Taipei, 6 Sep (CNA)--Following is a commentary, "What's in a Name?" aired by the Broadcasting Corporation of China on 6 September.

The free Chinese Government has given fresh instructions to its overseas missions and representative offices telling them to request foreign media to refer to the Republic of China by its correct name instead of "Taiwan," which is a province and presently seat of the government of the country.

What's the fuss? First, the name of a person or a country is the most important thing to the individual or the country concerned. Confucius declared 25 centuries ago, "make it certain that the correct name is used."

An Wei-chien, one of the six Chinese freedom-seekers who commandeered a Chinese Communist airliner to South Korea last year, was known as an Chien-wei for more than a year because of a mistake on the plane's passenger manifest. He immediately requested a correction after he and the other freedom-seekers arrived in Taipei last month. His request was promptly granted.

For the same reason, the Republic of China does not like itself to be called by an incorrect name. Nor do the people of the Republic of China like to be referred to as "Taiwanese."

One may call a New York resident "New Yorker" and a resident of Texas a "Texan" in the United States. But they are all known as "Americans" when they are traveling abroad.

The mix-up of the Republic of China's name is due partly to ignorance and partly to deliberate misinformation by the Chinese Communist regime, which has been trying to make the Republic of China a "Non country" and create the impression that free China on Taiwan is only a province under the communist flag. Unfortunately, most journalists in the West have been deceived.

To set the record straight, the Republic of China was founded by Dr Sun Yat-sen in 1912 and became the first republic in Asia. Some young correspondents of a few international news agencies erroneously described the Republic of China as a new country founded by the late President Chiang Kai-shek in 1949 after the communists overran the Chinese mainland. Greater absurdity there can be none.

The fact is that the Republic of China has been in continuous existence since 1912. It fought the Axis powers side by side with the United States and other allies in the Second World War and was a charter member of the United Nations.

Despite the communist usurpation of power on the mainland, the government of the Republic of China is not a government in exile. It is still in control of the Province of Taiwan and parts of Fukien.

Furthermore, the government in Taipei is the only legitimate government of China. A product of the Chinese constitution, its legitimacy has been periodically strengthened through popular elections.

Some journalists may worry about confusion because the Peking regime calls itself "People's Republic of China." The problem can be easily solved by referring to it as "Red China" or "Peking," while calling the Republic of China "free China," or even nationalist China."

Any way, calling the Republic of China "Taiwan" is a big mistake, those who knowingly persist in so doing are grinding Peking's ax without being paid.

CSO: 4000/002

BRIEFS

EUROPEAN STUDIES MEETING--Taipei, 9 Sep (CNA)--The first Tamkang European studies conference closed Sunday after the presentation sessions of 18 papers by scholars from European and Asian countries, and the host Republic of China, and discussion sessions. The closing ceremony was chaired by Chu Li-ming, a domestic scholar. On Sunday, the third day of the meeting, the emphasis of its agenda was placed on the trade of East and West Europe and its relations with the Republic of China. Other topics, including Europe and Africa, and the outer confrontation of Asian and Pacific region and security had also been discussed. The 3-day meeting, starting from 7 September, has not only paved the sound foundation for domestic research programs on Europe, but also made the nation's diplomatic relations with European countries step forward due to the achievement of a new phenomenon of academic interflow between the Republic of China and the European countries. [Text] [OW100301 Taipei CNA in English 0232 GMT 10 Sep 84]

MILITARY ACCELERATES RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT--The military is accelerating its research and development, and hopes to encourage the private sector to participate in the production of military goods and to develop an independent defense industry, the executive yuan said yesterday. In a written administrative report to the legislative yuan, the executive yuan said the military is strengthening its cooperation with the private sector to promote defense technology. A new set of regulations governing the production of military goods has been drawn up. Private willingness to take part in the production of military goods is expected to grow under the new regulations, the report stated. The military will help colleges and universities set up research centers to combine military and academic talents. In addition to the development of an independent defense industry, the executive yuan said, the military has spared no effort to seek innovative fighting tactics and transportation methods. The nation has been emphasizing the importance of an independent defense industry as arms sales from the United States which normalized relations with Communist China in 1978, meet increasing difficulties. [Text] [OW101033 Taipei CHINA POST in English 4 Sep 84 p 12]

CSO: 4000/002

XU JIATUN'S 'POLICY DECISION, PRACTICE'

HK100853 Hong Kong CHENG MING in Chinese No 83, 1 Sep 84 pp 11-13

[Article by Lu Chuan-chi [1687 0278 0796]: "Commenting On Xu Jiatun's 'Policy Decision and Practice'"]

[Text] Xu Jiatun, director of the Hong Kong branch of the XINHUA News Agency, attended a lunch meeting of the Lions Club of Tai Ping Shan on invitation on 9 August, at which he delivered a speech entitled "Policy Decision and Practice" to "accomplished professional men and women and industrialists who excel in their own line of [words indistinct]. However, after repeatedly weighing the speech, speaking bluntly, this writer found some questions raised in the speech difficult to [word indistinct].

Dare to Face the Question of Confidence Squarely

It is clear that this speech of Xu Jiatun was still aimed at the confidence crisis which widely prevails among the people of Hong Kong. He wished to give Hong Kong people a full view of the CPC's policy decisions on the future of Hong Kong in clear and summary terms so that they could realize that the CPC's policy decisions were in line with the spirit of "seeking truth from facts and looking far ahead from a great height" and "long-term policies formed through searching consideration." In a word: The people of Hong Kong may set their minds at ease. Xu Jiatun's boldness in squarely facing the confidence crisis which widely prevails among the people of Hong Kong is after all much better than the arbitrary assertion of some people that there exists no confidence crisis in Hong Kong, which is a gross deception.

In addition, judging from the "key note" of Xu Jiatun's speech and compared with his previous imposing stance of "coming to Hong Kong for its recovery" and the uncompromising stand he took not long ago in bitterly attacking the "colonialist solitary ministers and perverse sons," this attitude of his is more easily acceptable to the people of Hong Kong, for which we have to express appreciation.

Of the Three Sources of "Interference," Which is the Most Important?

However, after going through the speech, we have to say that in "doing ideological work," Xu Jiatun has not yet completely attained his goal because he failed to make an analysis of some crucial questions completely in the spirit of seek-

ing truth from facts and moreover, he replaced the analysis of history and reality with wishful thinking.

After dealing with the "scientific concept of 'two systems within one country'" and with the numerous policy decisions formulated according to this concept, which rest on "an ample objective basis and a profound mass basis," Xu Jiatun emphatically discussed the question of interference which may arise in the course of implementing these important policy decisions. If there is interference arising in the course of implementing the CPC's important policy decisions on the future of Hong Kong in the future, what could be its sources? Xu Jiatun held: "It could come from three sources." The order is "Interference coming from inside Hong Kong," "interference coming from the outside world," and "interference coming from the Chinese mainland."

Is this notion of three sources of interference correct? We find it difficult to say whether or not it is correct because it is merely a sort of forecast on possibilities. In fact, if any forecast has to be made, it is certain that interference does not come exclusively from the abovementioned sources. We have to consider that Xu Jiatun made such a definition on a higher plain. What merits intensively studying is which of the "three sources" of interference carries the heaviest "weight" in Xu Jiatun's eyes?

Judging from the order of the three-source interference which Xu Jiatun painstakingly arranged in his speech, evidently, what makes people most worried is, as he sees it, the "interference coming from inside Hong Kong," which comes first in the order, the "interference coming from the outside world" comes second, and that "coming from the Chinese mainland" last. If this sequence of interference sources is not enough to illustrate where the problem lies, let us weigh the words he used to elaborate the three sources of interference. This will help us fully understand which of the "three sources" of interference carries the heaviest "weight."

As for the first source of interference, Xu Jiatun used the remark of "we must be on guard and take all precautionary measures" to stress the seriousness of the interference. There is a considerable feeling "as if faced with a formidable enemy" in his remark. Speaking of the second source of interference which carried much less "weight," Xu Jiatun only urged that "our compatriots in Hong Kong should unite with all the foreign investors here to face outside challenges." What is the most interesting is the third source of interference. Xu Jiatun raised this question in this way: "What could be the third source of interference? To be frank, not a few of our compatriots in Hong Kong have fears that this could come from the mainland." This is a "witty" remark characterized exactly by the expressions of "to be frank" and "could."

"Interference could come from the mainland"--now the CPC itself is involved in this matter. Truly speaking, this matter, though hardly utterable, has to be mentioned. For this, Xu Jiatun used such "diplomatic terms" as "to be frank" and especially used the word "could." He was not so decisive and affirmative as when he dealt with the first two sources of interference. The embarrassment of Xu Jiatun "forcing himself to do a hard job" was clearly shown in his writing. This fully indicates that Xu Jiatun has underestimated the third source of interference that comes from the Chinese mainland.

What is Exaggerated and What is Minimized

It was appropriate for Xu Jiatun to say: "What really matters in judging various estimations and views is that we must all base ourselves on facts in order to achieve a rational analysis." When passing his "judgment" on the question of interference, has Xu Jiatun "based himself on facts?" He has not yet, as we see it. His "judgment" does not conform to realities in Hong Kong.

The confidence crisis of the Hong Kong people over the post-1997 Hong Kong can also be summarized as "a fear that interference might actually arise." They greatly appreciate the CPC's numerous "policy decisions" such as "recovering sovereignty over Hong Kong, guaranteeing the capitalist system remaining unchanged for 50 years," and "Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong," decisions designated to maintain the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong rather than opposing the notion of "two systems within one country." However, they are worried whether or not the implementation of these "policy decisions" can be guaranteed, or in other words, they are worried about the "interference" coming from inside the CPC which will repudiate the policy decisions formulated by the CPC itself. This is where the crucial point of the confidence issue lies. This is really what the Hong Kong people are thinking, the issue that carries the heaviest "weight," and also the matter against which "we must be on guard and take all precautionary measures."

Are the Hong Kong people well aware of the other sources of interference which may arise in the years after "1997?" Yes, they are. We do not doubt about the former two sources of interference listed by Xu Jiatun. However, "to be frank," as he was, these sources of interference are not significant enough to form a question of confidence.

Let us discuss the first source of interference in Xu Jiatun's terms. The possibility that "certain persons or some influential force in Hong Kong might not hesitate about sabotaging local social stability or even stirring up serious disturbances out of political prejudice or in pursuit of special privileges" is, as we see it, "nothing to be afraid of." For many years, in Hong Kong there have been quite a few persons "with political prejudice," and there has all along existed some influential force ready to "sabotage local social stability," and disturbances have been a common occurrence. However, Hong Kong's prosperity and stability has never been affected by these factors thanks to the practice of the rule by law. In Hong Kong, it seems people have never seen such a phenomenon in which "out of political prejudice or in pursuit of special privileges," "certain persons" could have managed to sabotage the stability of the Hong Kong community." However, so far as "great disturbances" are concerned, the "7 June incident" struck people most and up to this day they still have a lingering fear. It is precisely the CPC that instigated the incident and not "certain persons in Hong Kong" because they simply did not have such enormous capacities.

As for the second source of interference listed by Xu Jiatun, we cannot but regard it as "economic interference." In the last three decades, the phenomena similar to the one in which "competing for economic advantages, certain countries or organizations, out of selfish calculations, might adopt policies detrimental

to the economic interests of other countries and regions" were frequently seen. Let us put aside the instances of economic interference of the remote past and just have a look at the new textile rules on "country of origin" which the United States announced recently and wants to put into effect. This U.S. act serves as a blow to and interference in Hong Kong's economy. However, such interference has never been a scourge of the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong but on the contrary, in a certain sense, it can test and promote the competitiveness and adaptability of the Hong Kong economy.

Nevertheless, Xu Jiatun regarded these two sources of interference as two important factors menacing Hong Kong's prosperity and stability and touched lightly on the interference coming from the Chinese mainland. This shows that there is still a wide gap between the understanding of Xu Jiatun and that of the Hong Kong people on the Hong Kong issue. However, we hope this is merely a question of "understanding" and not one of "seeking truth from facts."

How Does the Desire of Man Replace Facts?

It seems that we will have no excuse if we say Xu Jiatun has some trouble in understanding things. As the director of the Hong Kong branch of the XINHUA News Agency who is living in Hong Kong, Xu Jiatun gets in touch with the Hong Kong media every day. It is impossible for him not to really understand where the crux of the Hong Kong issue lies. With his speech entitled "Policy Decision and practice," Xu Jiatun made extraordinary painstaking efforts to do publicity and persuasion work among the Hong Kong people in light of their lack of confidence in the CPC. What a pity his speech still failed to untie the fast knot in the hearts of the Hong Kong people. For example, after specifically admitting to the "worriers" of the Hong Kong people--"they are worried whether the policies adopted now for Hong Kong might change, or class struggles and political campaigns might be launched, or the policy of mutual benefit might be replaced by one in which China would benefit from Hong Kong in a one-way trade, and so on," he said, "let me solemnly declare: Such interference shall never be allowed to take place." Obviously, like the promises made in the past by the other leaders who held supreme positions in the CPC, this "solemn" stand taken by Xu Jiatun cannot be so effective as to boost the confidence of the Hong Kong people. Xu Jiatun still tried to replace the analysis of objective realities with subjective desire.

True, we have all reasons to believe the promises made by the leaders of the CPC and the "solemn" statement issued by Xu Jiatun but the development of objective reality hardly depends on man's will. The promise or the statement of "never be allowed" is one thing, however whether or not you can ensure that interference in objective reality will never arise is another. If objective reality could be entirely dependent on the subjective will of a certain person, the question of confidence could have completely vanished long ago.

Allowing or not allowing out of subjective thinking is one thing and the way objective laws develop is another. This is common sense. For example, the Chinese people enjoy the freedom of speech, assembly and association, which is absolutely "allowed" by the "Constitution of the PRC" but the facts are that the "Democracy Wall" in Beijing's Xidan was pulled down, the unofficially run

magazines were banned, Wang Ruoshui's articles refuting Hu Qiaomu were hardly published. ... "Defying laws human and divine" is an argument which the current leaders of the CPC have repeatedly declared as a practice which "shall absolutely never be allowed to take place." However, from the newspapers of the CPC, we can see this lawless act of cadres is still rife in some places in present-day China. One most vivid example at the moment is that the department concerned in Guangzhou took away the re-entry permit of a woman team leader of a travel agency, who belonged purely to the working class. If something happens with the boss of an agency, should his workers be punished together with the guilty? It was not until the Hong Kong branch of the XINHUA News Agency personally acted as a mediator that the team leader was allowed to return to Hong Kong. Can this be averted by the statement of "never be allowed to take place?"

Now let us discuss the question of class struggles and political campaigns, a question which strikes terror into Hong Kong people. It is not Xu Jiatun alone who said in the future Hong Kong class struggles and political campaigns "shall never be allowed to take place." On the Chinese mainland, have the leaders who hold supreme positions in the CPC not vowed solemnly "we must not launch any more class struggles and political campaigns?" However, during the "combat-crime" campaign, HONGGI, organ of the CPC, published volumes in succession about class struggle in the new period. The "political campaigns" which were not publically claimed to be political campaigns were still staged one after another. They included the campaigns to "struggle against the bourgeois liberalization" and to "eliminate spiritual pollution," campaigns which were not called campaigns. Is all this also "allowed" by Xu Jiatun to take place? Nevertheless, things did happen. This is called "objectives laws being independent of man's will." This is precisely where the "worry" of the Hong Kong people lies.

Don't Indulge Excessively in "Empty Talk"

We hope the CPC is sincere in making concrete self-criticism and analysis of its errors before the Chinese people (including the Hong Kong people), errors including not only what Mao Zedong pursued in the past but also those which, to this day, have not yet been corrected or have been repeated and is not just mouthing promises made by certain leaders of the CPC out of subjective wishes. With this sincerity, we believe the question of lack of confidence of the Hong Kong people can largely be settled.

It is a pity that quite a few leaders of the CPC have not yet managed to take this convincing fact-finding attitude and practice. Even the enlightened Xu Jiatun also made the mistake of not daring to speak the truth in his speech, in which he said: "The CPC is an open and noble-minded party, a party which takes a responsible attitude toward the people, and therefore it is also a party which never hesitates to admit its mistakes and correct them. Political parties anywhere in the world that never made mistakes are few. But as I see it there are not many which are as bold as the CPC in openly admitting its own mistakes and rousing the people to criticize them." In saying so, he was suspected of "telling lies and indulging in bragging and in empty talk" or at least "indulging in bragging and in empty talk." Here we would like to remind the CPC of noticing the following two facts:

First, it is a fact that the CPC openly admitted its mistakes and is also correcting them. However, it did so only after the principal leaders who committed the mistakes had stepped down from the historical stage. The leaders who are in power will never admit and correct their mistakes and moreover, even aware of their gross mistakes, they will insist in asserting that their line, principles, and policies are "Marxist-Leninist" and correct. This is the reason why the CPC made gross mistakes and failed to correct them for a long time. As we see it this phenomenon is also rarely seen in the world. We should like to ask: Under the control of such "laws," how can we blindly cast away the confidence crisis?

Second, it is also a fact that the CPC openly admitted its mistakes, even such a gross mistake as the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" but it did not admit all its mistakes in the spirit of seeking truth from facts. For example, while declaring no longer launching class struggles and political campaigns which took "proletarian dictatorship" as the theoretical basis, the CPC has still stubbornly clings to the "proletarian dictatorship" and still more regards it as the mainstay. Again for example, the "Great Cultural Revolution" was obviously personally initiated by Mao Zedong and also the product of Mao's basic thought and theory and the representative achievement of his which turned him into his opposite. However, when negating the "Great Cultural Revolution," the CPC is trying hard to separate Mao's mistake in launching the "Great Cultural Revolution" from his essential aspects. May we ask: Can the practice of negating the "Great Cultural Revolution" on the one hand and affirming Mao Zedong's achievements on the other hand be justified as really admitting and correcting mistakes?

At present there is an instance that makes people not know whether to laugh or to cry, namely, Beijing's bimonthly RENKOU YANJIU (Population Study) No 1 carried a special collection of articles including an article written by Xu Dixin, an economic authority of the CPC. To our surprise, they unanimously praised the "contributions made by Comrade Mao Zedong in China's population work." It was said that "Comrade Mao Zedong took a clear-cut and correct attitude toward China's drive to practice family planning" and that the views of Ma Yanchu and those of comrades Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai on the population problem were identical but such views were only "weighed down by Kang Sheng's subjective assertion that 'the more hands we have, the more vigorous our enthusiasm will become'." "To let Comrade Mao Zedong against Ma Yanchu" "did not tally with historical facts." ...So that is the "historical facts" of communists! If the view of Mao Zedong and Ma Yanchu were "identical," would Mao's purge of Ma Yanchu not have become the ravings of politicians? How can all this make people convinced?

It can thus be seen that the CPC will not thoroughly admit its mistakes even if it admits them and particularly it will never easily admit the mistakes it committed in the matters vital to its rule. At the same time, in admitting its mistakes, the CPC completely shifted the blame, as often as not, onto the notorious "gang of four" rather than doing it in a fact-finding manner. Is this practice still praiseworthy?

Therefore, after studying Xu Jiatun's speech, while affirming his boldness in squarely facing the problem of the confidence crisis prevailing among the Hong Kong people, we have to point out: He is still not adequately realistic in approaching matters concerning the Hong Kong issue. His speech once again revealed the deep-rooted unpractical habits of leaders of the CPC of indulging in exaggerations and glossing over errors. This revelation is of no benefit at all to the elimination of the confidence crisis prevailing among the Hong Kong people. Is it not more practical and realistic for the CPC itself to make a detailed and fact-finding self-criticism and analysis of its own mistakes?

CSO: 4005/019

COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA, MILITARY RELATIONS EXAMINED

Hong Kong CHENG MING /CONTENDING/ in Chinese No 81, Jul 84 pp 22-24

/Article by Zhang Ming /4545 2494/: "Communist Party of China's Relations with the Military"/

/Text/ Once Deng Xiaoping announced that troops would be stationed in Hong Kong, public opinion was stirred up and the Hang Seng /stock exchange/ Index sharply fell 30 points. Since the emergence of the Hong Kong question the stock market has been jumping, but a fall as quick and large as this one is truly unprecedented. It appears the explanation is that the people of Hong Kong fear the People's Liberation Army, and even fear the Communist Party!

If this is the case, it is purely a misunderstanding on the part of the people of Hong Kong, and a lack of understanding of the CPC's "party-military relationship."

The core idea behind the Chinese Communists' establishment of an army is, "The party commands the gun, and will never allow the gun to command the party." The party's absolute control over the military must be ensured. The military can only be a tool for the party; "it does whatever the party says." Such a party-military relationship has become an over one-half century tradition. It is reckoned that after 1997 there will not be a substantial change, although there is no lack of contradictions between the party and the military.

How was such a tradition of the party commanding the gun brought about?

Struggles Within the Military in the Early Stage of the Chinese Communist Party

The Chinese Communist Party founded the army on 1 August 1927, in the Nanchang Uprising. It was mainly engaged in military transport work at the time. However, 2 years earlier the CCP Central Committee had established a Military Affairs Department, with Zhang Guotao /1728 0948 3614/ serving as the first director. In 1926 Zhou Enlai succeeded him. Because of KMT-CCP cooperation, political work done by CCP members within the National Revolutionary Army cannot be considered underground activity. There were many active CCP members in the Northern Expedition Army. Zhou Enlai was vice chairman of the Whampoa Military Academy's Political Division. There were many Left-leaning students at the military school, a portion of which later became high level military

officers in the Red Army. The Nanchang Uprising split the KMT and CCP, and the CCP realized that there would be a way out only by "opposing armed counter-revolution with armed revolution" (Stalin on the Chinese Revolution). The uprising was led by Zhou Enlai; thereafter the CCP had its own military power.

After the establishment of the Red Army, there began a struggle within the party over leadership authority. At the time the Red 4th Route Army of the Jiangxi Soviet led by Mao Zedong and Zhu De had 20,000 men. Later there was Peng Dehuai's 5th Route Army, to which was added in 1930 a unit based in western Fujian, forming the Red Army's "First Front Army" with Zhu De as commander in chief and Mao Zedong as general political commissar. In order to guarantee the party's leadership over the Red Army, a Front Line Committee was established in the army (Front Committee), and Mao also served as its secretary. In 1933 the Central Red Army expanded to almost 100,000 men.

After moving from Shanghai to Jiangxi Soviet in 1931, the CCP Central Committee established the first "Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party" in its history, chaired by Xiang Ying /7309 5391/. Mao Zedong's military authority in the Soviet area began to be pushed aside. Xiang Ying used centralized leadership as an excuse to dismantle the General Front Committee and remove Mao from the posts of secretary of the Front Committee and general political commissar. Mao was reduced to chairman of the General Political Department.

Mao did not take this lying down and in November 1931, established a Central Soviet government with himself, the founder, chosen as chairman. He also served as chairman of the Revolutionary Military Affairs Committee under the central government. Zhu De was head of the government's Military Affairs Department as well as chairman of the military's "Red Army Military Affairs Commission." Four organizations with military authority were set up at once, and one can see that in the Jinggang Mountain period contention marked the struggle for party-military authority.

Mao Zedong Seizes Military Authority First

After Zhou Enlai, director of the Central Military Affairs Department, arrived at the Soviet area in 1931, the Central Military Affairs Commission and the Central Military Affairs Department were merged, and he served as general political commissar of the Red Army and secretary of the Soviet area's Central Bureau. In 1934 Zhou took over Xiang Ying's chairmanship of the Central Military Commission, and at the same time Zhang Wentian /1728 5113 1131/ succeeded Mao as chairman of the Second Session of the Central Soviet Government. Zhu De assumed the chairmanship of the subordinate government Military Commission. Mao, who had had military posts, at this time completely lost his authority in the Red Army.

The weaknesses of that group of foreign educated students commanding the barrel of a gun (plus their foreign advisor, Li De /2621 1795/), have finally been exposed. The defeat of the 5th /Communist/ Suppression Campaign gave Mao an opportunity. In January 1935, at the Zunyi Meeting on the Long March, the Central Committee was reorganized. Mao entered the Standing Committee of the

Politburo, but more importantly he replaced Zhou Enlai, becoming the third chairman of the Central Military Commission. Mao had not won the party's "chairmanship"; at the time there was only a general secretary, held by Zhang Wentian. Only after arriving at Yanan did the power over the party actually reside in Mao's hand (the situation is somewhat like Deng Xiaoping's today, although Zhang Wentian's power was even less than Hu Yaobang's). Not until the "Seventh Congress" 10 years later did Mao magnificently ascend the throne of party chairmanship.

In 1938 Mao said that in their struggle for military authority, Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek and the warlords passed on to their successors valuable experience; they would never settle on being "I, your unworthy chairman." Mao really was this way. He continuously clung to the chairmanship of the Military Commission for 41 years; he clutched it until death. In his opinion, once he had gained military authority, he also had party and political power. Before the founding of the country in 1949, he often issued military commands and appointments in the name of the "Central Military Commission." This did have authority during the war, and so Zhang Wentian, the oligarchical general secretary, found it convenient to remain unknown to the public and Wang Ming /3769 2494/, who returned from Moscow, was helpless and was defeated in several trials of strength.

In reality, military power prevailed throughout the Civil War period, training great numbers of military affairs personnel and cadres, but not party cadres. General Xu Guangda /6079 0342 6671/ quite clearly said, in 1962, "Due to the length and complexity of China's Revolutionary War, we can without exaggerating say that the entire party understands military affairs and is long experienced in war exercises. Almost every party member can conduct war; all have a certain knowledge and experience in military affairs."

Mao Zedong acted as a master of guerrilla warfare. In the struggle for political power with the KMT, he reduced the contradictions between party and military to the lowest degree, and succeeded in covering them up completely.

Peng Dehuai Devoted to Military Modernization

However, once this party captured the whole country, it was confronted with the new task of national modernization, and the wartime model for consolidation of party, government and military faced a challenge.

It was Peng Dehuai who raised this challenge. He was said by Edgar Snow to have been a Red Army marshal of great warmheartedness, using his moving and tragic fate to prove that he was a military genius and a brave politician. What is dramatic about this is that he was struck down by Mao Zedong and consequently humiliated to death. This was not because he strove to end the guerrilla traditions of the Chinese Communist Army; it was because he politically opposed Mao's blind ultra-Leftist line. In the CCP Central Committee's August 1958 formal resolution regarding Peng's antiparty clique, there is not one word condemning his military line. Nonetheless, several years later his "capitalist military line" finally encountered an assessment.

In 1953 when Peng Dehuai returned home from the battlefields of Korea, he became the CCP's first minister of national defense to support the modernization and renovation of the armed forces. Perhaps the costly Korean War made him even more convinced that the CCP's self-satisfied military organization could not meet the demands of modern warfare. He drew on the Soviet Red Army's experience, proposed a "regularization" policy of army building, and stressed the scientific nature of warfare. This was fundamentally contrary to Mao's empiricist thought on people's warfare and no doubt his opposition to the "Three Red Banners" was merely the manifestation of his worldview in the area of politics.

From the Lushan Plenum to the Cultural Revolution, in essence, Peng Dehuai's hard lot was a struggle between the military reform faction and the party's conservative faction; Mao Zedong relied on the party's and his own absolute authority over the military to suppress Peng's faction.

Lin Biao was waiting for the chance to rise up. As it turned out, his entire military thought, strategies and tactics were an exaggeration of the weak points of Mao's military theories, founded on dialectical materialism which makes contradictions and struggles absolute. In the age of nuclear missiles he advocated an army-building policy of "revolutionization," fearing neither suffering nor death. This shows that the thought of Mao and his great group of followers had already become rigid. They really did not understand what modern warfare is. As a party and state ruler, Mao cared only for power. When he retreated to the second line, he still did not relinquish power over the army, and was yet the chairman of the party and Military Commission. He gave the "National Defense Committee," this house of idle talk on general warfare military deliberations, to the state chairman, Liu Shaoqi, to enjoy.

Guns Did Not Command the Party in the "Cultural Revolution"

The radical line of the Mao-Lin clique had already lost reasonable control by the Cultural Revolution. They turned a great country of 800 million into a super military camp. They carried out their theory of people's warfare under the incitement of the feverish slogans, "All the people are Soldiers," "We Must Prepare to Fight a War" and "World War is Inevitable." At the "Ninth Congress" Mao said, "It was nothing but a scolding of our military-bureaucratic dictatorship." When the whole country was in great turmoil, he succeeded in using the military, which was poisoned by modern superstitions, to clean up the messy situation and put into practice overall military control.

Several Western Sinologists believe the Cultural Revolution was an exception to "the party commands the gun"; it was guns that commanded the party.

To be sure, all levels of the party organization were paralyzed in the period of rebellion and power seizing. Those who took power were army representative exercising military administration. In the (9th Plenum) Central Committee meeting, the proportion of military men was 39 percent. Despite this, it is still hard to determine whether guns commanded the party.

First, a portion of the party's leadership was not paralyzed, and in fact had gotten even stronger. The central party, government and military led by Mao, Lin and Zhou still effectively commanded the whole country. Due to the purges at every level, its ability to control could even reach the grassroots. This central ruling body made for a totalitarian state. In essence it had not the slightest change; as before, it was Mao's line and policies.

Second, although military personnel at all levels had authority, they were still loyal to Mao and carried out central directives. There were no purely military orders.

All levels of mass organizations also complied with central policies, and because of this, incidents antagonistic to the military representatives often arose.

Therefore, if one says it was not the party commanding the gun, one can only say a dictator commanded it or that the gun had not commanded the party. Otherwise one cannot explain how Mao could rule during the Cultural Revolution. Just one word from him was enough to strike down or liberate anyone.

In the circle of the Central Committee, even Lin Biao's power was repeatedly limited; he said that the People's Liberation Army was created, led and commanded by Mao. Mao bluntly asked, Cannot the creator command? Lin wanted to set up a state chairmanship, but Mao opposed it. In the end Lin's grab for power was unsuccessful. He was driven to revolt, and lost his life in trying to flee the country. Does this episode that was shocking to the world not indicate that under the Chinese Communist system, guns in command of the party is more difficult than going to heaven.

In October 1976, the coup planned by Hua Guofeng, Ye Jianying and others also was not military in substance, but only the utilization of Army Unit 8341. The gang of four was obsessed with ambition, but military power at its height only dragged out a director of the General Political Department (Zhang Chunqiao [1728 2508 2890]), and one issue of the JIEFANG JUNBAO [Liberation Army Daily]. They could not but accept the grasping of military power by the purged and rehabilitated Deng Xiaoping. (In 1975 Mao appointed Deng first vice chairman of the Military Affairs Commission and chief of the General Staff.)

Deng Xiaoping For the First Time Tries to Separate the Party and Military

Only after the second rehabilitation of Deng could the modernization of the Chinese Communist Army truly get on the agenda. As a premise, and Deng could adopt no other, he still had to resort to special skills in the struggle for power. Since taking over as chief of General Staff in 1977, he gradually strengthened and expanded his own power in the military. Seemingly all could be reformed and changed. However, party leadership was sacred and inviolable so he could not yield control of the army. In 1982 and 1983, he did not occupy the highest post in the party or government, merely two Military Commission chairmanships (just as Lin Biao installed his wife, Zhuo Lin, as an advisor in the Military Commission Office). With regard to seizing military power, he definitely did not copy Mao's enmity in betrayal.

Following the Whatever faction's fall from power, it was difficult to repeat the advocacy of war throughout the country and militarization. The "three branches and two armies" of the Cultural Revolution recently said no formally. A posture has appeared in the military reform that will surpass those of the Peng Dehuai period.

Deng Xiaoping allowed the party chairmanship and Military Commission chairmanship to separate, for the first time in 40 years in the CCP. In 1977, the 50th anniversary of the army's founding, Ye Jianying still spoke at length on the party's absolute leadership over the military, saying that political work was a life and death matter and that Mao's military thought was universally applicable. But in 1982, the army's 55th year, Military Commission Secretary Yang Shengkun's anniversary essay did not mention this at all, but spoke of better troops and weapons, military science equipment, not being satisfied with troop development from a single infantry into a compound military with many types of troops, etc. Besides, in 1979 there already were over 50 military schools openly seeking students. Not only did officers of all ranks have determined ages for military service, but an equivalent education was also required. Certain strategic principles were also publicly discussed.

In the CCP Central Committee, the proportion of military personnel is gradually decreasing. It was 39 percent in the "9th Congress," 31 percent in the "10th" and "11th" and 21 percent in the "12th." Compared with the "9th Congress," the "12th" has almost one-half less.

Are these not indications that reforms in the separate party and government systems will lead to a separation of the party and military? Is it possible for changes to occur in the political system of the Chinese Communist military, the political commissar's system and the class line?

"Military Nationaliation" Gives No Cause for Optimism

It looks as if there is still no cause for optimism. The present reforms have more or less evolved from two driving forces.

On the one hand, the 30-year-long struggle between the two lines has made the military suffer heavy casualties. Only taking three important posts as examples, three out of five ministers of national defense have fallen from power in the course of power struggles; six of eight chiefs of the general staff have been dismissed from office and lost power, and five chairman of the General Political Department have been removed. Adding to this other high-ranking officers, the losses suffered exceed the total for all previous wars. (In war, rank and file casualties are always heavy.)

On the other hand, to avoid this is terribly difficult. Since the CCP founded the country, it has fought three wars, the Korean War, the Sino-Indian Border War and the Sino-Vietnamese Border Conflict. These three were not fought perfectly. In particular the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War was even moreso a test that exposed weak points in the CCP military's lack of modernization. It was keenly felt within the military.

Thus, Mao Zedong's military thinking cannot remain perfect all alone under the ceaseless attacks of the surging tide of self-examination within the party and the country. Actually, the roots of 30-year-old problems in the military reside in Mao's military thinking; however, it is empiricism that still hinders the liberation of thinking. Under his leadership, it has been, "Defeat Chiang Kai-shek" and "Without Chairman Mao There Would Be No New China." His military thinking is totally intolerant to criticism. Looking at the orthodox view of warfare, military theory has ultimately become the greatest forbidden zone. In recent years, practically no articles are seen on this aspect of "liberalization." At present Deng Xiaoping himself has become used to "saying little and doing much" to confront this difficult problem. As for the fundamental problem of "military nationalization," however, it is possible that much will be said but little done.

They hold that the fundamentally different principle between a proletarian army and a capitalist army is just like the four that are upheld and cannot be renounced, the party's leadership and political work over the military; there is no prospect of renouncing them.

Several years back Ye Jianying had said, "Our army is a military group that carried out revolutionary political tasks. Warfare is not merely a military struggle, but also serves political struggles. It is political wars that are fought in many cases." It is our observation that this is an important aspect which the Chinese army cannot bear to look at.

12615

CSO: 4005/746

BACKGROUND OF GENG BIAO, HUANG HUA INCIDENT DISCUSSED

Hong Kong CHENG MING /CONTENDING/ in Chinese No 81, Jul 84 pp 25-27

/Article by Zhu Yuan /2612 3104/: "The Inside Story of the Geng Biao and Huang Hua Incident. It has been Over a Year Since Deng Xiaoping Sent a Work Group to Investigate the Geng Biao Problem. Deng has Long Intended to Send Him Packing But was Dissuaded by his Supporters Because Geng is not an Easy Character to Get Rid of..."

/Text/ Deng Xiaoping's angry rebuke of Geng Biao and Huang Hua in public has created a furor in Hong Kong public opinion over the past month. The abruptness, drama and connotations of the incident are sufficient grounds for entering it in the history of the Communist Party of China's interparty struggles. If one were to write a history of Hong Kong or a history of the "1997 question," note would certainly be made of Deng Xiaoping's rare performance.

His Excellency Deng deliberately acted out the role of an impassioned guardian of sovereign dignity. The people of Hong Kong, however, do not applaud his performance. The question is not one of accepting or rejecting the policy to station troops in Hong Kong but rather the manner in which this policy was formulated. The people of Hong Kong, who have never cared much about politics, have been strikingly made to take a class in it by His Excellency Deng, thus directly observing how motions are made for policies in the Chinese Communist totalitarian system!

It is worth exploring for a moment what else was not revealed by Deng Xiaoping's patriarchal behavior. As for the question of stationing troops, Geng Biao was not the first to take such a stand. Long before, Liao Chengzhi /1675 2110 1807/ and Ji Pengfei both said that troops need not be stationed in Hong Kong and that it was uncertain whether troops would be stationed there after 1997. Yet it was disastrous once spoken by Geng Biao. Huang Hua did not even mention the stationing of troops yet he was roundly cursed as well. There is clearly more to this than meets the eye.

Geng Biao Had Vested Interests in the "Cultural Revolution"

If an analysis is made that Geng Biao, Hung Hua and Deng Xiaoping were in opposing factions, then this incident is even less surprising.

Although Geng and Huang were not seen as part of the "Whatever Faction," in reality they at least had vested interests in the Cultural Revolution. The Cultural Revolution made Geng Biao in particular rapidly go up in the world and have grandeur.

Considering qualifications and records, Geng Biao had been a cadre during the Red Army period. He came from the fourth term at the Whampoa Military Academy. He was a company commander in the Yeting army during the Northern Expedition. In 1927 he participated in the Nanchang Uprising; during the Long March he was a regimental commander under Lin Biao and was promoted to commanding officer of a column in the War of Resistance. In 1948 he was a deputy commander in the famous Yang-Luo-Geng army unit (directly under the 19th unit), and participated in the Beiping-Tianjin Campaign. After the Chinese Communists founded the country, he was transferred to foreign affairs from 1950 on, perhaps because he had been the CPC representative to the military cooperation department during the period of national cooperation. He was successively ambassador to Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Pakistan and Burma. However, up until the Cultural Revolution in 1966, there was no indication that Geng was rising to power and position. (For a time he had been a deputy foreign affairs minister but was removed from office; his military rank was but a young general. His military colleague, Yang Dezhi, was a general, while Luo Ruiqing was both a general and chief of the general staff.)

In the early part of the Cultural Revolution, along with the other diplomatic envoys stationed overseas, he was recalled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to study behind closed doors. He watched helplessly as Luo Ruiqing was labelled an antiparty element. He twice jumped from a building in an attempt to commit suicide; his legs were broken in the fall yet he was still packed into a basket and raised up for criticisms and denouncements. Although they were both in command, Yang Dezhi was considered an example when he closely followed the central authorities in the Jinan Military Region and supported Wang Xiaoyu's /3769 2400 4416/ seizure of authority from the Provincial CPC Committee. Geng, who had a long relationship with Lin Biao, threw his lot in with the Mao-Lin clique. He instantly saw results; in 1968 he became the first ambassador stationed overseas during the Cultural Revolution, to the Chinese Communists' only European ally, Albania. In 1969 he was elected to be a Central Committee member of the "Ninth Party Congress." Of the nearly 300 persons who composed the Central Committee, only 3 were foreign affairs cadres. It is obvious that Geng Biao already enjoyed the trust of Mao, Lin and Jiang /Qing/.

In December 1970, Geng Biao was reassigned to be director of the International Liaison Department of the Central Committee. He promptly returned to China. In March 1971, he accompanied Zhou Enlai on a visit to North Vietnam in this capacity. In order to strengthen the "Party's centralized leadership," Geng became the leader responsible for foreign affairs in the Liaison Department, was the head of the Foreign Affairs Group of the State Council, and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Foreign Economic Relations were also under his overall leadership. Prior to the Cultural Revolution, the Foreign Affairs Group was called the Office of Foreign Affairs and was chaired by Marshall Chen Yi. At that time it was only concerned with contacting foreign political parties and exporting revolution. Domestically it had no authority

to govern foreign affairs. At the time, Liu Ningyi and Wu Xiuquan, cadres rich in foreign affairs experience, were minister and vice minister, respectively. At the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, Liu was labelled a "traitor" and Wu stepped aside. In 1967 the Liaison Department was taken over by the military.

Geng Biao had climbed to a position similar to Chen Yi's; at the end of the Cultural Revolution he was almost like Zhou Enlai's other assistants, but he was not put in important positions by the gang of four nor did Jiang Qing's cabinet name list include him. Nonetheless he still had a certain real power; he was still a Central Committee member in the "10th Party Congress," definitely related to Zhou Enlai and Kang Sheng's dual leadership (Kang Sheng controlled relations with overseas leftist factions).

It was very natural that Geng Biao should appear in a similar position to Hua Guofeng in the "Central Standing Committee" during the critical moment in 1976 when Zhou and Mao had died and the gang of four showed their hand. In the October coup, he was the person fully responsible for taking over the propaganda organs which the gang of four controlled. Another great achievement was hereby recorded in his contribution book. Consequently, he calmly and coolly climbed to the peak of his power during the Hua Guofeng period. In the "11th Party Congress" of 1977, 68 year old Geng Biao in one leap became a member of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, a post that his old war buddies Luo Ruiqing and Yang Dezhi had never attained. Then in 1978 he was appointed as a vice premier, number 6 of 18 (listed only after several senior statesmen). In 1980 he became secretary general and a standing committee member of the Central Military Commission. In 1981 he succeeded Xu Xiangqian as minister of national defense. It may be said that he enjoyed both office and fortune, but supreme arrogance comes with great power.

Geng Biao's Loss of Power was Unavoidable

That was a period of fierce fighting when the Deng-Hu faction was waging war with the Whatever faction to knock Hua Guofeng off his horse. Deng Xiaoping refused to rid the power group of the Cultural Revolution and Whatever factions. His new policies and successors had no guarantee of success. Furthermore, the Whatever faction was quite helpless. They slipped on dear old Mao's tiger skin and had the good name of ridding the people of a scourge by smashing the gang of four. They could be destroyed one after another only by adopting bamboo stripping tactics towards them. They waited 4 years after destroying Wang Dongxing and Wu De's "small gang of four" that had the wrath of the people before driving Hua Guofeng out of power.

After Hua's fall, the power to oppose the 3rd Plenum of the 11th party Central Committee and to boycott criticism of Mao was mainly seen in the military. At the time, although Wei Guoqing, chairman of the General Political Department, was in Deng's camp, he could not avoid being dismissed. It was Geng Biao's turn after Wei. At the time, Geng had become one of those with the most dazzling vested interests in the Cultural Revolution after Hua Guofeng. Moreover, to tell it truthfully, he stood alongside Hua and told him not to "treat it lightly." Deng Xiaoping never touched him. In the early 1982 streamlining of administrative structures, the vice premier was dismissed yet still appointed to "state council member," corresponding to vice premier.

The "12th National CPC Congress" alone was the turning point for Geng Biao. At this meeting of party representatives in which the Deng-Hu faction gained an overall victory, Geng embarrassed him by suddenly leaping into the group of old men who would not die in the "Central Advisory Commission" as a standing committee member, via his illustrious position in politics. Two months later he lost the position of minister of national defense and half a year later lost State Council membership at the Sixth National People's Congress, ultimately dropping down to vice chairman of the NPC's standing committee. This position had always been Zhao Yaowo's /6392 6674 4519/, the high level target of the United Front. Not long before, the disgraced Wei Guoqing and Peng Chong had come here to spend their old age together with Geng Biao and Huang Hua. However, Geng has an additional illustrious title to look after, "chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the NPC."

Of the members and alternates elected to the "12th Party Congress" Central Committee, only 25 had been members or alternates of the "9th Congress," whereas 279 had been symbols of the Cultural Revolution in the 9th Congress. Of the 333 names in the "11th Congress," only 135 members and alternates made it to the 12th Congress; 133 had been cleared out and 210 were new appointments. It is obvious that the Deng-Hu faction and the Whatever faction were irreconcilable. There was no way to compromise.

Likewise, Huang Hua was a lucky fellow during the Cultural Revolution. At 4 years younger than Geng Biao, he is much more of a diplomat although his revolutionary record cannot compare with Geng's. This Yenjing University student leader had been Zhu De and Ye Jianying's secretary in Yanan. Prior to the Cultural Revolution, he had been the director of a department in Western Europe and an ambassador to Egypt. In the early Cultural Revolution, he was the only ambassador not to have been recalled home to participate in the movement. In 1972 he was transferred from ambassador to Canada to the post of UN representative. He boycotted a book flattering Jiang Qing, "Jiang Qing Tongzhi" /Comrade Jiang Qing/ ("Hong Du Nu Huang" /Empress of the Red Capital/ on the mainland), and succeeded Qiao Guanhua /0829 0385 5478/ as minister of foreign affairs after the latter had fallen from power. He was put into important positions during the Hua Guofeng period, namely the posts of vice premier and CPC Central Committee member. After the "12th Congress," together with Geng Biao he was dismissed from the posts of foreign affairs minister, vice premier and committee member of the State Council. He acted as a deputy committee chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, arranging foreign affairs meetings for a number of former diplomats, but taking no part in them. This indicates that he has not the slightest position in diplomatic circles.

The Working Group had Investigated Geng Biao Early On

It can be seen from the successors and replacements to Geng and Huang that their loss of power was by no means caused by the reform system.

Zhang Aiping, the newly-appointed Minister of Defense, is only 1 year younger than Geng Biao. He came from a landlord background and likes art, literature and writing. At age 18 he joined the CPC, engaged in underground struggles in Shanghai and participated in the Long March. During the War of Resistance

Against Japan, he had protected Liu Shaoqi. He led the third detachment of the fifth column with Wei Guoqing and was fourth commander in chief of the New Fourth Route Army. During the Civil War he was a deputy commander of the second column in San Ye and in 1950 he was a commander of the second fleet in the navy. In 1954 he rose to general chief of staff and was awarded the rank of general.

Since 1958, Zhang Aiping has held the position of vice chairman of the National Defense Science and Technology Commission, responsible for military industries and the production of sophisticated weapons. During the Cultural Revolution he was implicated and stood aside, reappearing in 1973 to support the National Defense Science and Technology Commission. In 1976, he criticized Deng and again fell from power. After the gang of four collapsed, Deng reappeared and so did Zhang, as a member in the "11th Congress." In 1980, he was appointed vice premier.

It is quite obvious that Zhang Aiping had no connection with Lin Biao. In the Cultural Revolution he and Deng Xiaoping were both honored and disgraced. On top of this he had always been responsible for nuclear weapons, so Deng was naturally interested in him.

Although Huang Hua's replacement, Wu Xueqian, was several years younger, more importantly, he was a model Communist Youth League cadre, naturally a target greatly guided and supported by Hu Yaobang. The vigor of his age could not compare with Huang Hua's man, Ji Pengfei (75 years old), who not only remained a member of the State Council but further supported Hong Kong and Macao affairs.

Thus it can be asserted that Geng and Hua's demotions were the result of attacks on dissidents by the Deng-Hu faction. Although no Geng-Huang problems were divulged at the time, the news that Deng Xiaoping had sent a work group to investigate the Geng Biao problem has been common knowledge for over a year. Geng is an opponent to Deng's new economic policies. It is reported that long ago Deng intended to send him packing but was dissuaded from doing so by those near him because Geng is not easy to get rid of.

Although Geng has limited power in military circles, he has a long record of service. He has a conceited disposition. Taken as a leader although not a very large one, in 10 years of interparty struggles he could not be toppled; he has been red all along. He wields military symbols and presumably is a helpless warrior; upon flight into the Politburo, he was demoted by Deng for daring to speak out loudly on the Hong Kong question. Perhaps this was related to his temperament. As a chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the NPC, he was certainly aware of the sensitivity of the Hong Kong question and the status of Sino-British negotiations. He should also have understood that a unanimous decision had not yet been reached within the CPC. Any Hong Kong-Macao member could make a statement. He of course could have said a few words during the NPC.

Behind the "Unusual"

It is worth speculating whether he knew that Deng Xiaoping intended to station troops in Hong Kong. If he did know, then he intentionally challenged Deng. If he did not know, then it is still difficult to avoid suspecting him. However, his saying that troops would not be stationed, that military expenditures would not be turned in and that private property would be protected, not only catered to the hopes of the Hong Kong people but also conformed to Deng Xiaoping's strategic considerations on the Hong Kong policy. Thus, he could have thought that no mistake would be made.

Nonetheless, under the Chinese communist system, people who have "made mistakes" are free to be well behaved while not unruly in word or deed (it is possible that Geng Biao had never made a mistake and so was unaware of this rule), much less while Geng was being closely watched by people who wanted to capitalize on his mistakes. No matter what, Deng Xiaoping could not tolerate Geng's speech on freedom. After cursing their utter rubbish, he cited the British foreign minister, Geoffrey Howe, saying that Howe did not oppose China's right to station troops in Hong Kong, the implication being that even the colonialists did not dare to raise opposition to the matter yet this Geng Biao did! Deng was apparently very pleased with himself for inspiring awe by upholding justice. However, even though this exaggerated punishment was played very cleverly, the people still saw through it; they were not sold by it. Obviously Deng Xiaoping had come prepared. Contrary to his normal behavior, he flung information at a Hong Kong reporter and the impression given was that he did not do it to clarify policies but rather to jump at the chance to attack Geng and Huang and so disgrace them in international popular opinion.

This serious provocation on the part of Deng is very unusual (Deng does not have such a record). He seems to have been knashing his teeth in hatred, as normally it would not really be worth the trouble to get so angry at two colleagues who had already lost power for making a little error. There are only two possible explanations:

1. Geng Biao refused to comply after being removed from power and made strong opposition motions. To refuse a talking to would not do.
2. There is a power antagonistic to Deng Xiaoping at an even higher level of behind the scenes support, and Geng's revelation reflects this opposition. If this is so, Deng's anger was not directed toward Geng Biao but was rather a rebuke of the opposition factions and the big shot behind the scene.

Is there such a backstage supporter? Who is it? I dare not form a judgment. Nonetheless, there cannot be more than three to five people sufficiently qualified to be backstage supporters of Geng Biao, former minister of defense and member of the Politburo.

It is certain that the situation will further develop. Geng Biao and his supporters cannot tolerate such a deep disgrace. What worries people is that when an old man of 80 years publicly dares to provoke such a dangerous and enigmatic struggle, can it be that he believes in Lu Yi's maxim No 15: "After my death it matters not if flood waters dash the skies."

CHIU-SHIH NIEN-TAI ARTICLES EXAMINE PLA, HONG KONG

Editor's Preface

Hong Kong CHIU-SHIH NIEN-TAI [THE NINETIES] in Chinese Vol 7, Jul 84 p 49

[Preface by the editor]

[Text] Editor's Preface: Deng Xiaoping, "refuting a rumor" to Hong Kong and Macao reporters at the end of May, declared "officially" that the PLA will enter and garrison Hong Kong after 1997 to demonstrate the recovery of sovereignty; this was quite a shock for Hong Kong.

The vital point about this statement is not whether China has the right to station troops, or whether there is a need to station troops--be it as a defensive measure or to prevent any disturbance or unrest in Hong Kong--the vital point is the process by which this resolution came about, its strong flavor of rule by man, rather than by law, whether there is a divergence of views on the Hong Kong policy among the higher level of the CPC and the doubt it evoked as to the stability of their Hong Kong policy.

The statement made so all of a sudden by Deng on the stationing of troops in Hong Kong, the place, wording and spirit of the statement and his dressing down of two high officials of the central authority, Geng Biao [5105 7374] and Huang Hua [7806 5478], shows clearly that "the ultimate power is held in one hand" as far as the Hong Kong problem is concerned, and this is very disconcerting to many people, and makes a thorough understanding of the CPC's policy toward Hong Kong, as it now has come into prominence with the question of garrisoning troops there, a necessity.

Since the matter of garrisoning troops has already become a fixed policy, the PLA will, after 1997, no more be a mere neighbor of the people of Hong Kong across the Shenzhen river, but will move in to live under the same roofs of the special administrative area. Since the PLA will be in such close proximity to us, we have to inform ourselves of what kind of an army the PLA really is. This army of over 4 million men is the machinery that established and consolidated the Chinese communist regime. Under a shell of secrecy, it has all along existed as an entity of itself, "a state within the state," with an aura of mystery that made it even more difficult to understand and to get to know it.

The time of greatest significance for the relationship between the PLA and the Chinese masses was, apart from the war years, the time of the "three supports and two militaries" [supporting the revolutionary Left, agriculture and industry; exercising military control and giving military training] during the cultural revolution. The relationship between the PLA and the people during that period of time has become the theme of many stories of undying gratitude. They reflect the role played by the PLA at the political and social level, and during that time the knowledge of the people about the PLA was much enhanced; the standing of army men's families also reflects a peculiar aspect of the PLA.

Another example that provides Hong Kong with a reference is Shenzhen, north of the Luohu Bridge. Shenzhen has in the meantime been opened up as a special economic zone, but it is still an important border defense post and an important place closest to the nearest outpost of capitalism. The activities of the PLA at Shenzhen are also something that we must take note of.

The purpose of presenting here this set of articles under the special heading "The PLA and Hong Kong" is precisely to provide basic information on the above-mentioned questions that are now much on the minds of the people.

Stationing of Troops

Hong Kong CHIU-SHIH NIEN-TAI [THE NINETIES] in Chinese Vol 7, Jul 84 pp 50-52

[Article by Qi Xin [7871 6580]: "The Question of Garrisoning Troops and the Hong Kong Policy"]

[Text] Deng Xiaoping's talk about the garrisoning of troops repudiated the repeated promises made by high functionaries who had handled Hong Kong and Macao affairs in the past and rebuked two high officials of the party government, facts which make people wonder: is this government by law or one-man rule? Is there any institutionalization or is it that the word of one man alone counts. Is there within the party an opposition party in the Hong Kong question?

Deng Xiaoping's Talk on Garrisoning Troops

In the morning of 25 May, Deng Xiaoping was to meet the Hong Kong and Macao representatives to the National People's Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and was to allow 5 minutes to Hong Kong and Macao reporters for photographing. Many reporters thought that reporter-shy Deng would certainly not say anything in front of the reporters. Radio and TV reporters did not even get their tape recorders ready. However, all of a sudden, Deng started to talk in an excited voice, and this talk not only sent that day's shares on the Hong Kong exchange into a steep dive, but had a profound impact on Hong Kong's future prospects. The following is the full text of Deng Xiaoping's talk:

"I want to take this opportunity to talk to you reporters. First, the statements by the Central Government on the Hong Kong question, I say, are official; Premier Zhao says they are official. Furthermore, the specific organs that are really to issue statements are: one is the Office of Hong Kong and Macao Affairs, of which Ji Pengfei [1213 7720 7378] is in charge, and one is our Ministry of Foreign Affairs; there are department heads and personnel charged with acting as spokesmen on this question. Statements other than those issued by these places are invalid and are all not official.

Second, I want to destroy a rumor, Huang Hua and Geng Biao are talking sheer nonsense, telling people that the question of stationing troops in Hong Kong is not considered by the Central Committee. Since it is Chinese territory, why would China not be able to station troops in Hong Kong!

When I had a discussion with the British foreign minister, he also agreed with me. They, of course, hope China will not station troops in Hong Kong, but will rather employ some other form, but he acknowledged that once China has recovered its sovereignty, it has the right to station troops in Hong Kong. That is very clear. If we would not have that right, how could it still be called Chinese territory?"

The above is quoted from the DA GONG BAO of 26 May. The WEN HUI BAO did not print it in such detail, but merely reprinted the report of the New China News Agency:

"Deng Xiaoping, chairman of the CPC Central Advisory Commission, said here today: after recovery of sovereignty over Hong Kong, the Chinese government will have the right to station troops in Hong Kong. 'That will be symbolic for the PRC's protection of the territory and symbolic for the maintenance of sovereignty by the state.'

He said: 'Hong Kong is Chinese territory, why would we not be able to station troops in Hong Kong? Without that right, could it still be called Chinese territory?'"

Apart from the fact that the NCNA report changed the important point made by Deng Xiaoping, namely that "troops will be stationed in Hongkong," into only an emphatic "the Chinese government has the right to station troops in Hong Kong," the NCNA report omitted--and that is more important--the two sections in which Deng Xiaoping clarified who are official spokesmen in the Hong Kong question and in which he upbraided Huang Hua and Geng Biao for talking sheer nonsense.

It is also said that on that day when Deng Xiaoping made his statement, Fei Yimin [6316 1744 3046], manager of the DA GONG BAO's Hong Kong office, who stood nearby, repeatedly reminded Deng that the "5 minutes for photographing had passed," apparently not wanting Deng Xiaoping to go on talking. Furthermore, after Deng Xiaoping had met with the Hong Kong and Macao representatives to the National People's Congress and the Political Consultative Conference, Xu Jiatun [6079 1367 1470] came out and questioned

the reporters whether they had sent out reports on Deng Xiaoping's talk. When the reporters said they had already done so, Xu seemed somewhat nonplussed and said in obvious resignation that since the reports had gone out, nothing can be done about it anymore.

However, he immediately followed up with the supplementary explanation that stationing troops in Hong Kong after 1997 would be a symbolic manifestation of sovereignty and would also be of benefit for the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong. He said: "If a public security problem would arise in future, it would cause a much greater shock if PLA troops would be dispatched when things happened. If PLA troops are already in garrison there, such a garrison could immediately render assistance to restore stability, if there would be a sudden outbreak of disorders in Hong Kong. The garrison troops would of course not interfere in the daily life of Hong Kong, especially not be charged with public security, which would be a responsibility of the police, the garrisoning of troops would be only a precautionary measure."

Another delegate revealed to the reporters that Deng Xiaoping said that the garrison need not be too large. He asked what the present garrison of Hong Kong consists of, and the reporters replied, about 7,000 men. Deng Xiaoping then said: "For us, 3,000 to 5,000 would probably be enough."

After that event, certain Chinese leading personalities concerned with the question talked on several occasions on the problem of stationing troops in Hong Kong.

On 30 May, Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian [0702 1331 6197] said in Beijing: "After sovereignty will have been recovered and exercised over Hong Kong, China will have the right to station troops there. This is a question of elementary knowledge and is a factor of Hong Kong's prosperity and stability."

On 31 May, the Minister of National Defense Zhang Aiping [1728 1947 5493] said at the Beijing airport that after recovery of sovereignty over Hong Kong, troops will be stationed there whenever needed, this is a question of sovereignty.

On 8 June, Premier Zhao Ziyang said at Copenhagen: "The 'rights' in 'sovereign rights' comprise at least the right of foreign relations and the right of national defense. If China will recover its sovereignty over Hong Kong, that means of course that it will have the right to station troops there."

Looking at the NCNA report, the explanations provided by Xu Jiatao and whatever was later said by leading Chinese personalities, they all affirm as "official" only that part of Deng Xiaoping's talk of 25 May where he said that after recovery of sovereignty, China will have the right to station troops in Hong Kong. As to when and how many troops will be garrisoned, that will depend on the need and has not yet been finally decided. The purpose of the garrison would be to stabilize the situation in Hong Kong and prevent disorders.

However, the whole text of Deng Xiaoping's talk that day was already published in Hong Kong newspapers, also recorded on TV and radio and cannot be withdrawn anymore, and the impact this event will have on Hong Kong's future cannot be ignored.

The Right to Garrison and the 'Intention of Garrisoning'

Let us first of all state that no one denies that China will have the right, after recovery of its sovereignty over Hong Kong, to garrison troops in Hong Kong. The question is whether there is the intention to station troops in Hong Kong. Deng Xiaoping said: "Hong Kong will be garrisoned," thus affirming that this will be done, and he not merely declared that China will have the right to do it. If the NCNA report and various leading Chinese personalities were only emphasizing the right to do so, this is obviously not Deng Xiaoping's main idea.

To say that the garrison would be for the purpose of showing sovereignty makes no sense. China's territory is vast and there is not always a garrison at every place, and places without garrisons are not at all without symbols of sovereignty.

Speaking of actual needs, we can say that a garrison in Hong Kong would be of no significance for external defense, because after recovery of its sovereignty over Hong Kong, China would have in Hong Kong on boundaries with other countries, and the stationing of the PLA at Luohu would be sufficient to check any hostile threat to Hong Kong. As to the prevention of internal disorders, Xu Jiatun already signified that public security would be a responsibility of the Hong Kong police and a garrison would be there only as a precautionary measure. This touches on the problem of how to appraise the degree of a "disorder." Judging by past situations in Hong Kong, even at the time of the 1967 violence when real and false bombs appeared all over the place, the Hong Kong government still basically did not call the military into action. However, according to Chinese communist principles, it is quite possible that they would have thought the disturbance in the Central District year before last and this year's disturbance engendered by the taxi incident as sufficient reason to call the military into action.

That the people of Hong Kong show so sensitive a reaction against China's intention to station troops in Hong Kong is not without its reasons. First of all, the Chinese communists have all along relied heavily on the "barrels of guns," regarding them not only as the support of their political regime, but also as the vanguard in the promotion of each political movement and have given them the principal place in their successive power struggles. A political regime that wrested power by armed revolution will ordinarily place emphasis on the role of naked force when in a position to govern their country. There is absolutely no comparison possible between the position of the military in the political life of China and that of armed forces in Western countries.

Next, there is the relationship between the military and the future government of Hong Kong. Since the military are directly under the central government, the future Hong Kong government will not be called upon to pay military expenses and the PLA stationed in Hong Kong will of course take orders from the central government and will not accept assignments directly from the Hong Kong government, that is absolutely clear. The "high degree of self-government" of the future Hong Kong government will therefore find itself staring into the muzzles of guns that are commanded by the central authorities.

Third, there is the assessment of the danger. Last year in their suppression of crime on the mainland, China used methods of "greatest severity, greatest speed and most rigorously" that exceeded the provisions of the criminal law and the law of criminal procedure, because their assessment of the danger of the crimes was unduly high. The 1981 suppression of the democratic movement was based on the same considerations. If there is in future some small disturbance in Hong Kong, it is absolutely possible that the Chinese communists will assess the danger unduly high and have the military intervene. In the end, there will immediately be a challenge to human rights and government by law, just as when the military intervened in Tibet in that year and intervened in the cultural revolution.

Rule by Men and Lust for Power

Deng Xiaoping's talk on stationing troops has evoked yet another strong reaction, namely a questioning of the trustworthiness of the Chinese leaders.

On 2 November 1982, when a delegation from the Hong Kong Chamber of Industry and Commerce interviewed Liao Chengzhi [1675 2110 1807], the former director of the Office of Hong Kong and Macao Affairs, Liao indicated that after 1997 not a single soldier will be sent to Hong Kong.

On 4 May 1983, when Liao Chengzhi met a delegation from industry and commerce in the New Territory, he indicated that it will not happen that the PLA will be sent into Hong Kong as garrison.

On 30 October 1983, Huang Menghua [7806 1125 5478] published the content of an interview with the present director of the Office for Hong Kong and Macao Affairs, Ji Pengfei, who indicated that China will be fully responsible for the defense of Hong Kong, but will not establish a garrison in Hong Kong.

On 29 April 1984, a delegation from the Hong Kong Neighborhood Association on a visit to Beijing met Ji Pengfei, and a member of that delegation, Zhu Rongji [2612 2837 1015] declared that Ji Pengfei indicated that the military would move into Hong Kong only if there would be disturbances, otherwise not a single soldier will be stationed in Hong Kong.

On 21 May 1984, Geng Biao, vice chairman of the National People's Congress, made a statement to reporters that after 1997 China will not garrison Hong Kong and the people of Hong Kong will not have to pay military expenses.

This last statement by Geng Biao was the one that Deng Xiaoping called "sheer nonsense." However, the other cases were all statements by an organ that Deng Xiaoping said was authorized to make official statements on the Hong Kong question, namely the directorate of the Office of Hong Kong and Macao Affairs.

It is true though, that before the present talk, Deng Xiaoping had never publicly discussed the problem of stationing troops in Hong Kong. However, if so many statements by high officials responsible for Hong Kong and Macao affairs can be repudiated, who knows whether statements and promises made by Ji Pengfei and the likes will not also be cancelled by one word from Deng Xiaoping?

Furthermore, if Deng Xiaoping, as chairman of an advisory commission of the party, can actually rebuke two vice chairman of the National People's Congress, men who are authorized to interpret the Constitution, as talking "sheer nonsense," can indeed refute the repeated statements by other high-ranking officials of the state and the government and declare himself alone as "most official," this touches on the question whether there is here rule by law or rule by men and whether there is here any institutionalization or whether merely the word of one person is all that counts. If the future Hong Kong government will have to accept the control of the political system of mainland China, these facts will hardly have engendered any confidence among the people. Speaking of garrisoning as a manifestation of sovereignty and China having the right after recovery of its sovereignty to station troops in Hongkong, there are now many things that China has the right to do after recovery of sovereignty, which in past statements it had declared it will not do. Will it then in future still do all these things one after the other?

For instance, Chinese leaders have said that after 1997 not one cadre will be dispatched to Hong Kong, that certain provisions of the Constitution, such as on the four insurances, will not be applied to Hong Kong, that after 1997 Hong Kong will still be under English law and the court of final instance will be established in Hong Kong, that after 1997 the Hong Kong government can issue passports, that after 1997 Hong Kong will have an independent financial administration and that taxes and revenue will not have to be turned over to the central authorities, etc., etc. In none of the above cases is it implied that the central government does not have the right, namely to dispatch cadres to Hong Kong, to apply the provisions of the Constitution to Hong Kong, to establish the court of final instance in Beijing, to levy taxes in Hong Kong. All these things, the central government will have the right to do. Were Deng Xiaoping to apply the logic of the case of garrisoning troops in Hong Kong and would say: "If we don't even have this right, can this still be called Chinese territory?"

then could China at some future date not still do all the things that it now guarantees it will not do? Since there are the rights, it will not relinquish the right and not leave them unused. Deng Xiaoping's talk on the stationing of troops is once more evidence of the political tradition of the CPC, after all also a Chinese tradition.

An Opposition Party in the Hong Kong Question

What is perhaps worth more of our attention in Deng Xiaoping's talk on the garrisoning of Hong Kong, is why he spoke with such an excited voice when he publicly rebuked Huang Hua and Geng Biao. Public rebuke of high-ranking cadres still in office has never before happened in the history of the CPC. Even during his despotic years, Mao Zedong only rebuked Minister of Education Zhou Rongxin [0719 2837 9515] in a restricted internal document, he never rebuked in a public place a cadre still in office and of so high a rank as vice chairman of the National People's Congress. Another surprising thing is that Huang Hua actually did not at all speak of garrisoning troops, he only said that after 1997 the Chinese delegation to the United Nations may have a representative from Hong Kong as one of its members. Why would Deng Xiaoping, when talking of the garrisoning question, again drag in Huang Hua? These facts make one suspect that there seems to exist inside China a certain force that is opposed to Deng Xiaoping's Hong Kong policy. This force includes Huang Hua, Geng Biao and, we believe, some others.

If we again look at the past of Huang Hua and Geng Biao, we have reason to believe that the opposition party upholds the Hong Kong policy of the Zhou Enlai era. Huang Hua has always worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Geng Biao has for a long period of time served as head of the CPC's Liaison Department for Foreign Affairs, in actual fact a ministry of foreign affairs of the party. These two men did not suffer any attacks during the cultural revolution and have always worked in foreign affairs as followers of Zhou Enlai. We believe that they are convinced that Zhou Enlai's basic policy toward Hong Kong, namely "solving the problem through an appropriately long period of negotiations and maintaining the status quo before a solution has been arrived at," would be the best way to combine upholding the principle and maintaining flexibility, and that it would be a policy that would leave the initiative in one's hands. From long-time work in foreign affairs these foreign affairs cadres have a thorough understanding of the outside world and of course know also that any policy that will impose a change in the situation of Hong Kong, any interference in Hong Kong, will also do harm to China's own interests. After the central authorities had determined on a policy of recovering the sovereignty over Hong Kong, we believe Huang Hua and Geng Biao were still regarding it best to have as little as possible motion in the forthcoming transformation. Huang Hua's idea to allow a Hong Kong delegate to join the Chinese delegation to the United Nations, one might say, is the most realistically significant of all the measures that China intended to initiate concerning Hong Kong. It is a pity that it was already discredited by Deng Xiaoping as "sheer nonsense."

If the above appraisal of the situation is correct, then Deng Xiaoping's publicly rebuking Huang Hua and Geng Biao in such a great rage was not only targeted at the question of garrisoning Hong Kong, but directed against an internal opposition party that opposes his Hong Kong policy. If that is indeed the case, the struggle between these two parties, and particularly developments after Deng Xiaoping, deserve closest attention by the people of Hong Kong.

PLA Described

Hong Kong CHIU-SHIH NIEN-TAI [THE NINETIES] in Chinese Vol 7, Jul 84
pp 53-59

[Article by Mu Fu [3668 1133]: "The State Within a State, the PLA"]

[Text] The PLA is the "strong pillar" of the Chinese communist regime. It enjoys the most favorable treatment and widest privileges and forms an enormous independent system, but it remains all along an army of the party, commanded and controlled by the Central Military Commission, while the state possesses no military power. The phrase "political power comes out of the muzzle of a gun," a phrase that is highly fancied among all of Mao Zedong's classic writings, has been revered by the Chinese communists for half a century as the ultimate truth, as they were building their red regime in the battles of 22 years of civil war. They had relied on this "liberation army" to carry out a violent revolution on a scale unprecedented in our century and this of course raised this army to become the "favorite son" of communist China and the lifeblood that preserved the regime.

In the past 30-odd years, the communist Chinese army's position in the state and in society has not the least weakened because war turned into peace. On the contrary, it was strengthened and elevated as never before; it became the liberator of the people, the meritorious hero of the revolution, the heroic protector of the home and defender of the country and the strong pillar of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The PLA has developed from a "millet plus rifles" stage to a huge independent and all-embracing system, enjoying the most favorable treatment and the widest privileges.

Estimate of Military Strength

The Chinese PLA is composed of the field army, regional troops and various branches of the services. Its present regular military strength is generally put at about somewhat over 3 million men, more or less equal to the military strength of the United States and the Soviet Union (in 1981 the American armed forces on active duty numbered 2.08 million men with 1.03 million noncombat personnel, or a total of 3.11 million; the Soviet Unions armed forces numbered 3.67 million). However, this figure is obviously unduly low.

Communist China has never published official figures on its military strength. Even in recent years when it gradually opened up with statistical information, it has revealed not the least bit of statistical information on its armed forces and armament.

Figures that may serve as reference are: in March 1949, at the 2nd Plenum of the 7th CPC Central Committee, Mao Zedong mentioned that the field army numbered "a total" of 2.1 million men (in November 1948 he said that the PLA numbered over 3 million men). In 1956, the Minister of Defense Peng Dehuai mentioned in his speech at the Eighth National People's Congress that 5 million officers and men had been demobilized between 1950 and 1956 and that the strength of the army had been reduced by 2.7 million, comparing 1956 with 1950. If the number of men demobilized would have been half of the 1950 strength, the 1950 strength would have been 5.4 million men. According to a conservative estimate, the actual military strength of communist China in the early years of the regime and at the time of the Korean War could not have been less than 6 million men.

When Edgar Snow visited the mainland in 1960, the official figure he got for the regular army, navy and air force was 3 million (2.5 million for the army, and 250,000 for each the navy and the air force). When he again visited China in 1970, Zhou Enlai told him that during the cultural revolution 2 million crack troops had been transferred for "three supports and two militaries" work (support of industry, agriculture and the Left, exercising military control and giving military training). The crack military selected for this job were no doubt only a small part of the armed forces. In 1977 Deng Xiaoping also said that "every year up to a million soldiers are demobilized." The total number of PLA men during the cultural revolution must have been over 6 or 7 million men, which would be no more than 1 percent of the total population.

In 1979, the West estimated that China's military strength was 4.3 million men.

After Deng Xiaoping assumed power, one of the objectives that he repeatedly stressed was the reduction of the military personnel. In 1980, he pointed to four major problems in the armed forces, and the first one was to "cut down inflation." He said: "Our military personnel is excessively numerous," and blamed it for hindering the modernization of military armament. In 1982 he again declared: "The military are now considering a determined reduction in our military personnel." If China's military personnel were really only somewhat over 3 million, like in the United States and the Soviet Union, we believe the question would not be regarded with such seriousness. It is reported that Deng Xiaoping intends to reduce the armed forces personnel by one-third.

The Party's Absolute Control Over the Military

The party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the party. This is a principle that the Chinese communists firmly upheld since the 1927 Nanchang Uprising and the establishment of their army. Already in the 1930's Mao Zedong thoroughly elaborated on this principle, when he said that "having the army means having the power" is an experience that was of the highest importance for men like Sun Zhongshan, Jiang Jieshi down to all the warlords. He praised as especially clever the Hunan bureaucrat Tan Yankai as "familiar with the Chinese peculiarity," rising

and going down again repeatedly, but "never being only an oligarchic provincial governor, but always out to be the military as well as the political governor of a province." Later, when he became chairman of the National Government, he was concurrently chief of the second army corps. (See "Selected Works of Mao Zedong" p 534)

Mao Zedong was indeed a firm believer in the "extreme importance" of the gun; he considered himself "highest authority on revolutionary wars." The first thing that he got in 1935 at the Zunyi Conference was the military power. After the establishment of the PRC, he all along did not stay an oligarchic chairman, but always held concurrently the office of the chairman of the military commission in state and party. When he retired into the "second line" in 1959, he never relinquished, but always held on to the chairmanship of the party's Central Military Commission until his death in 1976.

The leader of the party wielding the highest military power, i.e., the power of commander in chief, that is the primary significance of the party commanding the gun, as it is also the strategically crucial point in the internal strife within the party. In his struggle with Hua Guofeng, Deng Xiaoping made certain to hold the real power as chief of the general staff. Before and after the 12th CPC National Congress, he could afford not to be party chairman or secretary general, but he certainly would not benevolently give away the job of chairman of the Central Military Commission. At the Sixth National People's Congress in 1983, the post of chairman of the state's military commission was also concurrently held by Deng Xiaoping, although he had no position at all in the state government. Furthermore, the five chairmen and vice-chairmen of the two sets of military commissions, one of the party and one of the state, were identical; their average age was 82, which makes them probably the oldest among the most powerful leadership groups in the world.

The principle of the party commanding the gun is also evident in the army's organization, the CPC having a comprehensive and tight party organization and political work system throughout the army. The power of command of the senior military officers is based on a system of collective leadership by the party committees at all levels; important decisions in the army cannot be passed without the approval of the political commissar. Even companies all have CPC branches ("the company is the foundation for the party branches") and all the words and deeds by officers and men are supervised by the political work personnel.

Another tradition in this control of the military by the party is that, apart from the military system unifiedly led by the Central Military Commission, there is also military leadership exercised by the local party committees. As a rule, the first secretary of the local party committee at all levels in the provinces, prefectures, municipalities and counties are concurrently first political commissars in the military organizations at the various levels, i.e. of the provincial military region, prefectural military subdivision, municipal garrison and the militia of the counties. This system of a double leadership precludes any possibility of the military breaking away from the party and taking independent action.

Table 1: The Political Organizational System of the PLA


	Party	Pol. Work Section	Senior Officer	Establishment (Soldiers)
Army Corps	Party Committee	Political Dept.	Political Commissar	50,000
Division	Party Committee	Political Dept.	Political Commissar	12,000
Regiment	Party Committee	Political Bureau	Political Commissar	3,000
Battalion	Gen. Party Branch		Senior Pol. Instructor	800
Company	Party Branch		Junior Pol. Instructor	160

Table 2. Previous Ministers of Defense in the PRC

	Position in Central Military Commission	Period of Service
Peng Dehuai	First Vice-Chairman	Oct '54-Aug '59
Lin Biao	First Vice-Chairman	Sep '59-Sep '71
Ye Jianying	First Vice-Chairman	Oct '71-Feb '78
Xu Xiangqian	Vice-Chairman of Stand. Comm.	Mar '78-May '82
Geng Biao	Secretary General	May '82-Nov '82
Zhang Aiping	Deputy Secr. General	Nov '82-

Some Western experts on China believe that there had been times when the gun commanded the party, for instance, at the times of army control during the cultural revolution. This only appears so on superficial observation. It is true that the overall military control during the cultural revolution was an exceptional period in the history of communist China, but we must not simply say that the gun had been in command of the party. At that time the party organization in cities and towns had broken down and power had been seized by the mass organizations of the cultural revolution, but at the center it was still the leading group headed by Mao Zedong that controlled the overall situation. Not only did they fly the banner of the party Central Committee, but they also carried out in reality a control that was not different from that in regular times. The orders they issued commanded authority with every rank of military control personnel and with the mass organizations. It may therefore appear outwardly as if the power was in the hands of the military, Lin Biao taking the place of Liu Shaoqi, but in reality the party with its power centralized in the Central Committee was still not replaced by the military. There was no real power aside from that of Mao Zedong. When Lin Biao stated that the PLA was "personally founded and led by Chairman Mao," Mao immediately retorted: "What one has created, would one not be entitled to lead it?"

Table 3: Graph of Communist China's Military Organization



Note: (1) The National Defense Science Commission and the National Defense Engineering Agency have been combined into a Commission for Sc., Techn. & Industry for National Defense, under the Central Military Comm. and the State Council. (2) The Railway Corps has been transferred to the control of the State Council. (3) The Strategic Missile Corps, establ. June 1984, was originally part of the Second Artillery Corps, which may or may not have been maintained.

Up to the 1978 Constitution, it was always openly stipulated that the chairman of the CPC was commander in chief of all the armed forces of the country. In recent years, Deng Xiaoping intended to split the party, the government and the military, but there is no prospect that there will be any change of substance in the party's leadership and control of the military.

The Unique Party-Army System of Organization

The system of military organization in communist China is on the whole of two forms, one is the "double headquarters" of the pre-cultural revolution time, and one is the unified military commissar system. Apart from these, there was also the single system of the "People's Revolutionary Military Council" of the early years of the PRC, which had been part of the "Coalition Government" before adoption of a constitution and had only had transitional character.

The first constitution adopted in 1954 at the First National People's Congress stipulated that the state president was commander in chief of all the armed forces of the country and shall also hold the post of chairman of the National Defense Commission. A Ministry of Defense was to be established under the State Council to "lead the building of armed forces," but without command powers. In actual fact, the military power rested with the Central Military Commission within the party, which also decided all military orders to be issued by the Ministry of Defense, and the National Defense Council had even less actual power. It is only a huge organization to pursue military united front activities and at most has some role as a consultative organ.

The two military leading groups, one of the party and one of the government, both with Mao Zedong as chairman, concealed the fact that there was this difference that one was real and one was only nominal. When Mao's movement of the "three red banners" suffered defeat in 1959 and he himself retired to the "second line," Liu Shaoqi became state president and concurrently chairman of the National Defense Council. It was then that the contrast of the two military headquarters became obvious. Liu's position as supreme commander was only nominal, while the actual powers of a supreme commander were exercised by Mao and Lin Biao, who was first deputy chairman of the National Defense Commission and concurrently minister of defense.

In 1966, at the start of the cultural revolution, following the downfall of Liu Shaoqi, the state military organization, which was a merely nominal organ, was thoroughly destroyed under the rebellious calls for the "bombardment of the headquarters." Having abolished the state president and the National Defense Council, the National Defense Commission of the CPC Central Committee came out into the open, giving orders and commands, moving troops and giving the generals their assignments, and apart from dealing with foreign affairs, nowhere was there need for anybody to even mention the name of the ministry of defense. This system of a unified Military Commission of the Central Committee has been extended to this day. Although the new Constitution of November 1982 stipulates the

establishment of a central military council of the state to be in full command of all the military, as we said before, this is merely a democratic adornment and nothing else. It is covering the party's Central Military Commission with a cloak of a state organ, and the great satire here is that the state president does not partake of the slightest military power. The framework of this system of unified control of the military affairs of communist China is demonstrated in table 3. Something that must be emphatically pointed out because it is easily overlooked is that the three chief branches under the Central Military Council (the general staff headquarters, the general political department and the general logistic department) are nominally on an equal footing, but the organ that has actual military powers is only the general staff headquarters. It is absolutely impossible to consider the General Political Department and the General Logistics Department as on par with the headquarters of the general staff. One may have an inkling of this state of affairs from the fact that in 1978 Deng Xiaoping wanted to have the position of chief of general staff. The ministry of defense, on the other hand, has no real power. It is not party to any highly confidential affairs at General Staff Headquarters, it is only because he represents the armed forces of the state that the minister of defense ranks very high. The organizational system of the General Staff Headquarters and of the Ministry of Defense may be seen from table 4.

Table 4: Organization of the General Staff Headquarters

Chief of General Staff	Combat Troops Department
Deputy Chief of Staff	Intelligence Department
	Military Training Department
	Mobilization Department
	Garrison Department
	Military Affairs Department
	Military Transportation Department
	Equipment Planning Department
	Military University and College Dept.
	Communications Corps Department
	Anti-Chemical Warfare Department
	Political Department
	Bureau for Cadre Affairs
	General Survey and Mapping Bureau
	Administrative Bureau
Organization of the Ministry of Defense	
Minister of Defense	Secretariat
Deputy Minister of Defense	Political Department
	(1) Foreign Affairs Bureau
	(2) Bureau of Budget & Statistics
	(3) Military Service Bureau
	(4) Bureau for Cadre Affairs
	(5) Bureau for Liaison Between Branches of the Services
	(Table 4 continued)

(Table 4 continued)

- (6) Bureau for Military Aid to Foreign Countries
- (7) Bureau for Agricultural Production by Military Units
- Military Courts
- Military Procuratorate
- Office for Transfers, Demobilization and Retirement

The whole country is divided into 11 military regions, namely Beijing, Shenyang, Guangzhou, Jinan, Nanjing, Fuzhou, Wuhan, Kunming, Chengdu, Lanzhou and Urumqi. Several field armies are stationed in each military district. The forerunner of the Beijing military region is the Beijing-Tianjin Garrison Command, which was charged with the defense and suppression of counterrevolutionaries in the area around the capital. There are therefore as many as eight field armies stationed in this district.

At the end of the 1970's, the total number of field armies was about 39, with an establishment of about 2 million men. Their distribution was as shown on the following map [not reproduced]. The joint chiefs of staff in charge of military operations in the United States and the general staff headquarters in the Soviet Unions are all under their ministries of defense, but the Chinese ministry of defense is completely outside the command system; the chief of the general staff has all command power in his hands and is only responsible to the Central Military Commission. This is a peculiarity of the Chinese system of organizing its military affairs.

Officers in Charge in Military Regions and Branches of the Services

	Commanders	Political Commissars
Navy	Liu Huaqing	Li Huiwen
Air Force	Zhang Tingfa	Gao Houliang
Beijing	Qin Jiwei	Fu Chongbi
Shenyang	Li Desheng	Liu Zhenhua
Jinan	Rao Shoukun	Chen Renhong
Nanjing	Xiang Shouzhong	Guo Linxiang
Guangzhou	You Taizhong	Wang Meng
Fuzhou	Jiang Yonghui	Fu Kuiqing
Wuhan	Zhou Shizhong	Li Chengfang
Chengdu	Wang Chenghan	Wan Haifeng
Kunming	Zhang Zhixiu	Xie Zhenhua
Lanzhou	Zheng Weishan	Tan Youlin
Urumqi	Xiao Quanfu	Tan Shanhe

Table 5: Members of the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee

Chairman	Deng Xiaoping
Vice-Chairmen	Ye Jianying
	Xu Xiangqian
	Nie Rongzhen
	Yang Shangkun
Secretary General	Yang Shangkun
Chief of General Staff	Yang Dezhi
Director, General Political Dept.	Yu Qiuli
Director, General Logistics Dept.	Hong Xuezhai
Minister of Defense	Zhang Aiping

The Two Lines in Military Affairs: Peng Dehuai and Lin Biao

The development of army building of the Chinese communist regime during the past 30 years may be roughly divided into three stages, namely the three periods when the military commission was headed by Peng Dehuai, Lin Biao and Deng Xiaoping.

The first stage (1950-1959). Strictly speaking it began after the conclusion of the Korean War in 1953. The Chinese communists' intention to build up a regular army was delayed by the Korean War, but was also spurred on by the Korean War. After Peng Dehuai returned from the Korean battlefields, he began systematically the work of "modernizing and regularizing" the army. He reorganized the system of organization, promulgated the Military Service Law and the Service Regulations for Officers, established military colleges and instituted regular training. In 1955, he established a system of military ranks. By 1956, at the Eighth National People's Congress, Peng Dehuai proclaimed that the PLA had changed from a single infantry army into a composite army with various different arms and services, thus "completing the most important transformation in its history." Peng Dehuai particularly emphasized the "regularization," that is, the demand for a "unified command, unified organization, unified institutions, unified training and unified discipline," in opposition to the long-standing practice of guerrilla style of work and the party commissar system with political commissars interfering in military affairs.

In his army building, Peng Dehuai completely following the pattern of the Soviet Red Army, in keeping with the pro-Soviet "lean to one side" political line of those days. This of course engendered a certain amount of dogmatism by uncritically copying foreign institutions, but that was not the reason for Peng's downfall, which was due to his publicly challenging Mao Zedong's "three red banners" policy. After Peng was replaced by Lin Biao, the modernization of the army that Peng had instituted was immediately and completely refuted, and a number of high-ranking military cadres who had been involved with it came under attack.

The second stage (1959-1977). After Lin Biao had assumed the posts of first deputy chairman of the Military Commission and Minister of Defense, he pandered to Mao Zedong's wants and immediately instituted a "revolutionization" in army building policies. He raised a whole chain of extremely

Leftist slogans, such as "give prominence to politics, the four firsts, the four-good company, the five-good fighter," etc. He started a fanatic movement for the study of Mao's writings, set up such men as Lei Feng and Wang Jie as heroic personalities for their blind devotion to Mao and loyalty to the party, started a policy of keeping the soldiers in ignorance, and by all this inflicted great harm on the fighting quality and the modernization of the army. Mao Zedong again and again acclaimed this policy and furthermore called upon the whole country to follow the example of the PLA. Perhaps the only thing that aroused his interest was the glory of his name by the development of the nuclear rocket weaponry at the National Defense Science Commission.

At the time of the cultural revolution, the "three supports and two militaries" became the task of the army and training was stopped almost completely. The "prominence of politics" had become something of a superstition. The military forces became "God's favorite one" and the tool of the rulers. In many places the military got involved in the fighting and were even ordered to massacre the masses, causing many tragedies. The reputation of being "the people's own army" was ruined to extinction.

The rebellion and flight of Lin Biao in 1971 brought on an unprecedented internal crisis in the communist Chinese military. The bankruptcy of the "revolutionary" political line in army building, which had been proclaimed for so many years, left the army in the following years in a condition of demoralization and apathy. Because of all power still being held by Mao Zedong and the gang of four, no one could bring about a change in this condition. One proof of this was the way Deng Xiaoping was toppled after he had come out in 1975, trying to rebuild the prestige of the army.

Deng Xiaoping's Power Among the Military

The third stage (1977-). That is the period during which Deng Xiaoping energetically tried to restore the fighting spirit of the Chinese communist army. After the disturbing influence of 20 years of revolutionization and perturbations, the condition of this army was, as Deng Xiaoping expressed it, "inflated, demoralized, arrogant, extravagant and indolent" to an extremely serious degree. It was easy enough to talk about rectifying the army! The problems of the military had accumulated in the ranks of the officers and cadres, but we have also to consider:

The problem among the military cadres was first of all the many rounds of political movements which seriously impaired the command structure of the army. In every movement, the military has again and again to pay a price, one group of its men was overthrown and another group of its men were wronged. For instance, in the big struggles against Peng Dehuai, against Liu Shaoqi and against Lin Biao, several tens of high-ranking commanders were purged. In the movement against the gang of four, 30 high-ranking cadres of large military district rank and higher were removed from their posts. Each struggle brought about yet another serious aggravation of the internal contradictions. The adverse effects of these

movements on the morale of the army was worse than anything else. Secondary problems were the seriously increasing ageing, the lack of education and the inflation of privileges.

Deng Xiaoping started out in his measures of army reform from a political-ideological preparation for the task. He used practical standards in place of Hua Guofeng's "grasp the key link in running the army" (where the term 'key link' refers to class struggle). He then proceeded to reorganize the leading groups in the military, getting rid of all who held different views, and energetically promoted a change in the officer corps in four respects: rendering them more revolutionary (to hold identical views with the Deng faction), younger in average age (those of company rank to be around 25 years, those of battalion rank 30 years, those of regiment rank 35 years, those of division rank 40 years, and those of army corps rank 45 years), better educated (new cadres to have college education and supplemental schooling for those already in office), professionally more competent (cadres at all levels must have been educated at relevant officers training schools). Present key office holders in the military may be seen in table 5.

At the same time there were reforms of the military organization, efforts made to have better troops and simpler administration, the members of the Military Commission were reduced to 9, the command levels for various services was reduced, the railway corps and the capital construction engineering corps were transferred to the State Council system, new military technologies were introduced, modern weapons were commercially acquired and the intercourse with foreign countries and mutual visits were increased.

After Deng Xiaoping came to power, he continuously, between 1977 and 1983, expanded the network of his own power through repeated readjustments in personnel and outright struggle. The forces that were earlier or later struck down or eliminated by him were: the gang of four--the gang system--any kind of faction--"three types of undesirable party members"--people who oppose the political line of the 3d Plenum and violaters of law and discipline. From Wang Dongxing [3076 2639 5281] to Geng Biao, from Xu Shiyu [6079 0013 0645] to Yang Chengwu [2799 2052 2976], they have all been defeated by him in the struggle for military power.

There are now a group of old cadres who have originated from the "second field army" (the red fourth front army), safely installed in key posts of the army, among them 7 commanding officers of large military districts: Qin Jiwei [4404 1015 0251], Li Desheng [2521 1795 3932], Xiang Shouzhong [0686 1343 1813], You Taizhong [1429 1132 1813], Wang Chenghan [3769 6134 3352], Zheng Weishan [6774 4850 1472], Zhou Shizhong [0719 0013 1813], and also Navy Commander Liu Huaqing [0491 5478 3237], and 5 political commissars of large military districts: Fu Chongbi [0265 1504 4310] at Beijing, Guo Linxiang [6753 2651 4382] at Nanjing, Wan Haifeng [5502 3189 1496] at Chengdu, Xie Zhenhua [5200 2182 5478] at Kunming, and Tan Shanhe [6623 0810 0735] in Xinjiang, while Deng Xiaoping himself was a senior officer of the second field army and the fourth front army. There are 7 field armies that belong to the "second field army" organization, they

are the 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 16th, 60th and 69th (partly), also the 15th paratroops. Add to this state also those that came to grief in the cultural revolution and the anti-Deng struggles, the power of the Deng faction among the military is really considerable. Of the commanders and political commissars of the original four field armies, only the following four are still alive: Liu Bocheng [0491 0130 2110], Deng Xiaoping, Xi Zhongxun [5045 0112 0534] and Su Yu [4725 5940]. Here too we see that the men of the second field army occupy the dominant position. The men of the second field army are now distributed throughout the armed forces, while the underlings of Lin Biao of the fourth field army are being squeezed out everywhere.

Military Expenses and Treatment of Officers and Men

Possibly in every country the army enjoys certain privileges to reward them for their loyal service to their country. The privileges of the Chinese communist army are established on top of its huge military organization. To ensure the supply and consumption of these privileges, while the country has insufficient economic strength and the burden on the people is already heavy, an independent system was built up, more or less parallel with the departments of the state, from a military industrial organization to army-operated farms, from the training of political and foreign affairs personnel to the whole range of cultural institutions, including art schools and film studios. In other words, apart from the public society, the military are completely capable of independently enjoying a modern life, and manage to do so with greater efficiency and with a greater dependability than the state organization can do it.

Although the Chinese communists have declared it their principle to maintain an army in a self-reliant way that will lighten the burden on the population, their military expenses are still mysterious beyond conjecture. In March 1980, Deng Xiaoping said: "The present military expenditure of our country is quite considerable; this is detrimental to our national construction." ("The Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping" p 249)

For as long a period of time as 17 years, from 1961 to 1977, communist China did not publish national statistical data. Whatever we know of official data on military expenditure may be seen in table 6:

Table 6: Official Figures on Communist China's Military Expenditure (in RMB)

Year	Total Exp. (in 100 million)	Military Exp. (in 100 million)	Percentage
1951			48.0
1955	293.5	65.2	22.2
1956			20.0
1957		55.2	19.2
1959	527.7	58.0	11.0

(Table 6 continued)

(Table 6 continued)

1960	700.2	58.0	8.3
1978	1110.9	167.8	15.1
1979	1273.9	222.7	17.5
1980	1212.7	193.8	16.0
1981	1115.0	168.0	15.1
1982	1153.3	176.4	15.3
1983	1292.5	177.1	15.0

Note: Data for 1951 and 1956 from Peng Dehuai's statement at the 8th NPC; other data from XINHUA MONTHLY and the China Encyclopedic Yearbook.

The internal relationships as shown by the data on this table are on the whole trustworthy, for instance, the highest expenditure at the time of the Korean War, the lowest figure at the time of the 1960 straightened situation, the comparatively high expenditure at the time of the war with Vietnam (proportionately), but how are we to evaluate the statements as a whole?

According to the data provided by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, the military expenditure of the United States and the Soviet Union by far exceeded the expenditure by Communist China. For instance, in 1978 the figures were US\$148 billion for the Soviet Union, US\$105.1 billion for the United States and only US\$11.2 billion for Communist China, or about 7.6 percent of the Soviet Union's expenditure. Western scholars are always doubtful about the Soviet Union's official figures of military expenditure. For instance, in 1970 the Soviet Union published a figure of 17.9 rubles (about US\$20 billion) of military expenditure, while Western estimates thought the figure should be between US\$50-75 billion. In that year, the military expenditure of the United States was US\$79.8 billion.

With this material as reference, we may estimate that the official Communist Chinese figures are unduly low; they should account for 20-30 percent of the state's expenditure, and not only for the 15 percent as they say. However, due to the backward productive forces in a large country that is to support several million soldiers, the absolute value of its military expenditure is still far below that of the United States and the Soviet Union. In other words, China's military modernization cannot in the foreseeable future match the United States or the Soviet Union. (see table 7)

Table 7: Comparison of Military Expenditure:
China, United States, Soviet Union. (in US\$billion)

	China	United States	Soviet Union
1960	39		
1970		778	539
1975		890	1240

(Table 7 continued)

(Table 7 continued)

1978	112	1051	1480
1979	148	1145	
1980	129	1427	1444

Source of data: "Concise World Economic Statistics."

Note: The official Soviet figure for the Soviet Union's military expenditure in 1980 was US\$26.5 billion.

Expenditure on research in nuclear and rocket weaponry, to be sure, are kept most secret and there is no way to verify these figures. The big-character posters of the cultural revolution revealed that expenditure on research, testing and manufacturing of China's first atomic bomb ran as high as RMB60 billion, but that was called spreading a rumor. However, an estimate in the tens of billions may not be too high for the costs to Communist China of developing their nuclear weapon, judging by the US\$2 billion that it cost the United States to manufacture the atomic bomb in the 1940's at Los Alamos and by Marshal Chen Yi's pledge to have "rather an atomic bomb than pants."

The treatment of officers and men comprises the free supply of clothing, food, housing, medical expenses, cultural recreation and transportation. The pay of officers (platoon leaders and higher ranks) is from RMB40-350, according to 24 ranks. The pay was even higher before the cultural revolution. Since it aroused a lot of contradictions when officers, transferred to civilian work places, were highly paid for low jobs, officers' pay was reduced by 30 percent.

Soldiers (soldiers, noncommissioned officers up to squad leaders) are issued annually 3 shirts, 3 pairs of shoes, winter and summer uniforms. Their pocket money is a monthly RMB6-15, demobilization pay is one-time payment of several hundred yuan, depending on circumstances. A battalion commander's demobilization pay may amount to several thousand yuan.

Privileges of the Military

As to military privileges, there is first of all their exemption from "struggles." In all the many political movements during the past 30 years that involved the entire population, when "even fowls and dogs were not left in peace" and everyone was in danger, certain high-ranking officers may have gotten into trouble, but never was there among the military any criticism and struggle of having everyone go through an ordeal, at the most it was required to study the documents and enhance one's knowledge and nothing else.

Even the cultural revolution, that large-scale confused fighting that left on place unaffected, in general never spread to the military. At the beginning of the cultural revolution, the central authorities emphasized

that the military should give priority to "education by positive examples" and not engage in airing views or in exposing, criticizing and investigations. During the 10 years of the cultural revolution, the main accusation put forward against many people was "opposing and disturbing the military," "sabotaging the stability in the army" and "brazen attempts to destroy our 'Great Wall'." Any of those who had believed that the class struggle knew no limits of space and time and who directed their spearheads against the army, could not avoid coming to no good end. From Wang Guanqi [3769 7070 2058] and the red guards, who wanted to "pinch the military a bit," to Jiang Qing [3068 7230], who wanted to "set fire to burn down the grass on the waste land," they all had to pay the price of incarceration.

According to Mao Zedong's logic, not everything could be spotlessly clean and flawless among the military and there could be reason for struggle, but to maintain the strength of unthinking loyalty as his trusted stake in the game, he was ready to pay any price. He, therefore, kept the army in a special position, having them ready to come as soon as called and be capable of fighting. During the continuous fighting and general chaos throughout the country, Mao precisely relied on these troops to put down the internal disorder by both means, take-overs and suppressions. The high prestige of the PLA not only allowed the high-ranking officers to be arrogant and domineering and to tyrannically abuse their powers, but even the lowest soldier reaped not a small measure of benefits. After their demobilization, they were everywhere regarded as of excellent political character and by all units entrusted with important tasks or placed into extremely important positions. The result is that quite a number of these ignorant and incompetent political soldiers developed into fellows who would either make trouble out of nothing or flatter and fawn, or a number of the more courageous ones would even take things into their own hands and commit offences against law and discipline.

Another aspect of the privileges is of a material kind. In 1979, there was an internal document which passed on the criticism by a high-ranking Romanian general of the practice of special privileges in the Communist Chinese army and their way of staying aloof from the people. He had visited a deputy commander in one of the provincial military districts and quoted as example that that deputy commander lived in a single-family house with a courtyard of so much acreage, the house of so many rooms, and a number of persons, a doctor, a secretary, a chauffeur, a cook, guard personnel and an amah, all for his own personal service, and also having a private car for transportation. He said, the Romanian minister of defense travels with the common people together in the same plane, lives in an apartment...The material was very sharp and to the point, and soon thereafter Ye Wenfu's [5509 2429 4395] poem on a general appeared, attacking the military privileges that no one dared to touch.

For many years the source of recruits were mainly the youths of the rural areas. After a few years of service, the soldiers could transfer to civilian work as workers or cadres. Joining the army was therefore a very desirable outlet for the youths in the villages, whereby they imperceptibly

crowded out employment opportunities for a part of the urban population. Only a short time ago, to speed up the military modernization, there was an increase in the recruitment of urban youths, and it was ruled that soldiers from rural areas should return to the villages after their demobilization.

The treatment of the soldiers is of course too far below that of other countries, but much better than the treatment of rural and urban youths in the country. The supply of food in unlimited quantities alone is something the majority of the rural youths could not have imagined in their dreams. One officer once said: "In the education of new recruits it has always been an important point to have them exercise some restraint in eating. In our unit we have every year several recruits who die from eating to the point of bursting or from twisting of the intestines." The peasants often have not enough food grain to eat, and what they have is much of the coarser grains. When the new recruits see the fragrant rice, they easily are led to eat without regard for their lives.

As to the military privileges, which are so far apart from local conditions, seen in the present situation where modernization now demands stepped up replacement in the army of much of the old by new things, there is the possibility that the problems will take a more serious turn, resulting, first, in a sharpening of the contradictions between the army and the people, and, second, in increasing the conservative trend among the military.

It is an Army of the State or of the Party?

It cannot be denied that during the past 30 years the PLA performed some good deeds in support of the country and of benefit to the people. The most outstanding of such actions was helping the people in natural disasters. In all the flood, drought or fire disasters of the past, one word of command created many heroes who would go through fire and water, much revered by the people. In railway construction and other engineering projects, the army had mobilized substantial forces. In general, the relationship between the soldiers and the people has been harmonious, definitely a difference as between heaven and earth compared to the olden days when soldiers were no different from bandits. However, if it is the intention to build a truly modernized people's army, some problems of a basic character must be solved. Apart from problems of a purely military character, the problem that must be mentioned first is whether this army is to be an army of the state or of the party?

The army of Communist China has been used by a dictator and by careerists, with the serious consequences that the morale was dissipated, the prestige of the army went down, men were harmed and generals were lost and the progress of modernization slowed down. Even the communist authorities cannot but face up to these facts. They too now seem to feel that it is not at all a glorious thing that the army belongs to one party (to restore the system of a state military council). However, they have not

yet, realized, or refuse to acknowledge, that this is precisely the chief root of their military problems. The "theory of a party army" has already been proven in theory and practice as an unsuitable guiding principle for the building of a modern army. There is always an endless stream of struggles between political parties. An army that is linked to one party cannot avoid being drawn into the fray and the result will be that they will murder each other. If one says that during their protracted fighting the Chinese communists have produced many an outstanding general and strategist, it is unfortunate that these people did not fall in battle, but became meaningless victims in party struggles. No wonder that some people say that Jiang Qing deserves a big medal for having lightly exposed batches of old generals to mortal danger.

The civil war was a fight between nationalists and communists, and it might there still be acceptable to say that the army belonged to the party. However, in a unified, peaceful modern country still to emphasize that the army must be loyal to one party, or even one leader, and not loyal to the people and the country, not to protect the borders and fight off invaders, this can only turn the Communist Chinese "modernization" into a farce.

If the army is not included into the state organization, it will be very difficult to ensure that history will not repeat itself. Solution of this problem, of course, also touches on a much broader problem--"the leadership of the party." Because the Chinese communists will not allow to question their sole leadership of the whole country, we can hardly hope that they will relinquish the "absolute leadership" over the military, which they consider more important than anything else. It may therefore already count as some achievement if there is even only a formal effort of "rendering the army into a state institution."

The pro-Deng cadres have already taken many measures to speed up the "modernization of the army," including the promulgation of a new Military Service Law and Regulations Governing Military Officers, restoration of a system of military ranks, strengthening education in universities and colleges and improved training, renovation of weaponry, readjustments in personnel, etc. It is basically a return to the military line of Peng Dehuai, but compared to the 1950's, the road to readjustment of the military is a much thornier one. The biggest tiger blocking the way are those batches of incompetent and inert old military cadres that hang on to their jobs. We heard recently of a high-ranking military cadre of provincial rank in the interior that he refused to take the special privileged retirement for old cadres, which would mean that he is raised one rank in salary, and retains the right to pursue the documents issued by the central authorities (this as a symbol of power), but he still refuses to accept. These "local gods" know that their preferential position completely depends on holding on to "power," and that this power is very limited. Their condition for retirement, which they bargain for, is to be transferred to the "Erhuanqu" district of Beijing. Only by residing in the residential area of the high cadres in the capital, can they ensure for themselves living conditions comparable to those they enjoyed like

local despots in the provinces of the interior. People like that can possibly be counted in the tens of thousands. Whether they have rendered meritorious service or have been evil bureaucrats, who dares ask and invite their hostility?

As to the young officers, they are not hampered by old practices and customs, also do not have much of the heroism transmitted from the war years, even less of the fanaticism and blind obedience of the Lin Biao era. As military men, they hope to have an opportunity for advancement and of proving their abilities. They are possibly better at actions and not at pondering problems. As long as the storm-signal ball has not yet been lowered in the factional fighting and the dangers are not yet over, how long will they still tolerate the present condition?

Personal Story

Hong Kong CHIU-SHIH NIEN-TAI [THE NINETIES] in Chinese Vol 7, Jul 84 pp 60-62

[Article by Liang Liyi [2733 7787 0308]: "The PLA That I Knew"]

[Text] Team Leader Zhao is of farm serf-laborer origin. He earned the title of "Combat Hero of the First Class" in the Korean War. Innumerable wrinkles line his swarthy face, concealing the scares of battle. In 1965 I was detached to join a "four clean-ups work team." He was my team leader.

The Great Hero

Ever since my return to mainland China in 1954 to enter a higher school, I was full of respect and reverence for the PLA. Especially since the 1960's, when one movement after the other, to study Lei Feng, to study Wang Jie, was launched, the mention of the PLA was of men whose examples we must emulate. However, the time that I had work relations with individual men of the PLA, and had quite some contacts with them, came in 1965, when I was transferred for work with the four clean-ups work team. The team leader of our work team was a PLA cadre. Mentioning the PLA brings this team leader Zhao to my mind.

Although the four clean-ups teams were special contingents for the "re-education of people," they had many regulations and taboos. For instance there was the demand that all members devote themselves wholeheartedly to their work; it was not permitted to ask for leave to return home; lifestyle had to be one of hard work and plain living; it was not permitted to buy snacks, even soda water was strictly prohibited, only cigarettes and cold tea were exceptions. One was required to be alert to the presence of the enemy. Without permission from the organization, no contacts must be had with Hong Kong guests or foreigners, otherwise one was liable to have committed the crimes of maintaining illicit relations with a foreign country, divulging state secrets, or similar crimes.

Among all these hundreds of regulations, I found most difficult to accept the prohibition to have contacts with friends from Hong Kong, because my husband was a "guest from Hong Kong."

Our team leader Zhao was a Mongol, originally a Mongol serf. He had been a small lama; he is a combat hero of the first class, known throughout the country. He performed great meritorious deeds at the battle of Shangganling during the Korean War. At that time, his platoon held a commanding height and persevered until victory, he being the only survivor of his platoon. The fighting was extremely vicious. The events were already over 10 years back and there was peace and no more fighting, but the scars of war remained in that swarthy, long and narrow face that I have never seen smiling. The innumerable crisscrossing wrinkles were like a brand left by the hardships of life.

There was a big difference between his outer appearance and his real age. Especially viewed from behind, looking overweighted and bent down, his legs somewhat bent, having suffered freezing in ice and snow, he looked even more aged. Even though he wore a new uniform, shining red badge on his cap and collar insignia, it all could not conceal the original impression of feebleness due to old age. He was only 38 years old, 9 years older than myself. Some said he looked as if he could be my father. It is true, in the beginning I showed respect to him as if he were of an older generation and adored him like a hero. As I had lived many years in Hong Kong, growing up in the capitalist society, an intellectual, growing up in the greenhouse of a school, I have never had to weather the storms of class struggle and therefore had a special esteem for this man who had originally been a serf and now was also a great hero.

Rigid Sense of Principle

In the beginning, he gave me a perfectly good impression, but after a small debate, he began to leave a few black marks in my mind. That was a debate meeting after viewing a movie. When making our statements, everyone was talking about raising our vigilance, removing the scales from our eyes, being adept at recognizing the class enemy that infiltrated our revolutionary contingents, etc. I also talked in this manner, but added a few words. I said:

"Among the enemy there are some of us, among us there are some of the enemy, that is a rule."

Team leader Zhao criticized me on the spot; he said I was wrong. It is true, the enemy certainly can infiltrate our contingents, but the members of our revolutionary contingents will under no circumstances sneak into the black lair of the enemy. One can only say:

"There is the enemy among us; there cannot be anyone of us among the enemy."

This made us start an argument. I quoted many examples to explain the problem. Before liberation, many underground workers and communists infiltrated the enemy contingents and worked there. There are also many examples of this nature from the old guerrilla base in our Baoan County, from the Dongjiang column...

While going on talking, I had regretfully paid no attention to the expression on team leader Zhao's face. Team leader Zhao was shaken by a strong cough, a lump of phlegm moved about in his throat and with a loud "ta" he spit on the ground. It was then that I noticed that he was boiling with rage. His face drew longer and changed from red to a greenish tint and from that to black. Finally he opened wide his pair of small brown eyes filled with a fierce gleam, stared at me for a while, with two big blue veins pulsating at the corners of his forehead. One hand slammed down on the meeting table and everyone in the room fell silent, strangely, there was even no sound of coughing or spitting. When he hit the table, my whole body jerked. I looked around in surprise. All the several tens of people at the meeting had the same facial expression, a stupefied apathy. I only heard the beat of my own heart and felt an icy cold in my fingertips.

Slowly I lowered my head, stifled my fear and made an effort to show the same apathy as the other.

Team leader Zhao's ghastly pale, icy cold, stern, wrinkled face was truly terrifying. He was about to teach me a lesson with that same class sentiment of hatred for the enemy that he felt at the battle of Shangganling. Because he was too excited, and when angry spoke with a strong Mongolian accent, I hardly could make out what he was in the end saying. Only as he cursed for quite a while, I understood that I had after all committed some crime. It turned out that he said I had attacked and insulted the communist party and that is a serious question of class standpoint. The communist party is glorious, great, correct and will absolutely not infiltrate the black lair of the enemy. After I had pulled myself together and regained clarity of mind, I felt very wronged. I wanted to gather up courage, stood up to argue with him because I knew that reason was on my side. I would dare argue with him right up to the superior leadership, but as I looked around at all my classmates, I again met those expressions of stupefied apathy and I lost all my courage of continuing the argument to full victory. In front of this battle hero of great reputation, and again on the topic of so serious a question as political standpoint, who would take my side? I had best swallow my anger.

This was during the work of the four clean-ups, when this PLA cadre left the first black mark in my mind. However, I kept respecting him, because on the battlefield he is truly a hero. I forgave him because he had originally been a rural serf, has had no education and had only quite recently freed himself of the shameful label of illiteracy.

Iron Discipline

However, later a second incident occurred and there I could not forgive him.

It was like this:

In November 1965, when my little daughter was almost 1 year old, I, her own mother, could not return home to celebrate her birthday, which made me feel quite uneasy. However, with the thought that revolutionary work must take precedence over everything else, I felt I had to bear the knot in my heart and devote myself wholeheartedly to the work of the four clean-ups. On the day of my little daughter's birthday, the amah sent a message through someone saying that my daughter was sick, quite seriously sick, asking me to come home immediately. My home was a few li away from my workplace, 20 or 30 minutes by bicycle. I immediately asked team leader Zhao for leave, but team leader Zhao said, the class struggle is now reaching its greatest intensity, we are now doing a thorough study of the problem of cadre classification, none of our work team are permitted to leave, to avoid that someone divulge secret information to the class enemy. Any moving outside must be a collective action.

I was one who had returned to China from Hong Kong and after graduating from Guangzhou University was assigned to work in Shenzhen. I had no relatives there and all I could do was to entrust my two daughters to an amah. Although I had colleagues and neighbors to give some attention, there was no relative in my home there. If anything happened, nobody was there to make a decision. The more I thought of it, the more scared I got. Having no other alternative, I secretly sent a letter to Hong Kong during the midday rest period asking my husband to quickly go to Shenzhen. It was a violation of discipline for members of the work team to send a letter to Hong Kong. Still, I did it and nobody found out.

I really felt very bad these days. All my thoughts were with my little daughter. When I left home to work in the four clean-ups, she was not quite 8 months and had not yet learned to hold her milk bottle. She was such a well-behaved baby, so smart, never cried or made trouble. When one lifted her up, she would wave her hands and wiggle her feet and giggle happily. Actually, I have had very little sparetime to carry her in my arms. How sick was she now? At the thought of her, I felt a dull pain in my heart. What was her sickness? Could it be meningitis? That was now epidemic! I was thinking and thinking. I criticized myself for having such a strong attachment to my family. None of the other team members had a family, are they like me? My petty bourgeois mentality and sentiments were really too strong and it was very necessary for me to undergo tempering in this work team. After scolding myself in this way, my mood quietened down. However, in the end I still was waiting for a chance to go home.

One afternoon at 2:30, the entire work team was to rush to the Shenzhen theater to hear a report. Not quite finished with my lunch, I saw already some people moving out and I hastily pushed my bicycle out to catch up with them.

My skill riding a bicycle has never been good, I had learned it only recently. If I saw a motorcar coming toward me still quite a distance away, I would quickly jump off my bicycle, as I would otherwise certainly ride plunk into the motorcar. This time I could not care less, I only hoped that I could quickly make a secret trip home. All my legs did was pedal furiously and make the wheels spin at a flying speed. I did not think of danger, only of making speed. The bicycle went up a fairly steep incline, then over the top it gathered speed, but I was still pedalling furiously, getting the wheels to spin faster. The many motorcars I met just flashed by. All that was on my mind was my little daughter. Suddenly there was a little heap of sand on the gradient road and that stopped my front wheel. The bicycle turned a somersault and I was thrown high into the air, falling heavily to the ground. In the truck that was rushing up from behind, the driver was fortunately able to break abruptly and came to stop next to me. I was sweating all over, but quickly got up and got underway on my bicycle.

When I came to the door of my home, my elder daughter shouted in a shrill voice:

"Mama is back, mama is back."

The entire small room seemed in commotion. Her little hand had dragged me into the house, but I paid little attention to her petty bothering, all I was concerned about was my seriously ill little daughter.

When I went into her room and saw little sister asleep in her bed, feebly breathing, I started to cry. Elder sister hastily and rather roughly took little sister in her arms and before I could do it, had lifted her from her bed. I took little sister out of big sister's arms, my eyes completely blurred by tears. I wiped my eyes and could not help calling out chokingly and my voice trembling and hoarse:

"Heavens, who is that, is that my little baby, what has changed her like that?"

Her whole face was completely swelled up, her nose not protruding, her large eyes reduced to a slit. I could not recognize her at all. I was shaking with fright, seeing this little being trembling all the time in my arms. At last I heard a feeble sound coming from the little mouth that had shrunk to a little slit: "Mama!"

Then I saw the little slit of a mouth pulling to the sides. She was probably happy to have mama come home and smiled.

I dried my tears, held her in my arms and kissed her again and again. Big sister was whirling around, calling out, dancing, laughing. Later, the amah consoled me and told me to relax, telling me that she had taken little sister to the doctor every day, that she has had pneumonia, but had taken an unsuitable medicine and that the allergy to the medicine had brought about the swelling of her face; there was nothing to worry about. Hearing this, I quietened down somewhat. However, by that time I felt as if I had broken my legs; I could hardly move them. Then I suddenly felt very thirsty. I was really thinking of resting a little at home, but I saw on my watch that it was already past 2:30. I would be late and would be criticized. Then I quickly put little sister back to bed, kissed big sister and rushed out toward the Shenzhen theater. Big sister and the amah followed me to the door; they were calling:

"Change your pants, there are big holes at the knees."

I looked down and so it was, even some blood oozing out, but how could I attend to that? Did I have time?

No Understanding for Human Feelings

That Saturday I knew my husband would surely come home; he must have received my letter. In the afternoon I asked team leader Zhao for permission to go home in the evening, my daughter being sick and my husband coming home from Hong Kong, but team leader Zhao curtly said:

"Leave will not be permitted; members of the work team are not to have contacts with people from Hong Kong."

I said: "That is my husband."

Team leader Zhao said: "Also not in case of husbands."

Nothing else for me to do but to keep quiet.

That evening there was really to be a very important big public accusation meeting, the target of the accusations being an assistant manager of a corporation, a fourth category cadre marked as belonging to the category of class enemies. The place for the accusation meeting was our meeting room.

I knew that that evening my husband, finding that I had not returned home, would certainly telephone me. Since I could not get home, I was at least hoping to hear his voice and to hear how my little daughter was getting on, that was all I wanted. I specially kept watch near the telephone.

At 7 p.m. the accusation meeting started. Righteous indignation was vented in all the criticizing, insulting, shouting, one wave after the other, one speaker after the other. I was busy recording all the crimes of that fourth category cadre that the masses exposed. After a while, there was

indeed the "ling, ling" ringing of the telephone. I hurriedly stretched out my hand for the telephone, but team leader Zhao immediately shouted to stop it: "I order you to put down the receiver!" as if he was giving an order to his soldiers in the Shangganling battle.

My hand stopped in midair and I looked up in surprise, turning toward team leader Zhao.

Team leader Zhao rushed over and grabbed the telephone; the tense accusation meeting came to a stop.

"Hello! Hello! Who is there?....I will not connect you....don't call again..."

Team leader Zhao's two dark-black eyebrows had suddenly drawn together, and the muscles in his wrinkled face were twitching all the time.

I was quite sure that it had been my husband's telephone call; how could I have been refused to get the call? I was very anxious and restless. After all, how was my little daughter's sickness? I found this too unreasonable and could not endure it any longer. My whole body felt like consumed by fire. I fiercely jumped up, dashed over, stretched out to get hold of the telephone and shouted:

"This is my telephone call, I want to get this call, that is a call from my husband..."

Team leader Zhao pushed me back with his left hand and with his right hand ruthlessly pushed down the receiver, breaking off the call.

"Are you crazy? Back to your seat. I order you to go back to your seat!" team leader Zhao shouted.

I was really like mad when I rushed forward, violently pushed his left hand away and grabbed the receiver.

"Hello, hello," I shouted with all my might, but was unable to hear anything but a scratching sound.

Dumbstruck I let go of the telephone, tears streaming from my eyes.

I had completely ruined the accusation atmosphere of the meeting. Team leader Zhao, very angry, dragged me out of the meeting room like a little child and furthermore told me that he will severely punish me.

After what happened then and there, that combat hero of the first class, whom I had revered, his glory and his lofty image had vanished forever.

Military Dependents

Hong Kong CHIU-SHIH NIEN-TAI [THE NINETIES] in Chinese Vol 7, Jul 84 pp 63-64

[Article by Li Huiru [7812 1979 1172]: "Military Dependent, Officer's Wife and Armyman's Woman"]

[Text] Wives who are PLA men's dependants are in correct formal language referred to as "junshu" [military dependants]. The small town dwellers call them "guantai" [officer's wives], and the common people in the rural areas of the south call them "dajunpo" [armymen's women]. Becoming the wife of an officer is like getting a political guarantee and, as to one's livelihood, like getting a meal ticket.

The wives of PLA officers are called by three different names in various different strata of the mainland population, namely military dependants, officers' wives and armymen's women.

The Official Designation and the Popular Names Used by the People

In the public newspapers, magazines and on the radio, also in formal speeches, throughout the country, the short term "junshu" [military dependant] means family members of soldiers of the revolutionary army. To be a military dependant is a great honor, often linked together with "lieshu" (member of the family of a soldier or cadre who has sacrificed his life for the revolution) and is receiving the same respect from the people.

Under the propaganda of those in power, the prestige of the PLA is very high, as expressed in such sayings as "Without the people's army, the people would have nothing," "The people of the whole country must emulate the PLA," etc. Joining the army is very honorable, as the saying is: "One man joining the army brings glory to the whole family." Wherever there is a family that has one member in the army, the local government would post a red sign over their door: "Honorable Family." Being a common soldier is already a very glorious thing, being an officer is even exceedingly more so, and there is of course also a different value in being the wife of an officer as compared to being the wife of a common soldier. The expression used by the small town dwellers in the cities for the wives of PLA officers is bluntly "guantai" [officer's wife]. This term was criticized by the revolutionary cadres and by the government, because, as they say, it vilifies and slanders the great PLA, since the PLA is not working as "bureaucrats" [suggested by the component "guan"], but is serving the people, is the army of the sons and brothers of the people, and the word "taitai" is a bourgeois appellation and must under no circumstances be applied to family members of revolutionary armymen, who refer to their wives as "airen" [presently used term for "wife"]. Regardless of all the criticism, there are still some small town dwellers who still, by force of old custom, use the term "guantai." However, when hearing the word, the "guantai" makes one associate it with the wives of

officials during the KMT times--hands waving goose feather fans, heavily made up, bewitching and coquettish, parasites who specialized in making trouble. The small town dwellers still seem to preserve this impression of the wives they call "Guantai," because these officers' wives have privileges due to their political and economic status such as the common small town dwellers do not have.

The common people in the villages of the southern region graphically call the wives of officers "dajunpo." This term is much disliked by the officers and their wives, but has become of common usage in the language of the masses, and there is no way to change that.

The Meaning of "Dajunpo"

The "dajun" part has originally had a good meaning, a name of respect as used by the peasants for the army, but adding to it the particle "po" [woman] makes it lose much of its concept of respect. The term "dajunpo" has various connotations:

First, the "po" appears dependent on the "dajun" [big armyman], i.e. the wife benefits from the high position of her husband. Second, she is dependant on and attached to the power of the "big armyman," does not have to work, enjoys high position and lives in ease and comfort, a life-style that cannot be mentioned in the same breath as the plight of the woman in the villages who are all the time working exposed to the sun and the rain.

Third, they specifically serve as the means of procreation. The "dajunpo" are particularly capable of bearing children, having one child every year, continuously giving birth. After they have reached the goal of having a basketball team, they work toward the goal of a football team. However this is not the fault of the "dajunpo," but related to the population policy of those days and the privileged political and economic circumstances of the PLA.

Heaven on Earth--Marriage to an Army Officer

Even though the appellation "dajunpo" may be not too pleasing to the ear, an army officer is still the object of pursuit by the village maidens as an ideal marriage partner, especially by girls with bad class origin, daughters of landlords or rich peasants. Once the relationship is established, one may say, the escape from the "sea of bitterness" is immediate. Not only escape from the work in the village, but the possibility to move far away from the village following the tours of duty of the army, also the immediate assumption of the honorable appellation of revolutionary armyman dependant, all these blessings also extending to the next generation.

Handsome and spirited, the young officers with careers in front of them, are not at all pursuing the village girls as marriage partners, but are after the more educated girls, such as members of the culture teams,

teachers, nurses and university graduates. In the 1950's and 1960's, when friendship dances were in vogue, there were fairly large-scale public activities arranged to help officers find marriage partners. These were parties sponsored by the party organizations and the female students of universities. There were several such activities throughout the year.

Officers of the PLA are either of the navy, the army or the air force. From the standpoint of the university girls, the best choice was the air force and the second choice the navy, because the officers in these two services were better educated, had more of the flavor of intellectuals and were higher in social standing than officers of the army. However, officers of these two categories were comparatively few, therefore most sought after by university girls.

I had two classmates in the university who after participating in parties with air force and navy officers really came to know two officers. Any holiday thereafter, the two officers inevitably came to visit, they always went out together in pairs and many people envied them. In less than a year, they reached the stage of talking of marriage. When preparations for the wedding were about to be started, the medical checkup revealed that the navy officer had tuberculosis and was discharged from the service. The wedding was therefore called off. The air force officer was in charge of secret data in his unit and his marriage would have to be approved by higher authority. His girl friend was of a capitalist family, the father living abroad, so her family background was designated as of "complex social relationships," and this kind of marriage would never get the approval of the party organization of the military. The happy events suddenly went up into smoke. Thereafter all relations were broken off.

The Political Guarantee

Generally, in the mind of the common people, having become the wife of an officer amounted to acquiring a guarantee which effectively guaranteed safety in class struggle, and as to livelihood it amounted to acquiring a long-term meal ticket. The future held no worries as to having a warm home and sufficient food. However, there were exceptions at times.

On the even of the Lin Biao incident in 1971, there was in our town the retail store of a metal firm. The wife of an officer worked there as saleslady, and she had an unfortunate accident. One day she was bored at the store and leafed through a copy of the PEOPLE'S PICTORIAL. She happened to see a photo taken by Jiang Qing of Lin Biao bareheaded and blurted out intuitively and carelessly:

"On this picture Deputy Chairman Lin looks like bald-headed Jiang!"

This phrase was exposed by the revolutionary masses. According to the Six Point Directive on Public Security, an attack on Deputy Chairman Lin was a counterrevolutionary act. She was immediately arrested and sentenced to punishment. Even the guarantee of being the wife of an officer was of no avail.

As soon as her army-officer husband got wind of the matter, he immediately severed all connections with her, made a clean break with her and insisted on divorce.

Only 1 year after the Lin Biao incident (13 September) was she declared innocent and released from prison, but her army-officer husband had in the meantime found himself another young female and had remarried.

There is therefore no absolute political guarantee for a "dajunpo."

Special Economic Zone

Hong Kong CHIU-SHIH NIEN-TAI [THE NINETIES] in Chinese Vol 7, Jul 84 pp 64-66

[Article by Yu Jiwen [0151 7162 5113]: "The PLA and the Special Zone"]

[Text] Because of its neighborhood to Hong Kong, that capitalist world of all evil, the Shenzhen of those days was on constant vigilance. At that place, the PLA had enacted many a miscarriage of justice, there had been hatchet men and pitiful creatures, and also... Since Shenzhen has established a second border defense line, the Shenzhen special zone was declared separated from the rest of the country. The second border defense line is over 80 km long, has 18 customs stations and frontier inspection stations and a highway all along the entire line with defensive barbed wire on both sides. The highway is guarded by the PLA, whose military vehicles patrol it day and night.

Only a waterway separates Shenzhen from Hong Kong's New Territory. In the past this was an important border defense post. There were four levels of border guard zones, namely a non-border defense zone, a border defense zone, a special border defense zone and a restricted zone. Entering and leaving these zones required permit certificates relevant to each zone. Since it was a border defense zone, there were of course defense forces stationed there. However, after the establishment of the special economic zone, especially also after establishing the second border defense line, the main body of the defense force is not stationed along the second defense line. Inside the special zone, personnel in PLA uniforms are only seen at Shenzhen's Jiulong Customs and at several customs inspection points where rail traffic from Hong Kong comes in. The whole situation and appearance is quite different from what it was in those days when Shenzhen was in a state of highest alert.

Three Great Cases Enacted in Shenzhen

In those days, due to the proximity of Shenzhen to Hong Kong, the capitalist world of all evils, Shenzhen, one may say, was at all times at highest military alert, particularly during the cultural revolution.

One big short of the PLA at Shenzhen who until today has left a deep impression on the minds of many people is Zhang Jingyao [1728 2529 5069]. That man was deputy army commander of the 42nd Army and after the cultural revolution became commander of the Guangzhou Military Region Headquarters. After the Lin Biao incident he was transferred to Hunan, still in a commander post, and he was only brought down after the arrest of the gang of four. The reason why he left such a deep impression among the people is that he enacted many miscarriages of justice in Shenzhen.

July and August of 1968 was the time when the class purification contingents began to flourish. In his capacity of responsible person of the military control commission for the Huiyang region, Zhang Jingyao led a work team into Shenzhen. After he assumed office, he gave a report at the Shenzhen Theater, its content being: Shenzhen is on the border defense zone and borders on Hong Kong and Macao. Many special agents, men of the Anti-communist Save-the-Nation Corps, KMT agents, etc. have infiltrated here and brought confusion to our class struggle; we cannot remain silent and calm. The next day he established three special cases teams and he himself specially took control of three big cases: (1) the case of the white pig; (2) the case of the Anti-communist Save-the-Nation Corps, and (3) the case of the fire at the Exhibition Hall. In all three cases, the enemy was, according to Zhang Jingyao, the Anti-communist Save-the-Nation Corps that had infiltrated into Shenzhen and must be annihilated.

The case of the fire at the Exhibition Hall occurred a little time before that. The exhibition at the Exhibition Hall, which was part of the workers' culture palace at the side of the Shenzhen Theater, was on "Oppose the British, Resist Violence" (some say it was on the "four greats," i.e. Mao Zedong being great teacher, great leader, great supreme commander and great helmsman, as advocated by Lin Biao at the time of the cultural revolution). The special cases team was sure that the fire was an act of sabotage by the enemy and launched an investigation.

The case of the white pig was even more complex and peculiar and of a much wider scope. In 1967 there had been border conflicts between Shenzhen and Hong Kong with hot arguments from both sides. On 15 October 1967, a conflict occurred between the Hong Kong police stationed at Wenjindu and a group of peasants from Shenzhen. After a certain turmoil, a 37-year old high-ranking British inspector of the Hong Kong police force was found mightily standing on Chinese territory. As a result, he was seized by the Shenzhen forces and arrested. In that year, the Hong Kong Leftists were launching their "Oppose Britain, Resist Violence" struggle (in Hong Kong officially called riots or violence), when they referred to the "British colonial rulers" as "white pigs." Now it is said that the arrested inspector, Frank Knight, was a very stout man, and he was therefore of course called a white pig. After the incident, the British diplomatic mission in Beijing protested to the Chinese authorities. It is also said that the Hong Kong government tried to take up contact with the Hong Kong Leftists, hoping to arrange a "deal," and get the arrested inspector back on an exchange (during the riots the Hong Kong government had arrested a number of Leftists and sentenced them to imprisonment). Surprisingly,

"the willow secretly blossomed forth," and 36 days after his arrest the heavily guarded Frank Night mysteriously regained his freedom and returned to British territory. How he got free is a riddle that gives people food for thought. This big case later got several thousand people of Shenzhen into trouble. None who only has had a glimpse of the white pig was spared, and many who had never seen the white pig became implicated.

Because of these three big cases, no less than 5,000 people in Shenzhen were arrested. Under the rigorous methods of Zhang Jingyao, many were cruelly beaten and forced to confess. Zhang himself once interrogated the driver of the county party commissioner and forced him to confess having aided in the escape of the white pig. During the proceedings of the special cases, over 30 persons were listed to be executed, many who could not stand the methods of the special cases teams committee suicide, many more were cruelly imprisoned and had for a long time to bear the shameful label of ignominy. Due to the importance of the cases, there were later repercussions in the central authorities. In 1975 a rehabilitation was ordered in the three cases, and in 1978 a thorough rehabilitation was proclaimed. On that occasion the Chinese communist authorities said the cases had been false. The fire at the Exhibition Hall was explained as due to an electric shortcircuit. The case of the Anti-communist Save-the-Nation Corps was the result of confessions by compulsion, however, the case of the white pig has never been explained. During the rehabilitation proceedings, many people of Shenzhen demanded to bring back Zhang Jingyao to assuage public indignation, which finally brought out the county party commissioner who for good or for worse settled the matter in a way that left is unsettled.

Hatchet Man and Pitiful Creatures

Under Zhang Jingyao's rule, another man who left a deep impression was Ni Mingyu [0242 2494 3768], at that time commander of the armed units of Baoan County and concurrently member of the party's standing committee of Baoan County and chairman of the military control committee of Baoan. As the capable hatchet man for Zhang Jingyao, Ni zealously participated in the above-mentioned three big cases. After the downfall of Lin Biao, this man was not chased from office, but on the contrary promoted to become deputy commander of the Huaiyang military subdistrict.

At the time when they were all-powerful, Ni Mingyu worked on quite a number of pitiful creatures, some of them, the same as Ni, PLA men with the shining red star on their caps. One of a comparatively higher status among them was Li Fulin [2621 1381 2651]. Before liberation, at age 15, he had become a "little red devil" [member of the communist youth corps] and at age 19 he had already become political commissar of an armed work unit. After liberation, he came south and stayed in Guangdong. At the time of the cultural revolution he was deputy secretary at the Huiyang prefectural party committee, and at the time of the four clean-ups he was secretary of the Baoan County party committee. In his wildest dreams he would never have thought that he would finally end up being imprisoned by his own fellow officers.

In the accusations against Li Fulin, the crime mentioned was that he once followed the Liu Shaoqi line in promoting the "three freedoms and one contract." Another crime was that he had relied on Hong Kong to build up Baoan. It was Ni Mingyu who sent him to prison and had him handcuffed. Once, when Ni inspected the place of detention, Li Fulin thought, since they both had been fellow workers, he could ask Ni to somewhat loosen the handcuffs on his wrists. Without even a snort from Ni, the personnel that had followed him reacted to the facial expression of their superior and indicated to Li to stretch out his arms. How could Li know that that man would grab the handcuffs and press them hard, so that they would be even tighter. Li suffered terrible pain and could not help heaving a deep sigh: never could he have expected that a person who joined the revolution when he was 15 would be receiving this kind of treatment in a communist prison.

Some Southern Tyrants, Some Soft-Hearted Persons

Because power was in their hands, and in their belief that once power was held, it must also be used, many large and small "southern tyrants" emerged during the time of the military controls. There was a military man by the name of Lin. He was transferred to Shenzhen only at the end of the time of the class purification contingents in 1969 and was a clerical worker in a military training regiment. He misused his powers to seduce a few girl students. This came out a few months later and he was hurriedly transferred away.

There was another military man by the name of Qiu who was in charge of certain "counterrevolutionary" cases. The people who were "processed" by him remember clearly that he not only frequently labeled people as criminals but also gave orders to beat them. His creed was that the slogan "verbal struggle, not violent struggle" does not apply to misbehaving diehards. He was later demobilized and stayed on in Baoan.

However, the PLA men are also human and human beings are always contradictory and complex, and of many kinds. In those days, there was a certain battalion political instructor, the deputy regimental commander of a certain training regiment in Shenzhen. In his strict and harsh ways he was not amenable to reason and made people fear and hate him. Nevertheless, he was opposed to excessive criticism and denunciation. At the time of the class purification contingents, because he once opposed the punishment of a man by the training regiment, he was transferred to Guangzhou. On his departure he told the people who sent him off as a last message that he had no strength to help them and they better be careful.

Another political instructor of a training regiment had on several occasions protected students with somewhat unsatisfactory family backgrounds. Later he met on the street some people who had been arrested during the time of the military control, had been released, but still had their labels as criminals not yet removed. Everyone would generally have greeted them and kept away from further contact with them, or even would have given them as wide a berth as possible, but he still shook hands with them and jovially chatted with them.

The cultural revolution, however, has greatly changed the opinion of the people about the PLA. Before the cultural revolution, people were not familiar with them and had a certain respect for them. During the cultural revolution it was fear; after the cultural revolution they had nothing good to say about them.

In Shenzhen the lack of understanding between the army and the people was of long standing. The common people have always felt that members of military units are something special, or perhaps more accurately, that they had special privileges. For instance, they paid half fare on the means of transportation, they need not line up when buying movie theater tickets--a preferential treatment according to notices pasted outside the theaters.

After the gang of four, there was a certain change in the situation. When more troops were demobilized, a certain demobilized officer returned to Shenzhen. He was a native of Baoan and had served on Hainan, reaching the rank of battalion commander. He returned to his native place to take up a civilian occupation and became one of the managers of a construction company. Nobody knew then whether he actually knew anything of the business, but he was anyway supported by that unit.

Contacts Between Visitors From Hong Kong and the Border Inspection Units

The men of whom people from Hong Kong gain most of their impressions, I believe, are not some of the above-mentioned types. As far as the visitors are concerned, those who want to visit their native places or the visitors from Hong Kong who pass the Luohu Bridge, they gain their main impression from the PLA men with whom they come into unavoidable contact at the Jiulong customs. And then again, there are the border defense units of whom people think with a lingering fear after they have smuggled themselves into Hong Kong. At the time before "wrongdoers were left a way out," the border defense units were quite rough with "supervisory soldiers" who tried to secretly cross over into Hong Kong.

As to the PLA at the customs points, what most attracts the attention of Hong Kong visitors in general is their northern accent. Their status is that of border defense force members, but different from the ordinary units, their duty is to check travellers' papers. In the past, they had to write out an introductory certificate for a visit to one's native place, now they have to check the permits for the return to people's native places. Most of them are not Cantonese, at least none come from Baoan County or nearby. The men of the border inspection units are professional soldiers on pay. Their uniforms generally have four pockets and that is the outfit of platoon leaders and higher ranks in the army. The women among them are military personnel selected from nursing schools, because being transferred to an important place like the Jiulong customs requires that special demands be made as to their ideology, class status and background.

The personnel who check traveller's baggage belong to the customs administration and are not part of the military. The present naval personnel have had training in the customs schools, however, at the time of the cultural revolution, it was necessary to belong to the "five categories of red elements" to be employed in the customs service. There are of course cases where the checking is again done by PLA personnel, but if the PLA do the checking, it is not a small matter, because the customs check to prevent smuggling, but the PLA check to guard against secret agents.

After the proclamation of opening Shenzhen as a special economic zone, Shenzhen has already changed from an alert and rigid border defense to an outpost that as much as possible has contacts with and mixes with the capitalist world. It looks that it must be after cautious consideration and painstaking arrangement, that the PLA men are hardly visible in the special zone. At present, they are only at the second defense line on guard and patrol duty.

Some day, after the 3,000 or 5,000 PLA men will be ordered to garrison Hong Kong, that special administrative zone, as chairman Deng Xiaoping said, in order to manifest the recovery of sovereignty, one wonders whether out of cautious consideration and by painstaking arrangements they will as far as possible also be concealed in order not to irritate the sensitive nerves of the people of Hong Kong?

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